Iraq, Afghanistan and the future of British military doctrine: from counterinsurgency to Stabilization

Abstract

After nearly a decade of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, it is unsurprising that both the UK and US militaries have drawn heavily on their experiences to inform new doctrine. Recent British and American doctrinal developments have attempted to rationalize intervention, combining elements of counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, peace support and state-building in a way that reflects their experiences in these seemingly intractable conflicts. The UK response, JDP 3-40. Security and Stabilisation: the military contribution, 1 is a bold attempt to expand the horizons of operational military doctrine by articulating a holistic, politically focused strategic approach to intervention. This article explores the issues raised by the creation of Stabilization doctrine, setting it in political and strategic context, analysing its key features, and examining its relationship with and impact on related British and US doctrine. 2 It concludes by discussing the obstacles that Stabilization must overcome if it is to make a major contribution to the military's ability to undertake such interventions and posing broader questions about the proper function of military doctrine.In essence, Security and Stabilisation reveals as much about the frictions between policy direction, strategy formulation and doctrinal development as it does about the lessons learned by the British military in Iraq and Afghanistan. In this document the challenges of policy, strategy and military operations are inextricably interwoven, creating a hybrid piece of doctrine simultaneously worthy of great praise for its ambition and flawed by that ambition. Paradoxically, the panoramic scope of the doctrine exposes an inherent tension between the necessity for unambiguous operational guidance for military officers engaged in stabilization and the desire to communicate the complexity of a comprehensive strategy for stabilization. To understand the ways in which this affects the utility of British Stabilization doctrine, one must first grasp the context in which it evolved.

Military doctrine, command philosophy and the generation of fighting power: genesis and theory

“…81 In a perceptive examination of British doctrine in Iraq and Afghanistan, no reference was made to the kind of command philosophy that was being applied to these two operations: 'This disquiet was twofold: first there was frustration born of the lack of strategic direction in Iraq and Afghanistan; second there was a palpable loss of confidence in the robustness of the doctrinal foundations supporting British military operations.' 82 The relationship between doctrine and command philosophy contributes greatly to the ability, as stated at the beginning of this article, to create a force multiplier effect. 'If doctrine is the epoxy the commander's way of command in the circumstances is the hardener.'…”

Cultural Awareness in Peace Operations: Effective Marketing or Strategic Communications

“…Western militaries are called to adjust to such controversial tasks which although have been recognized as important, they are proved extremely difficult to be implemented in practice (Griffin, 2011). As Haddad advocates, the French military has already incorporated the notion into the French National Security Strategy, yet this is a difficult task to be implemented fully in practice.…”

Organizing for Counter-insurgency: Explaining Doctrinal Adaptation in Britain and Germany

“…26 The 2007 counter-insurgency amendment was followed by the November 2009 release of Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 3-40, Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution, which provides an operational-level doctrine within which army tactical-level COIN doctrine is situated. 27 The doctrine tackles higher-level operational issues which received less attention in the 2007 British COIN manual. JDP 3-40 identifies the need for the military to deliver, assist and enable across three stabilization tasks designed to enhance the influence of military forces within the host government, competing elites and wider population: building human and national security; fostering host government capacity and legitimacy; and stimulating economic and infrastructure development.…”