Irrigation and Society in Medieval Valencia

Glick, Thomas F.

doi:10.4159/harvard.9780674281806

Cited by 206 publications

(90 citation statements)

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“…As noted by Anderson and Maass (1978) and Glick (1967), punishment was progressive: recidivists received more severe punishment than first time offenders. Fines for recidivists varied between 20 and 25 pesetas in Mula.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 88%

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Let the Punishment Fit the Criminal

Donna

Esppn-SSnchez

2014

SSRN Journal

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We investigate the role of punishment progressivity and individual characteristics in the determination of crime. To analyze welfare implications we model individuals' response to judges' optimal punishment in a dynamic setting. We introduce two distinctive features motivated by our empirical setting. First, judges rarely imposes maximum punishment for first time offenders. Instead, we observe low fines (or just a warning) even when crime detection technology is efficient and punishment is not costly. We account for this by allowing an unobservable (to the judge) individual state to be correlated with a public signal (the environment). This generates an optimal punishment that is conditional on individual observables. Second, judges punishments follow a progressive system: conditioning on type, recidivists are punished harsher than first-time offenders for the same crime. We account for these dynamics by introducing a persistent unobservable (to the judge) component. Judges update their beliefs about individuals depending on whether they committed a crime in the previous period; this gives rise to progressivity in the optimal punishment system. For the empirical analysis we examine a novel trial data set from a self-governed community of farmers in Southern Spain. We find that judges vary the degree of imposed punishments based on individual characteristics-such as when victims or accused have a Don honorific title indicating they are wealthy. Recidivists are punished harsher than first time offenders.JEL Codes: D44, C13, L14, K14, K42

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 88%

“…Conversely, if fines are low, we would expect high crime rates. However, "the actual fines assessed were very low (a few pennies at the most) and also variable, depending on the gravity of the offense, on general economic conditions, and probably on the individual's ability to pay" (Glick (1967), p. 56).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Let the Punishment Fit the Criminal

Donna

Esppn-SSnchez

2014

SSRN Journal

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“…water in a sustainable manner, or at least allowed the water resource to regenerate itself and did not destroy the natural cycle. In some instances the institutional arrangements concerning water use are said to have been constitutive to those societies; this was the case, for example, in communities in Indonesia (Geertz, 1980), Sri Lanka (Leach, 1961), Tanzania (Gray, 1963), Spain (Glick, 1970), the Netherlands (Schama, 1987;van de Ven, 1993) and the Andes (Zimmerer, 1995). Some other societies that were unable to use the water in a sustainable manner collapsed (e.g.…”

Section: Holocene Water Systemsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolving water science in the Anthropocene

Savenije

Hoekstra

Zaag

2014

Hydrol. Earth Syst. Sci.

143

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Abstract. This paper reviews the changing relation between human beings and water since the Industrial Revolution, a period that has been called the Anthropocene because of the unprecedented scale at which humans have altered the planet during this time. We show how the rapidly changing world urges us to continuously improve our understanding of the complex interactions between humans and the water system. The paper starts by demonstrating that hydrology and the science of managing water resources have played key roles in human and economic development throughout history; yet these roles have often been marginalised or obscured. Knowledge of hydrology and water resources engineering and management helped to transform the landscape, and thus also the very hydrology within catchments itself. It is only fairly recent that water experts have become conscious of such mechanisms, exemplified by several concepts that try to incorporate them -integrated water resources management, eco-hydrology, socio-hydrology. We have reached a stage at which a more systemic understanding of scale interdependencies can inform the sustainable governance of water systems, using new concepts like precipitation sheds, virtual water transfers, water footprints, and water value flow.

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“…Cabe destacar que aunque la organización e instituciones de este sistema de riego ya llamaron la atención a Jaubert de Passa (1823), que transcribió sus ordenanzas. El trabajo de Ostrom sobre los regadíos valencianos se basa en los estudios previos de Maass y Anderson (1978), y Glick (1970). No obstante, algunas características que Ostrom identifica como principios de gestión en el caso de la huerta de valencia, han sido discutidas a la luz de otros trabajos históricos (Garrido, 2011a(Garrido, , 2012.…”

Section: Introductionunclassified

Expansión del regadío tradicional y control local en la Real Acequia de Moncada

Martínez¹,

Reig²,

Palau-Salvador³

2014

Proceedings - Irrigation, Society and Landscape. Tribute to Thomas F. Glick

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Resumen. Son numerosos los ejemplos de sistemas de riego que han sido capaces de auto-gestionar el agua como un recurso comunal a largo plazo y en condiciones de marcada escasez, entre ellos el de la Comunidad de Regantes de la Real Acequia de Moncada (RAM), con 5000 ha y 13000 propietarios que gestionan de forma colectiva los recursos hídricos del río Turia. Ostrom (1990), basándose en el caso de la Huerta de Valencia, propuso varios principios asociados al éxito de la gestión comunal. El objetivo de este trabajo es revisar dos de ellos (a) la existencia de límites claramente definidos y (b) la capacidad de los usuarios de modificar las normas de operación, para el caso de la RAM, basándonos en la consulta de archivos históricos. Los resultados muestran que, pese a que el espacio regado no ha permanecido totalmente constante, sí que han existido unos límites prefijados que han permitido mantener una relación entre tierra regable y disponibilidad de recursos que se ha adaptado a las necesidades de los usuarios y donde es destacable la importancia de la gestión y toma de decisiones a escala local.Palabras clave: riego, gestión colectiva, expansión del riego, derechos de riego, extremal.Abstract. There are wide arrays of examples of irrigation systems that have been able to self-manage water as a common resource in the long term and in severe scarcity conditions. One of them is the Real Acequia de Moncada (RAM) Irrigators Community, with 5000 ha and 13000 owners who collectively manage water resources from the Turia River. Ostrom (1990), based in the case of the Huerta of Valencia, proposed several principles associated to the success of collective management. The objective of this work is to analyze two of them for the case of the RAM, (a) the presence of clearly defined boundaries and (b) capacity of users to modify operational rules. We contrast these principles with the information of historical archives. We show that limits have existed, allowing maintaining a relation between irrigated land and resources, and adapting to users' needs. Local management and decision making has been also of remarkable importance.

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Irrigation and Society in Medieval Valencia

Cited by 206 publications

References 0 publications

Let the Punishment Fit the Criminal

Let the Punishment Fit the Criminal

Evolving water science in the Anthropocene

Expansión del regadío tradicional y control local en la Real Acequia de Moncada

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