Is addiction a myth? Donald Davidson’s solution to the problem of akrasia says not*

Abstract

An obvious problem for the concept of addiction is its portrayal as involving involuntary behavior in the face of the addict's intentional actions. This has led some writers to call addiction a myth and to describe the self-labeling of persons as addicts as an illustration of causal attribution. We argue that this position is seriously mistaken. We propose that it is possible to construct a meaningful concept of addiction without assuming it involves completely involuntary behavior and to do so within the language of agents engaging in intentional action. One way of doing so arises from the work of Donald Davidson (1917Davidson ( -2003, particularly his essay "How is weakness of the will possible?" (Davidson, 1969). Davidson proposes a solution to the classic philosophical problem (called the problem of akrasia or incontinence) of how it is logically possible for someone to perform an action against her better judgement, and his solution is relevant to an understanding of addiction (i.e., addiction is a class of akratic action). Thus, Davidson's solution to this philosophical problem is also an answer to the question of how it is possible to understand addiction without assuming it entails completely involuntary behavior. At the same time, Davidson's conclusion at the end of his essay-that the akrates cannot give a reason for preferring incontinent over continent action-suggests what addicts mean when they say they feel compelled to behave the way they do.

Is the concept of compulsion useful in the explanation or description of addictive behaviour and experience?

“…This raises an interesting possibility. In a discussion of the work of the American philosopher, Donald Davidson and of the idea that addiction can be fruitfully seen as a form of akrasia (i.e., weakness of will), Heather and Segal (2015) end by repeating Davidson’ conclusion that the akrates (and therefore the addict) does not have a reason for preferring the akratic action to action based on an all-things-considered judgement about what it would be better to do; she cannot therefore tell us or herself why she broke her resolution to refrain from behaviour she knows to be ill-advised. Heather and Segal continue: This (not having a reason for the breakdown of a resolution) may also represent a sense in which the addict reports feeling compelled to engage in addictive behaviour—the subjective sense of not being able to understand one's past behaviour and therefore feeling that one must have been driven by some extrapersonal force to carry it out.…”

“… 8 Other research by Davies and his colleagues supports the view that what people say about drug use very much depends on whom they are talking to and in what context rather than reflecting any underlying objective state, neurophysiological, socio-psychological, or otherwise. See Heather & Segal (2015 , p.79). …”

Problem gambling—a Lacanian Real

“…If not, how is this lack of knowledge experienced and handled in households? Although the hidden and incomprehensible aspects of "addictions" have been reported in previous studies (e.g., Heather & Segal, 2015;Rantala & Sulkunen, 2011;Room et al, 2015), they have seldom been the subject of research. However, some explanations have been given.…”

The images theory of addiction

“…Satisfaction of an addicted desire becomes its own function and its sole meaning (de-semiosis). It is commonly observed that addicts either do not understand themselves at all (Chantal, Vallerand &, Valliers, 1995;Davidson, 1980;see also Borch, 2015, andHeather &Segal, 2015), or they explain their behavior by actor-observer biases. Even the pleasure is often no longer there (Koski-Jännes, 2004).…”