Is Bigger Better? Activity and Success in Negotiations in the United Nations General Assembly

Abstract

Theorists often claim that being bigger than one's counterparts offers advantages in multilateral negotiations. In this article, I examine that argument using data from negotiations in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). The article analyzes and compares the activity levels of smaller and larger states in international negotiations, and sheds light on the conditions under which the latter “punch below their weight.” My analysis indicates that size directly affects participation, but not success rates. Bigger states can better formulate national positions on a broad range of issues, enabling their diplomats to more actively participate in negotiations, while smaller states are absent more often. Activity is conducive to success, which helps bigger states. But not every negotiation strategy is equally effective. In the UNGA's one‐state, one‐vote context, bigger states are not able to systematically exert disproportionate influence despite their often superior financial resources and bargaining strategies.

Persuading the Giant? Explaining Eastern Partnership States’ (Unexpected) Negotiation Success in Relations with the European Union

“…As outlined in the introduction, factors linked to changes in the domestic or international context cannot fully account for the rather sudden concession offers by the EU within relatively stable domestic contexts and geopolitical parameters. The article therefore draws on negotiation theory, which emphasizes the dynamics of and within negotiation processes, with a focus on international and regional intergovernmental organizations (Panke 2013a,b;Panke 2014), as well as negotiations between the member state governments in the EU (Panke 2010;Naurin 2015). While duly acknowledging the complexity of the literature, we can distinguish two broad schools of thought to explain negotiation success: The first approach, around which the vast majority of analyses cluster, focuses on material factors related to size, administrative and financial capacities and hard bargaining leverage.…”

“…More specifically, the article operationalizes negotiation theory, which captures the role of factors, such as expertise and persuasion in negotiation strategies and processes (Zartman & Rubin 2009;Panke 2010Panke , 2014Risse 2000;Checkel 2002). While dynamics of persuasion are well-conceptualized in the literature on international negotiation (Grobe 2010), the concept of manipulation has received less attention.…”

Foreign policy change and international norms: a conceptual framework

“…Again, these domestic features recall Hermann's (1990) leaders, bureaucracy, and domestic restructuring as drivers of FPC. At the international level, politics consists of international negotiating dynamics, where states may be lobbied by non-state actors such as multi-national corporations (MNCs), civil-society organizations (CSOs), international bureaucrats, or other states that may employ incentive or sanction techniques to secure a favored negotiation outcome (Panke, 2013(Panke, , 2014.…”

The Rational Design of Relations Between Intergovernmental Organizations

“…Some international institutions may benefit the interests of specific groups of member states leading to a situation of 'contested multilateralism' (Morse and Keohane 2014; Urpelainen and Van de Graaf, 2015). Even if institutions grant states equal opportunities, variation in their unilateral resources allows some to benefit more than others (Panke 2013(Panke , 2014Dijkstra 2015).…”