2018
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3193576
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Is Blockchain the Death of Antitrust Law? The Blockchain Antitrust Paradox

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Cited by 13 publications
(8 citation statements)
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“…Besides the mentioned alternative forms of power to facilitate indirect governance for sustainability and balance power asymmetries, digital platform technologies enabling disintermediation could also be seen as an alternative promoting non-mediated forms of power by building on transparency, traceability and trust (Saberi et al, 2019). The case of blockchain governance illustrates the potential of diminishing the power of governing actors and replacing it with trust through anonymity and immutability (Schrepel, 2019b). In the fashion industry, blockchain technology can block nefarious agents and hold the corrupt accountable for social and environmental misconduct (Saberi et al, 2019).…”
Section: 3mentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…Besides the mentioned alternative forms of power to facilitate indirect governance for sustainability and balance power asymmetries, digital platform technologies enabling disintermediation could also be seen as an alternative promoting non-mediated forms of power by building on transparency, traceability and trust (Saberi et al, 2019). The case of blockchain governance illustrates the potential of diminishing the power of governing actors and replacing it with trust through anonymity and immutability (Schrepel, 2019b). In the fashion industry, blockchain technology can block nefarious agents and hold the corrupt accountable for social and environmental misconduct (Saberi et al, 2019).…”
Section: 3mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Considering highly competitive markets with standardized products and services, transaction cost theory sees efficiency gains by entering interorganizational arrangements, mainly through the cooperation with external, mediating partners to achieve lower costs (Halldorsson et al, 2007). While mediation, such as through blockchains, may reduce transactional costs (Schrepel, 2019b), it provides only a limited view on reaching holistic sustainability goals. While previous research found evidence that stakeholder pressure and SSCM both contribute to an organization's sustainability performance, a nuanced view of how intense pressures should be is relatively rare (Wolf, 2014).…”
Section: Theoretical Implicationsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…For example, some authors argue that blockchain makes anti-trust law as we know it unusable because the very concept of blockchain as a trustguaranteeing technology contrasts with a legal area that intends to regulate anti-trust. 129 Nevertheless, the blockchain and competition law frameworks are striving for the same goal, namely decentralisation. Therefore, technology and law should work hand in hand instead of against each other, according to the approach of a regulation of and with blockchain.…”
Section: Competition Lawmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The city functions as a marketplace; through blockchain technology it allows people-the participant-to communicate, to trade and to earn external reputation (see https://swarm.city). 48 Schiller (2018), Savelyev (2017), Rühl (2019), Di Ciommo (2018, Woebbeking (2019), Schrepel (2019), Levi and Lipton (2018) and Mik (2017). 49 See The LAO (2019a, b).…”
Section: Daos: Nature and Governancementioning
confidence: 99%
“…2 DiMatteo et al. (2019), Schrepel (2019), Szostek (2019) and Kraus et al (2019). 3 Natarajan H et al, Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT) and blockchain, mber 2017.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%