Is consciousness reflexively self‐aware? A Buddhist analysis

Abstract

This article examines contemporary Buddhist defences of the idea that consciousness is reflexively aware or self‐aware. Call this the Self‐Awareness Thesis. A version of this thesis was historically defended by Dignāga but rejected by Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamika Buddhists. Prāsaṅgikas invoke a distinction between two truths or realities; they deny an ultimate reality but admit the use of conventional frameworks. This article asks whether some contemporary account can withstand Prāsaṅgika critique and be accepted as conventionally true. It analyses the commitments of contemporary versions of the Self‐Awareness Thesis into a fourfold taxonomy with distinct assessment criteria and shows how each can withstand four of the most prominent Prāsaṅgika objections. This article also discusses subtle differences in Prāsaṅgika criteria for distinguishing conventional truth and falsity and concludes by demonstrating that some defenses of the Self‐Awareness Thesis can provisionally satisfy some Prāsaṅgika criteria for conventional truth.

Minimal phenomenal experience

“…At the same time one can now make sense of the idea of how it might occur in dreamless deep sleep, namely, as an"island of awareness" the content of which "is not shaped by sensory input from either the external world or the body and which cannot be expressed via motor output" (Bayne, Seth, & Mas-simini, 2019, p. 7). The possibility of a fundamental, non-egoic form of reflexivity built into consciousness itself has been discussed for centuries by Buddhist philosophers (Finnigan, 2018;Williams, 1998). Following Brentano's classical idea of a single state simultaneously directed at an intentional object and itself (Brentano, 1874(Brentano, /1973(Brentano, , p. 153, 2012, many fine-grained conceptual models have been developed in more recent analytical philosophy of mind (Montague, 2016, Chapter 3, 2017Peters, 2013), and the issue is currently attracting a lot of attention (Ganeri, 2017;Josipovic, 2019;Kriegel, 2019;Strawson, 2017;Thompson, 2011).…”

Karma, Moral Responsibility, and Buddhist Ethics

“…Contemporary scholars treat Mādhyamikas as holding that there is no ultimate reality, there is no ultimately true reductive base for an analysis of persons, but that 'our conventional or customary standards of rational acceptance are the only game in town' (Siderits 1989: 238). 16 Yogācārins, by contrast, are traditionally read as proposing some form of metaphysical idealism, in terms of which considerations of personal identity are analysed as mere reifications of the structural features of (at least some mode of) consciousness (Finnigan 2017b;2018b). 17…”

Minimal Phenomenal Experience

“…If there was such an intrinsic, and fundamental form of reflexivity, then one could imagine it either as co-existing with specific content or as a pure stand-alone phenomenon. The issue of a fundamental, non-egoic form of reflexivity built into consciousness itself has been discussed for centuries by Buddhist philosophers (Finnigan, 2018;Williams, 1998) and, following Brentano's classical idea of a single state simultaneously directed at an intentional object and itself (Brentano, 1973(Brentano, , 153p, 2012, many fine-grained conceptual models have been developed in more recent analytical philosophy of mind (Peters, 2013). Currently, the issue is increasingly gaining attention (Kriegel 2019, Thompson 2011, Ganeri 2018, Zosipovic 2019.…”