Is Distributed Cognition Group Level Cognition?

Ludwig, Kirk

doi:10.1515/jso-2015-0001

Cited by 11 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 21 publications

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“…Viewing from the socio-cultural perspective, the development of group cognition requires students to synergistically coordinate social, behavioral, and cognitive activities in order to collectively solve problems, construct knowledge artifacts, and advance group knowledge (Akkerman et al, 2007;Ludwig, 2015;Stahl, 2009). Unlike most previous work that defines and investigates group cognition from the qualitative, phenomenological perspective, this research proposes a quantitative measure equation based on an operationalizable working definition to analyze group cognition, which is further complemented with the qualitative, temporal microanalysis of group fragments.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The coordination of those two dimensions triggers the development of internalized team knowledge (the collective knowledge held in the individual minds of team members) and externalized team knowledge (facts or concepts explicitly agreed upon by team members). Although those concepts argue that group cognition is a complex, multidimensional, and multilevel phenomenon which cannot be simply attributed to the aggregation of individuals' contributions (Akkerman et al, 2007;Ludwig, 2015;Stahl, 2009), very few studies have proposed operationalizable working definition of group cognition to ground further analysis of empirical research.…”

Section: Review Of the Relevant Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

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Development of Group Cognition in Online Collaborative Problem-Solving Processes

Ouyang

Ling

Jiao

2021

Journal of Educational Computing Research

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Group cognition is a cognitive science concept that studies how groups think, learn, and work. Most research investigates group cognition as a qualitative-oriented phenomenon. From a quantitative perspective, this research proposes a measure equation of group cognition, conducts empirical research during online collaborative problem-solving, and uses multiple quantitative methods to examine group cognition complemented with qualitative microanalysis. Specifically, social network analysis, behavioral pattern analysis, and quantitative content analysis are used to measure three groups’ group cognition. Results show that only one group successfully develops group cognition through synergistic coordination of social, behavioral, and cognitive activities. Students in the other two groups either take separate responsibilities to cooperate or have unequal participations, which indicates an inadequacy of group cognition. The extent that three groups develop group cognition is consistent with the order of groups’ final performance scores. Research analytical and pedagogical implications are provided to advance research and practice of group cognition.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Review Of the Relevant Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Development of Group Cognition in Online Collaborative Problem-Solving Processes

Ouyang

Ling

Jiao

2021

Journal of Educational Computing Research

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“…Other proponents of a realism of group agency are Theiner et al (2010) who argue for a realism about group cognitive states. In what set off a subsequent dispute with Ludwig (2015), Theiner et al argue that well-established models explaining individual cognitive behavior can be applied to collective systems. They suggest that to settle the question of whether groups have minds "[w]e should … be asking whether specific cognitive models that work at the level of individuals also work at the level of groups."…”

Section: My Emphasis)mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Similarly, Ludwig (2015) responds to Theiner et al (2010) that their arguments "so obviously fail" and are "question begging" and seeks to register a "terminological drift or sliding" in their arguments. My diagnosis of this situation is that Theiner et al operate with the theory-commitments view, whereas Ludwig assumes a truthmaker view of existence.…”

Section: Eliminativism: Ludwig and Rupertmentioning

confidence: 99%

Existence, really? Tacit disagreements about “existence” in disputes about group minds and corporate agents

Himmelreich

2019

Synthese

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A central dispute in social ontology concerns the existence of group minds and actions. I argue that some authors in this dispute rely on rival views of existence without sufficiently acknowledging this divergence. I proceed in three steps in arguing for this claim. First, I define the phenomenon as an implicit higher-order disagreement by drawing on an analysis of verbal disputes. Second, I distinguish two theories of existencethe theorycommitments view and the truthmaker viewin both their eliminativist and their constructivist variants. Third, I examine individual contributions to the dispute about the existence of group minds and actions to argue that these contributions have an implicit higher-order disagreement. This paper serves two purposes. First, it is a study to apply recent advances in meta-ontology. Second, it contributes to the debate on social ontology by illustrating how meta-ontology matters for social ontology.

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“…At first glance, it is not entirely implausible that reasons can be distributed. Some think that groups can have distributed reasons for a group-based belief (for an overview and criticism, see Ludwig 2015). Consider a group of trans* people who (as a group) believe that trans* people should have a right to use the bathroom designated for the gender with which they identify.…”

Section: Why Perceptual Reasons For Beliefs Cannot Be Preserved Diach...mentioning

confidence: 99%

The real epistemic significance of perceptual learning

Brogaard

Gatzia

2017

Inquiry

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In 'The Epistemic Significance of Perceptual Learning' (this issue) Elijah Chudnoff argues that cases from perceptual learning show that perception not only generates reasons for beliefs but also preserves those reasons over time in perceptual learning cases. In this paper, we dispute the idea that perceptual learning enables the preservation of perceptual reasons. We then argue for an alternative view, viz. the view that perceptual learning is epistemically significant insofar as it modifies our perceptual system in such a way as to make us capable of perceiving subtle low-level properties (e.g. lightness) and high-level properties (e.g. chess configurations). Acquiring the capacity to perceive these properties is what enables us to achieve expertise in a variety of subject matters (e.g. chicken sexing, chess playing, language fluency). Along the way, we argue against two main points in Chudnoff's paper. The first is that, pace Chudnoff, perceptual learning does not result in the acquisition of new facts. It only results in the acquisition of a new perceptual capacity. The second is that experiences resulting from perceptual learning can always serve as immediate justifiers of beliefs and hence do not need supporting background information in order to serve as reasons.

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Is Distributed Cognition Group Level Cognition?

Cited by 11 publications

References 21 publications

Development of Group Cognition in Online Collaborative Problem-Solving Processes

Development of Group Cognition in Online Collaborative Problem-Solving Processes

Existence, really? Tacit disagreements about “existence” in disputes about group minds and corporate agents

The real epistemic significance of perceptual learning

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