Is dyads’ behaviour conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment

Morone, Andrea; Temerario, Tiziana

doi:10.1016/j.socec.2018.02.001

Cited by 3 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 17 publications

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“…This technique shed light on the predominance of conditional cooperators among the distribution of social preferences confirmed in a wide range of context: cultural factors across three continents (Kocher et al., 2008) and Russian versus Swiss individuals (Herrmann & Thöni, 2009); children samples (Hermes et al., 2020); dyad decision‐making (Morone & Temerario, 2018); repeated game (Fischbacher & Gäther, 2010); punishment (Weber et al., 2018); known and unknown probabilities (Fischbacher et al., 2014).…”

Section: State Of the Artmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Fischbacher, Gäther, and Ferh ((2001); from now on FGF) have shown that most subjects behave as conditional cooperators, moving against theoretical prediction. This work has been widely extended to test the robustness of the results for cultural factors (Kocher et al., 2008), in a dyad decision‐making environment (Morone & Temerario, 2018), trust (Makowsky et al., 2014) and under punishment constraints (Weber et al., 2018). Thus, their methodology has been established as a robust approach to elicit social preferences.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Do risk and competition trigger conditional cooperation? Evidence from public good experiments

Bergantino

Gil-Gallen

Morone

2021

Ann Public Coop Econ

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We investigate the effect of intra‐group competition and risk marginal per capita returns on subjects' cooperative behavior in a one‐shot public good game—following the well‐known approach proposed by Fischbacher, Gächter, and Fehr (2001) and extending the Colasante et al. (2018, 2019) parametrization. We study the interaction between environment and social preferences and test the existence of a causal relationship of risk and competition over cooperative behavior when an individual's benefit of the public good is heterogeneous and uncertain. Our results report experimental evidence about competition fostering cooperative behavior leading to a rise in contribution for all the subjects regardless of their social preferences. However, risk has a detrimental effect on cooperative behavior due to encouraging free riding.

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Section: State Of the Artmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Do risk and competition trigger conditional cooperation? Evidence from public good experiments

Bergantino

Gil-Gallen

Morone

2021

Ann Public Coop Econ

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“…There is a large literature around cooperation and reciprocity, mostly concluding that people when in groups behave more selfishly than when they make decisions individually (selfish shift). Morone and Temerario (2018) analyzed dyads (group of two strangers) strategies in a one-shot public goods game. Employing a variation of the strategy-method they recorded larger self-regarding behavior of dyads rather than individuals and a larger share of free riders when the decision units were dyads.…”

Section: Game Schematic Descriptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Morone and Temerario (2018) analyzed dyads (group of two strangers) strategies in a one-shot public goods game. Employing a variation of the strategy-method they recorded larger self-regarding behavior of dyads rather than individuals and a larger share of free riders when the decision units were dyads.…”

Section: The Tv Show Description and Research Hypothesismentioning

confidence: 99%

Deal or No Deal: comparing individual and group choices in a risky context

Morone

Santorsola²,

Tiranzoni³

2022

JES

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PurposeThe authors believe that comparing individuals to groups' decision making is crucial provided that many important choices in society are made by groups, i.e. committees, governing bodies, juries, business partners and families. This study aims to discuss the aforementioned topic.Design/methodology/approachThe authors analyze risky decision making in the context of the television game show Deal or No Deal – Italian edition. Specifically, the authors scrutinize and compare individual (standard “Deal or No Deal” edition) and group (special edition) choices in the risky choice context provided by programe.FindingsAfter analyzing contestant's behavior in the standard edition episodes plus a special edition the authors calculate a risk index observing that no statically significant difference is present between individuals' and groups' actions.Originality/valueIn the “Deal or No Deal” special edition contestant were groups of two strangers. It is not uncommon to have couples playing on TV, however the individuals usually know each other well and have relationships in real life. The special edition therefore provides a unique setting (absent to best of the authors’ knowledge in the literature) for investigation and could offer real-world insight. Indeed, in many instances the authors have to contract/make decisions with people the authors do not know/know very little (i.e. occasional business partners, representative at other companies/institutions, insurance/finance advisors, new work colleagues, etc.).

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“…In the standard setting of a public good game (PGG, henceforth), players simultaneously decide how much to contribute to the public good and, as a result, they face the natural uncertainty due to uncertainty on others' behavior (Messick et al [1988]) at the moment of deciding whether and how much to contribute. Furthermore, previous related research like Fischbacher and Gächter [2010] and Morone and Temerario [2018], remarks how each subject's preferences are characterized by a different willingness to cooperate. Those papers find subjects behaving as free-riders, subjects that are altruistic and subjects that act as conditional cooperators.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Voluntary contributions in a system with uncertain returns: a case of systemic risk

Colasante

Garcı́a-Gallego

Georgantzı́s

et al. 2019

J Econ Interact Coord

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This paper investigates systemic risk that emerges from the interplay between uncertain returns to individual actions, uncertainty on others' behavior and all this filtered through individual attitudes towards risk. We design a finitely repeated linear public good experiment based on a voluntary contribution mechanism and analyze the effect of risky and uncertain returns on subjects' contributions. Results from a baseline treatment without uncertainty are compared with two risky treatments characterized by different values for the marginal per capita return. In the treatments with risk, subjects are randomly assigned to one out of three feasible marginal per capita returns, independently of what their individual contribution was. Results show that a sufficient level of uncertainty leads to significantly lower individual contributions. Furthermore, in a system with lower contributions due to uncertainty, subjects' risk aversion enhances the systemic risk, leading the system to collapse.

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Is dyads’ behaviour conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment

Cited by 3 publications

References 17 publications

Do risk and competition trigger conditional cooperation? Evidence from public good experiments

Do risk and competition trigger conditional cooperation? Evidence from public good experiments

Deal or No Deal: comparing individual and group choices in a risky context

Voluntary contributions in a system with uncertain returns: a case of systemic risk

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