Is Externalism about Content Inconsistent with Internalism about Justification?

Chase, James

doi:10.1080/713659224

Cited by 10 publications

(13 citation statements)

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“…A straightforward argument for the incompatibilist thesis has been suggested by Bonjour () in a brief passage from which we can, following James Chase (, 237), extract the following line of reasoning: (1)If content externalism is true then there can be an agent S with belief B such that part or all of the content of B is not internally available to S . (2)If agent S with belief B is such that part or all of the content of B is not internally available to S , then the justification relations B stands in with other beliefs of S 's are not internally available to S . (3)If an agent S with belief B is such that the justification relations B stands in with other beliefs of S are not internally available to S , then not all factors relevant to the justification of beliefs of S are internally available to S . …”

Section: Externalism In Philosophy Of Mind and Epistemologymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Bonjour's accessibility argument is a quick way to reach the incompatibilist thesis, but perhaps it is too quick . One charge against the simple accessibility argument, leveled by Chase (, 238), and more recently by Brent Madison (), is that the sense of internal availability (e.g., accessibility) precluded by content externalism in (1) is, as Chase puts it, ‘not the sense of internal availability at issue in characterizing J‐Internalism’. The incompatibilist conclusion (4) thus is dismissed as the product of illicit equivocation.…”

Section: Externalism In Philosophy Of Mind and Epistemologymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Rather, the justification relations that are relevant are those that stand between A* and B*, where A* and B* have the same narrow content as A and B . Thus, as Chase reasons, what would be a factor relevant to Stan's belief B (‘there is water in front of me’) will be that A* beliefs are evidence for B* beliefs, and “ this fact is internally available to S even in evil demon cases .” (Chase , 238) Thus, ( contra (2)), the following conjunction can be true: an agent S with belief B can be such that (i) part or all of the content of B is not internally available to S ; and (ii) yet it is not the case that the justification relations B stands in with other beliefs of S 's are not internally available to S . Thus, as the argument goes, new evil demon cases illuminate why it is that (2) in Bonjour's accessibility argument should be rejected.…”

Section: Externalism In Philosophy Of Mind and Epistemologymentioning

confidence: 99%

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Varieties of Externalism

Carter

Kallestrup

Palermos

et al. 2014

Philosophical Issues

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ABSTRACT. Our aim is to provide a topography of the relevant philosophical terrain with regard to the possible ways in which knowledge can be conceived of as extended. We begin by charting the different types of internalist and externalist proposals within epistemology, and we critically examine the different formulations of the epistemic internalism/externalism debate they lead to. Next, we turn to the internalism/externalism distinction within philosophy of mind and cognitive science. In light of the above dividing lines, we then examine first the extent to which content externalism is compatible with epistemic externalism; second, whether active externalism entails epistemic externalism; and third whether there are varieties of epistemic externalism that are better suited to accommodate active externalism. Finally, we examine whether the combination of epistemic and cognitive externalism is necessary for epistemology and we comment on the potential ramifications of this move for social epistemology and philosophy of science. INTRODUCTIONThe distinction between internalism and externalism is common to both contemporary philosophy of mind and contemporary epistemology, and it is the central topic of ongoing debates in both disciplines. To a certain extent this is unsurprising, given that these two theoretical domains are closely related in that they both focus on the study of cognitive phenomena.Despite the appearance of such common grounds, however, there are several differences between these two fields of study. Arguably, the most important one is that philosophy of mind studies cognition in a more inclusive way, by considering all kinds of mental states and processes (e.g., experience, beliefs, desires, emotions and so on), whereas epistemology focuses on the cognitive process of knowledge-acquisition and its cognates (e.g., belief and justification).Accordingly, it would be unsafe to assume that the internalism/externalism distinction maps on to both disciplines in the exact same way. And, indeed, it doesn't. Briefly stated, on the one hand, the internalism/externalism distinction, as it is normally construed within contemporary epistemology, refers to the debate over whether an agent's justification for believing a proposition p should always be (at least in principle) accessible to him by reflection alone. In other words, epistemic internalists hold that one's justification should always be internal to one's conscious mind, whereas epistemic externalists deny this claim.1 On the other hand, the standard way of thinking about the internalism/externalism debate within philosophy of mind is that internalists hold that cognitive processes and mental states reside exclusively within the agent's head, whereas externalists deny this on multiple grounds and with several degrees of departure from the internalist position.Embodied cognition theorists, for example, hold that several mental processes and states (e.g., experience, emotions and desires) may be constitutively dependent not only on the agent's brain but ...

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Section: Externalism In Philosophy Of Mind and Epistemologymentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Externalism In Philosophy Of Mind and Epistemologymentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Externalism In Philosophy Of Mind and Epistemologymentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Varieties of Externalism

Carter

Kallestrup

Palermos

et al. 2014

Philosophical Issues

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“…4 For more on Putnam's BIV argument, and on the general anti-sceptical consequences of the content externalist approach that he and Davidson propose, see Brueckner (1992a), Christensen (1993), Warfield (1998) and Wright (1994). A very different possible epistemological consequence of content externalism-regarding whether or not it is consistent with epistemological internalism-is explored in Chase (2001), Vahid (2003 and Kallestrup & Pritchard (2004). 5 Critical appraisal of McDowell's response to the sceptic has been fairly limited, though for two interesting-and very recent-discussions of McDowell in this respect, see Macarthur (2003) and Greco (2004).…”

Section: Duncan Pritchardmentioning

confidence: 99%

McDowell on Reasons, Externalism and Scepticism

Pritchard

2003

European J of Philosophy

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“…2 A notable exception is (Bonjour 1992). Bonjour's incompatibilist argument is criticized by James Chase (Chase 2001) who is, in turn, criticized by Anthony Brueckner (2001). Kallestrup and Pritchard cite Bonjour's article as inspiration and claim that their incompatibilist argument "...is not touched by Chase's remarks."…”

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confidence: 98%

Is Internalism About Knowledge Consistent with Content Externalism?

Gerken

2007

Philosophia

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There is widespread suspicion that there is a principled conflict between epistemic internalism and content externalism (or anti-individualism). Despite the prominence of this suspicion, it has rarely been substantiated by explicit arguments. However, Duncan Pritchard and Jesper Kallestrup have recently provided a prima facie argument concluding that internalism about knowledge and externalism about content are incompatible. I criticize the incompatibilist argument and conclude that the purported incompatibility is, at best, prima facie. This is, in part, because several steps in the argument are faulty and, in part, because there are promising responses available to the compatibilists.

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Is Externalism about Content Inconsistent with Internalism about Justification?

Cited by 10 publications

References 1 publication

Varieties of Externalism

Varieties of Externalism

McDowell on Reasons, Externalism and Scepticism

Is Internalism About Knowledge Consistent with Content Externalism?

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