Is France exceptionally irreligious? A comparative test of the cohort replacement theory

Abstract

While scholars have often pointed to the fact that France might be an exceptionally irreligious country, this hypothesis has not yet been tested with longitudinal data; and nor have researchers tried to account for this alleged irreligiosity. The present article tries to fill this gap in the literature by comparing France to other Catholic countries in Western Europe. To do so, we use the Church Attendance and Religious change Pooled European (CARPE) dataset, which to date is the most extensive dataset of church affiliation and church attendance in European countries, as well as International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) data that allow us to measure religious beliefs and make retrospective estimations as far back as the 1910s. We find that (1) France shows significantly lower aggregate religiosity than other Catholic countries in Western Europe, although this difference has diminished in the last few decades; and (2) this low level of religiosity cannot be explained by France-specific period effects operating in the last 40 years. Rather, secularization in France takes the form of cohort replacement, which has led to differences in religiosity between the countries being reproduced from one generation to the other. In other words, France is so irreligious because it began on the path of secular transition earlier or from a lower level than comparable countries.

Modeling Fuzzy Fidelity: Using Microsimulation to Explore Age, Period, and Cohort Effects in Secularization

“…The conclusion of the analysis is secondary. In fact, assuming the kind of S-curve process of decay in religiosity documented in Voas 2009, the model shows that cohort effects supply the best explanation, which is a conclusion broadly favored within the literature (Idler 2021;McAndrew and Richards 2020;Molteni and Biolcati 2018;Stolz, Biolcati, and Molteni 2021;Voas and Chaves 2016;Brauer 2018). But that result should be understood not as an argument for the greater importance of cohort changes so much as validation of a proof-of-concept model with almost unlimited potential for deeper exploration.…”

Individual‐Level Determinants of Religious Intergenerational Transmission: Evidence from Catholic Europe1

“…As mentioned, the cohort replacement perspective argues that more religious older cohorts are gradually being succeeded by less religious young cohorts (Stolz et al. 2021). In this article we are less interested in variation in the levels of religiosity between age groups than in assessing whether the predictors of our four outcomes varied between age groups/cohorts.…”

“…Fourth, the parental religiosity transmission effect could be expected to vary between generations, with younger cohorts being less likely to be impacted by their parents' religiosity compared to older cohorts (Molteni and Biolcati 2023). Indeed, cohort replacement theory argues that as older generations are dying off and being succeeded by more secular younger cohorts, societies are slowly becoming less religious (Molteni and Biolcati 2023;Stolz et al 2021). Thus, we expect: H4: Catholics who belong to younger cohorts should be impacted less by parental religiosity compared to older cohorts.…”

“…Indeed, cohort replacement theory argues that as older generations are dying off and being succeeded by more secular younger cohorts, societies are slowly becoming less religious (Molteni and Biolcati 2023; Stolz et al. 2021). Thus, we expect:H4 Catholics who belong to younger cohorts should be impacted less by parental religiosity compared to older cohorts.…”

Generationen abnehmenden Glaubens

“…2 Stolz et al (2021), Voas und Chaves (2016), Wolf (2008). 3 McClendon und Hackett (2014), Stolz et al (2020).…”