2010
DOI: 10.1016/j.brat.2009.08.005
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Is manipulation of mood a critical component of cognitive bias modification procedures?

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Cited by 34 publications
(24 citation statements)
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“…However, we consider a mood congruency explanation highly improbable because not only did we observe a similar effect on cognition in our previous study in which there were no differences between groups in state mood, but past work also observed similar effects on cognition irrespective of whether the modification procedure elicited differences in directly evoked anxiety (Hoppitt, Mathews, Yiend, & Mackintosh, 2010;Mathews & Mackintosh, 2000;Wilson et al, 2006). Furthermore, Standage, Ashwin, and Fox (2010) have recently shown that a directly evoked change in mood state across the modification procedure is not sufficient to induce a change in cognitive bias. In two experiments, Standage et al (2010) demonstrated that a change in interpretation bias occurred only after a CBM-I paradigm and not after a mood induction paradigm, despite both paradigms resulting in changes in mood state.…”
Section: Discussionsupporting
confidence: 56%
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“…However, we consider a mood congruency explanation highly improbable because not only did we observe a similar effect on cognition in our previous study in which there were no differences between groups in state mood, but past work also observed similar effects on cognition irrespective of whether the modification procedure elicited differences in directly evoked anxiety (Hoppitt, Mathews, Yiend, & Mackintosh, 2010;Mathews & Mackintosh, 2000;Wilson et al, 2006). Furthermore, Standage, Ashwin, and Fox (2010) have recently shown that a directly evoked change in mood state across the modification procedure is not sufficient to induce a change in cognitive bias. In two experiments, Standage et al (2010) demonstrated that a change in interpretation bias occurred only after a CBM-I paradigm and not after a mood induction paradigm, despite both paradigms resulting in changes in mood state.…”
Section: Discussionsupporting
confidence: 56%
“…Therefore, we cannot rule out the possibility that state anxiety did have an effect, either alone or in combination with the cognitive effects brought about via CBM-I. In fact, Standage et al (2010) have posited that the effectiveness of CBM-I may depend on both cognitive and affective components acting in combination, which they suggest would be consistent with some clinical research that proposes that emotional activation enhances the efficacy of cognitive behaviour therapy (Samoilov & Goldfried, 2000).…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 84%
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“…Other recent studies have directly manipulated mood to investigate whether changes comparable to those observed during interpretation training can be induced by mood state induction alone. In an initial experiment, Standage, Ashwin, and Fox (2010) confirmed that modifying interpretation using the method used by Mathews and Mackintosh (2000) produced training-congruent differences on a test requiring the resolution of ambiguous word strings as either a positive or negative sentence (the scrambled sentence test; see Rude, Vladez, Odom, & Ebrahimi, 2003, for evidence that this test can predict later depression). Then, in a second experiment, Standage et al showed that inducing contrasting emotional states using a musical mood manipulation failed to produce any differential change on the same task.…”
Section: Alternative Explanations For the Effects Of Interpretation Tmentioning
confidence: 82%
“…) Our final predictions concerned state rumination following autobiographical recall. In CBM experiments designed to simulate cognitive contributions to anxiety, investigators have been careful to argue that CBM is not merely a mood-induction procedure but instead establishes a tendency to respond anxiously to potentially stressful situations (e.g., Standage, Ashwin, & Fox, 2010;Wilson, MacLeod, Mathews, & Rutherford, 2006). Therefore, as a final "far" transfer task, we examined ruminative reactions to remembering instead of anxious reactions to a stressful task.…”
Section: Methodsmentioning
confidence: 99%