Is Meaning Normative?

Abstract

Many people claim that semantic content is normative, and that therefore naturalistic theories of content face a potentially insuperable difficulty. The normativity of content allegedly undermines naturalism by introducing a gap between semantic 'ought's and the explanatory resources of naturalism. I argue here that this problem is not ultimately pressing for naturalists. The normativity thesis, I maintain, is ambiguous; it could mean either that the content of a term prescribes a pattern of use, or that it merely determines which pattern of use can be described as 'correct'. For the antinaturalist argument to go forward, content must be prescriptive. I argue, however, that it is not. Moreover, the thesis that content supplies standards for correct use is insufficient to supply a similar, a priori objection to naturalism.

Dynamics, Brandom-style

“…25 Hattiangadi [2006] argues in a similar vein. 26 I am doubtful of these intuitions for parallel reasons as I am doubtful of intuitions about how to draw the distinction between semantics and pragmatics, or for that matter, what the basic concept of semantic theorizing should be.…”

Inferentialism and the Normativity of Meaning

“…Hence the claim of Glüer and Wikforss that only some of these cases concern genuine, prescriptive correctness lacks clear substantiation. Hattiangadi (2006) offers what looks like a more elaborated argument for the same thesis. She writes (238):…”

“…However, all such claims have faced fierce resistance from those philosophers who insist that meaning is not normative in any nontrivial sense of the word-viz. Glüer and Pagin (1999), Wikfors (2001), Boghossian (2005), Hattiangadi (2006), Glüer and Wikfors (2009) and Hattiangadi (2009). In this paper I will sketch one particular approach to meaning claiming its normativity and defend it against the anti-normativist critique: namely the approach of Brandomian inferentialism.…”

The normativity of meaning defended

“…shall examine and respond to two forceful objections recently (and independently) raised against it by Boghossian (2005), Hattiangadi (2006) and Miller (2006). Although I shall argue that the objections are unsuccessful, they are worth attending to, not only because the normativity thesis is so widely accepted and is thought to have such ramifications but, most importantly, because doing so offers the opportunity to help clarify how it is to be understood.…”