Is More ‘Brussels’ the Solution? New European Union Member States' Preferences about the European Financial Architecture*

Spendzharova, Aneta

doi:10.1111/j.1468-5965.2011.02208.x

Cited by 34 publications

(23 citation statements)

References 27 publications

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“…Arguably, we can't. Spendzharova (2011), in her examination of the multi-level dimension of the European financial crisis, discusses international financial institutions in the same breath as domestic financial sectors, alongside euroscepticism and civil society at the subnational level. She pinpoints the tension between greater centralization of authority at higher levels of governance versus regulatory autonomy at lower levels.…”

Section: Comparative Uses (2007 -)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Twenty years of multi-level governance: ‘Where Does It Come From? What Is It? Where Is It Going?’ *

Stephenson¹,

Bache²,

Flinders³

2017

Frameworks of the European Union’s Policy Process

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In two decades since the Maastricht Treaty, multi-level governance (MLG) has developed as a conceptual framework for profiling the 'arrangement' of policy-making activity performed within and across politico-administrative institutions located at different territorial levels. This contribution examines the ways in which the MLG literature has been employed, effectively taking stock of applied research to date. It identifies five main uses of MLG and the different focus of emerging research over time. Considering the most recent scholarship, the contribution explores possible new directions for research, in light of global governance, culminating in a 'bird's eye view' of MLG over 20 years.

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Section: Comparative Uses (2007 -)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Twenty years of multi-level governance: ‘Where Does It Come From? What Is It? Where Is It Going?’ *

Stephenson¹,

Bache²,

Flinders³

2017

Frameworks of the European Union’s Policy Process

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“…The European Commission and Parliament have consistently pursued greater regulatory convergence (Financial Times 2009;. However, these legislative initiatives were met with resistance by some member states which preferred more national regulatory autonomy, such as the United Kingdom and the Czech Republic (Buckley and Howarth 2010;Grossman and Leblond 2011;Spendzharova 2012).…”

Section: Section 52 Banking Supervision Reforms Since 1999: the Roadmentioning

confidence: 97%

“…The new legal regime empowers the ESAs to take decisions with a direct and binding effect on market participants and national supervisory organizations. While member states in favour of greater centralization and harmonization of financial regulation as well as the European Commission and Parliament welcomed the enhancement of the ESAs' powers, other member states voiced concerns about a possible fiscal burden and loss of sovereignty (Buckley and Howarth 2010;Spendzharova 2012). The negotiations also gave rise to debates about the lack of a viable common European deposit guarantees and bank resolution regime (Kudrna 2012;Schoenmaker and Gros 2012).…”

Section: Section 52 Banking Supervision Reforms Since 1999: the Roadmentioning

confidence: 97%

Regulating Banks in Central and Eastern Europe

Spendzharova

2014

Self Cite

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The series maps the range of disciplines addressing the study of European public administration. In particular, contributions to the series will engage with the role and nature of the evolving bureaucratic processes of the European Union, including the study of the EU's civil service, of organization aspects of individual institutions such as the European Commission, the Council of Ministers, the External Action Service, the European Parliament, the European Court and the European Central Bank and of inter-institutional relations among these and other actors. The series also welcomes contributions on the growing role of EU agencies, networks of technical experts and national officials, and of the administrative dimension of multilevel governance including international organizations. Of particular interest in this respect will be the emergence of a European diplomatic service and the management of the EU's expanding commercial, foreign, development, security and defence policies, as well as the role of institutions in a range of other policy areas of the Union.Beyond this strong focus of EU administrative governance, the series will also include texts on the development and practice of administrative governance within European states. This may include contributions to the administrative history of Europe, which is not just about rules and regulations governing bureaucracies, or about formal criteria for measuring the growth of bureaucracies, but rather about the concrete workings of public administration, both in its executive functions as in its involvement in policy-making. Furthermore the series will include studies on the interaction between the national and European level, with particular attention for the impact of the EU on domestic administrative systems.

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“…24 Claessens et al (2011), at pp 29-32. 25 Ojo (2011);Pauly (2009);Spendzharova (2012). 26 Hulster (2011).…”

Section: Bailoutsmentioning

confidence: 98%

International Coordination in Cross-Border Bank Bail-ins: Problems and Prospects

Lupo-Pasini¹,

Buckley

2015

Eur Bus Org Law Rev

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Bail-in is quickly becoming a predominant approach to banking resolution. The EU Bank Recovery Resolution Directive and the US Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's single point of entry strategy envisage creditors' recapitalisations to resolve a failing financial institution. However, this legislation focuses on the domestic aspects of bail-in, leaving the question of how it is applied to a cross-border banking group open. Cross-border banking resolution has been historically subject to coordination failures, which have resulted in disorderly resolutions with dangerous systemic effects. The goal of this article is to assess whether bail-in is subject to the same coordination problems that affect other resolution tools, and to discuss the logic of international legal cooperation in bail-in policies. We demonstrate that, in spite of the evident benefit in terms of fiscal sustainability, bail-in suffers from complex coordination problems which, if not addressed, might lead to regulatory arbitrage and lengthy court battles, and, ultimately, may disrupt resolutions. We argue that only a binding legal regime can address those problems. In doing so, we discuss the recent Financial Stability Board's proposal on cross-border recognition of resolution action, and the role of international law in promoting cooperation in banking resolution.

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Is More ‘Brussels’ the Solution? New European Union Member States' Preferences about the European Financial Architecture*

Cited by 34 publications

References 27 publications

Twenty years of multi-level governance: ‘Where Does It Come From? What Is It? Where Is It Going?’ *

Twenty years of multi-level governance: ‘Where Does It Come From? What Is It? Where Is It Going?’ *

Regulating Banks in Central and Eastern Europe

International Coordination in Cross-Border Bank Bail-ins: Problems and Prospects

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