Is Panama Really Your Tax Haven? Secrecy Jurisdictions and the Countries They Harm

Jánský, Petr; Meinzer, Markus; Palanský, Miroslav

doi:10.2139/ssrn.3267366

Cited by 10 publications

(17 citation statements)

References 34 publications

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“…The Bilateral Financial Secrecy Index (BFSI) is a direct extension of the FSI developed by Janský et al (2018). It estimates the importance of secrecy jurisdictions for each specific country individually rather than globally.…”

Section: The Bilateral Financial Secrecy Indexmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Regarding the quantitative part of FSI, the global scale weight, the BFSI uses a different source of data than the GSW in the FSI-while the FSI uses data on exports of financial services from the IMF's Balance of Payments Statistics which are only available at the unilateral level, the BFSI requires data on a bilateral level. Janský et al (2018) thus use data on cross-border portfolio investment, namely assets, from the IMF's 2015 Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) to construct the so-called bilateral scale weights (BSW). While there are other sources of bilateral data that could be relevant to use to construct the BSW (such as foreign direct investment), as Janský et al (2018) argue, portfolio assets are likely to capture well the economic activity that may make the best use of financially secretive regulations in secrecy jurisdictions.…”

Section: The Bilateral Financial Secrecy Indexmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Janský et al (2018) thus use data on cross-border portfolio investment, namely assets, from the IMF's 2015 Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) to construct the so-called bilateral scale weights (BSW). While there are other sources of bilateral data that could be relevant to use to construct the BSW (such as foreign direct investment), as Janský et al (2018) argue, portfolio assets are likely to capture well the economic activity that may make the best use of financially secretive regulations in secrecy jurisdictions. The BSW is then defined analogously to GSW as the share of portfolio investment assets between country i and jurisdiction j on the total global value of cross-border portfolio investment.…”

Section: The Bilateral Financial Secrecy Indexmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The European Union faces large amounts of financial secrecy supplied to it by a number of secrecy jurisdictions around the world. To explore the patterns of this phenomenon, in this chapter, we used the Bilateral Financial Secrecy Index (BFSI) developed by Janský et al (2018) to estimate which jurisdictions supply most secrecy to the EU Member States. We then used the BFSI to assess the progress of two recent EU policy efforts to tackle financial secrecy: automatic exchange of country-by-country reporting data and the blacklist and greylist published by the European Commission.…”

Section: Conclusion and Policy Recommendationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Actors involved or benefitting from the veil of secrecy attempt to exploit it on various levels and to various extent. In this chapter, we build on the Tax Justice Network's Financial Secrecy Index, which ranks each jurisdiction's contribution to global financial secrecy, and its bilateral extension, the Bilateral Secrecy Financial Index (BFSI), as developed by Janský et al (2018). The BFSI identifies the largest suppliers of financial secrecy for each specific country, rather than at the global level.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 4 more Smart Citations

Country-by-Country Reporting and Other Financial Transparency Measures Affecting the European Union

Jánský¹,

Knobel²,

Meinzer³

et al. 2021

Combating Fiscal Fraud and Empowering Regulators

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The EU faces large amounts of financial secrecy supplied to it by secrecy jurisdictions. In this chapter, we use the Bilateral Financial Secrecy Index to quantify which jurisdictions supply most secrecy to EU Member States. The chapter assesses the progress of two recent EU policy efforts to tackle financial secrecy: automatic exchange of country-by-country reporting (CbCR) data and black and grey list of non-cooperative jurisdictions. It is found that 34 per cent of the financial secrecy faced by the EU is supplied by other Member States, whose a priori exclusion from the blacklisting exercise reveals its fundamental flaw. Further 13 per cent is supplied by the EU’s dependencies, mainly the UK’s Cayman Islands, Bermuda, and Guernsey. The jurisdictions that supply the most secrecy not covered by automatic information exchange of CbCR data are the British Virgin Islands, United States, and Curacao. Finally the chapter discusses policy recommendations that stem from our analysis.

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Section: The Bilateral Financial Secrecy Indexmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Bilateral Financial Secrecy Indexmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Bilateral Financial Secrecy Indexmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Conclusion and Policy Recommendationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 3 more Smart Citations

Country-by-Country Reporting and Other Financial Transparency Measures Affecting the European Union

Jánský¹,

Knobel²,

Meinzer³

et al. 2021

Combating Fiscal Fraud and Empowering Regulators

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

Is neoliberalism still spreading? The impact of international cooperation on capital taxation

Hakelberg

Rixen

2020

Review of International Political Economy

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The downward trend in capital taxes since the 1980s has recently reversed for personal capital income. At the same time, it continued for corporate profits. Why have these tax rates diverged after a long period of parallel decline? We argue that the answer lies in different levels of change in the fights against tax evasion and tax avoidance. The fight against evasion by households progressed significantly since 2009, culminating in the multilateral adoption of automatic exchange of information (AEI). In contrast, international efforts against base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) failed to curb tax avoidance by corporations. We theorize that international cooperation is an intervening variable, countering the negative impact of tax competition on capital taxation by reducing the risk of capital flight. Under such conditions, domestic political pressures in favor of higher capital taxes can unfold. We confirm our argument in a differencein-difference analysis and through additional tests with data for up to 35 OECD countries from 2000-2017. Our central estimate suggests that the average tax rate on dividends in 2017 is 4.5 percentage points higher than it would have been absent international tax cooperation.

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Regulating havens: The role of hard and soft governance of tax experts in conditions of secrecy and low regulation

Killian

O’Regan

Lynch

et al. 2020

Regulation & Governance

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International tax governance is significant societally as it impacts both inequality and the capacity of governments to deliver on their social contracts. Tax experts forma key, under‐researched, heterogeneous element of the tax ecosystem, subject to a range of hard and soft governance influences. While problematic tax regimes are appropriately identified by reference to lax regulation or financial opacity, few empirical studies explore how operating in these jurisdictions affects the governance of tax experts individually. Using international survey data, we find that the influence of soft governance on tax experts varies across conditions of secrecy or lax regulation. Soft governance, including that of the workplace and the profession, is most influential in challenging regimes. Beyond a tipping point of economic freedom, regulatory knowledge and the threat of sanction become less influential. Elements along the continuum between hard and soft governance interact in a non‐homogenous way that indicates a role for professional bodies and firms in tax governance.

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Is Panama Really Your Tax Haven? Secrecy Jurisdictions and the Countries They Harm

Cited by 10 publications

References 34 publications

Country-by-Country Reporting and Other Financial Transparency Measures Affecting the European Union

Country-by-Country Reporting and Other Financial Transparency Measures Affecting the European Union

Is neoliberalism still spreading? The impact of international cooperation on capital taxation

Regulating havens: The role of hard and soft governance of tax experts in conditions of secrecy and low regulation

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