Is paranoid schizophrenia really camouflaged depression?

Zigler, Edward; Glick, Marion

doi:10.1037/0003-066x.43.4.284

Cited by 117 publications

(94 citation statements)

References 76 publications

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“…We hypothesise that EA does indeed play a causal role in the development of a variety of beliefs that are similar to suspiciousness. This hypothesis would complement contemporary models of paranoid delusion formation and maintenance, which have typically posited that unpleasant emotions contribute to the development and maintenance of persecutory delusions (e.g., Freeman et al, 2002;Zigler & Glick, 1988). Ethical constraints will prevent researchers from conducting true experiments intended to elicit or increase levels of delusions and peculiar beliefs in clinical samples.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Thus, it should come as no surprise that theorists have long posited a relation between emotions and delusional and peculiar beliefs (e.g., Kraepelin, 1899Kraepelin, /1989. In fact, unpleasant emotions are primary components of several contemporary models of delusions, including persecutory delusions (e.g., Freeman, Garety, Kuipers, Fowler, & Bebbington, 2002;Zigler & Glick, 1988). In support of these theories and models, empirical research examining clinical populations has found a relation between persecutory delusions and unpleasant emotions such as depression, fear, worry, and anger (e.g., Freeman & Garety, 1999;Kennedy, Kemp, & Dyer, 1992).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 96%

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Emotional awareness, gender, and suspiciousness

Boden

Berenbaum

2007

Cognition & Emotion

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We investigated the causal relation between emotional awareness (EA) and suspiciousness, and whether this relation is moderated by gender. After inducing an unpleasant mood, we manipulated EA by having participants read one of two versions of a story (the high EA condition provided cues to what the participant was feeling and why, whereas the low EA condition did not). Following the manipulation, one sample of participants completed a measure of suspiciousness, and a second, independent sample of participants described their emotional state. Emotional Awareness Condition × Gender effects were obtained for suspiciousness and EA. Men in the low EA condition reported significantly higher levels of suspiciousness and lower levels of EA than men in the high EA condition. Women in both conditions reported equally high levels of EA, which were greater than those of men in both conditions, and the manipulation did not affect their levels of suspiciousness.There is broad consensus that emotions directly affect judgment, decision making, and information processing (Clore, Gasper, & Garvin, 2001;Gasper & Clore, 2000;Kahneman & Ritov, 1994;Lowenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 2001). Thus, it should come as no surprise that theorists have long posited a relation between emotions and delusional and peculiar beliefs (e.g., Kraepelin, 1899Kraepelin, /1989. In fact, unpleasant emotions are primary components of several contemporary models of delusions, including persecutory delusions (e.g., Freeman, Garety, Kuipers, Fowler, & Bebbington, 2002;Zigler & Glick, 1988). In support of these theories and models, empirical research examining clinical populations has found a relation between persecutory delusions and unpleasant emotions such as depression, fear, worry, and anger (e.g., Freeman & Garety, 1999;Kennedy, Kemp, & Dyer, 1992). Similarly, several studies conducted with non-clinical populations have also found a relation between suspiciousness (which we distinguish from paranoia as being of less than delusional severity), and unpleasant emotions, such as general unhappiness, depression, anger, and social anxiety (e.g., Martin & Penn, 2001;Rawlings & Freeman, 1996).That there is an association between suspiciousness/paranoia and increased levels of unpleasant affect is not in doubt. However, the experience of unpleasant affect may be only one of several facets of emotional experience that contribute to the development and maintenance of suspiciousness/paranoia. Models of paranoia have typically focused on excesses of unpleasant affect as a causal factor. We posit that emotional awareness (EA) is a second facet of emotional © 2007 Psychology PressCorrespondence should be addressed to: M. Tyler Boden, Department of Psychology, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 603 E. Daniel Street, Champaign, IL 61821, USA. mboden@s.psych.uiuc.edu. Publisher's Disclaimer: Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.informaworld.com/terms-and-conditions-of-access.pdf This article maybe used for research, teaching and private study pu...

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 96%

Emotional awareness, gender, and suspiciousness

Boden

Berenbaum

2007

Cognition & Emotion

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“…A substantial body of literature has examined the concept of cultural paranoia as a result of the experiences among African Americans in the United States. 25,28,39,52,53 More recent explanations of the high rates of paranoid and schizophrenic diagnoses among African Americans have been attributed to how the characterization of psychopathology occurs, dimensionally rather than comprehensively. 28,40,53 These findings suggest further research is needed to explore symptom expression and their related diagnoses.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Symptoms of Psychological Distress among African Americans Seeking HIV-Related Mental Health Care

Shacham

Basta

Reece

2008

AIDS Patient Care and STDs

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The purpose of this study was to examine the prevalence of symptoms of psychological distress experienced by African Americans upon self-enrollment in HIV-related mental health care and to compare the symptoms in this sample to the Brief Symptom Inventory (BSI) normative sample, the instrument used in this study to assess symptoms of psychological distress. Data were collected from 575 African Americans living with HIV who self-enrolled at an HIV-related mental health clinic located in a large city in the southeastern United States. Nearly 20% of the sample reported a t score Ն 63 for both somatization and paranoid ideation, a level indicative of a need for further psychological evaluation. Compared to the normative sample, this sample had significantly lower levels (p Ͻ 0.05) of anxiety, depression, phobic anxiety, interpersonal sensitivity, and global severity index than the normative sample and had significantly higher levels of paranoid ideation and somatization than the normative sample. These results indicate that, overall, African Americans presented for mental health services with lower levels of symptoms of psychological distress than the normative sample. To that end, it is possible that African Americans living with HIV may underreport symptoms of psychological distress or may experience symptoms of psychological distress differently than other individuals. As a result, it is important that HIV-related service providers recognize these patterns of psychological distress and provide appropriate referrals to HIV-related mental health providers. 413

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“…According to the classic psychodynamic conception, paranoid symptoms are occasioned by defensive attempts to escape intolerable feelings of shame and culpability by projecting them onto others (see McWilliams, 1994). Any sense of personal guilt or failure is transformed into dangers that threaten from outside, and the deluded individual assuages his or her sense of personal inadequacy at the cost of living in a world replete with hostile, malevolent agents (Adler, 1914(Adler, /1929Bell, 2003;Freud, 1895;Zigler & Glick, 1988). Notwithstanding differing conceptions of the syntax of the putative projective process (see McKay et al, 2007a), the formulation of Bentall et al retains certain elements of this classic notion, particularly the idea that paranoid individuals impute malicious intentions to others so as to evade conscious awareness of negative self-representations.…”

Section: Persecutory Delusionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Confabulation, delusion, and anosognosia: Motivational factors and false claims

McKay¹,

Kinsbourne²

2010

Cognitive Neuropsychiatry

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False claims are a key feature of confabulation, delusion, and anosognosia. In this paper we consider the role of motivational factors in such claims. We review motivational accounts of each symptom and consider the evidence adduced in support of these accounts. In our view the evidence is strongly suggestive of a role for motivational factors in each domain. Before concluding, we widen the focus by outlining a tentative general taxonomy of false claims, including false claims that occur in clinical settings as well as more garden-variety false claims, and incorporating both motivational and nonmotivational approaches to explaining such claims.Keywords: Anosognosia; Confabulation; Delusion; Motivational processes Patients in neurological and psychiatric settings are known to make rather striking claims. Consider the following two examples:1. ''I am the left foot of God.'' 2. ''My father is 95Á96. My mother is 10 years younger so she is 85Á86.'' The first claim is striking because it is bizarre and grandiose, but also because the individual who made it was a brilliant mathematician who went on to win a Nobel prize (see Nasar, 1998 Moscovitch, 1995, p. 228). How are we to account for such claims? And how can we characterise them? According to the scientific literature, the first example is considered to reflect a delusion (David, 1999), whereas the second is a paradigmatic instance of confabulation arising in the context of memory impairment (Moscovitch, 1995). The problem from a theoretical perspective is that it is not clear what the distinctions are between these two classes of symptom, nor what the nature of the overlap is between them, if any. This is most obvious when one considers that certain patient presentations are thought of as involving delusion in some circles, and confabulation in others. An example is anosognosia, which involves unawareness or denial of disease or disability, in particular denial of left hemiplegia following right-hemisphere brain damage. Recent authors have explicitly characterised this condition as either delusion (e.g., Aimola Davies, Davies, Ogden, Smithson, & White, 2009;Davies, Aimola Davies, & Coltheart, 2005) or confabulation (e.g., Heilman, 2009;Hirstein, 2005).One feature common to confabulation, delusion, and anosognosia is that each of these symptoms typically involves some sort of false public claim. There may be exceptions to this*for example, delusions are usually conceptualised as false beliefs (cf. Hamilton, 2007;Stephens & Graham, 2004), and beliefs can be kept private. On the other hand, it is typically because of the public declarations of deluded individuals that delusions attract clinical attention. Another exception involves the fact that delusions and confabulations might be, as it were, ''serendipitously'' true. A patient may lack access to his biographical information, yet by chance may confabulate the correct answer when asked his age. Such exceptions aside, false claims are a key feature of these disorders. Our primary aim in this paper is to consider t...

show abstract

Is paranoid schizophrenia really camouflaged depression?

Cited by 117 publications

References 76 publications

Emotional awareness, gender, and suspiciousness

Emotional awareness, gender, and suspiciousness

Symptoms of Psychological Distress among African Americans Seeking HIV-Related Mental Health Care

Confabulation, delusion, and anosognosia: Motivational factors and false claims

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