Is Safety In Danger?

Broncano‐Berrocal, Fernando

doi:10.1007/s11406-013-9467-9

Cited by 30 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 12 publications

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“…In short, when it comes to deciding whether or not Smith, in @, knows what time it is, options (1) and (2) are equally defendable, but neither, contrary to what Bogardus maintains, establishes the conclusion that there can be knowledge without safety: either (1) Smith's belief is safe in @ and amounts to knowledge, or (2) it is unsafe in @ and does not amount to knowledge. In other words, Bogardus is wrong to think that his atomic clock case constitutes a danger for the safety condition on knowledge (Bogardus 2014;Bogardus and Marxen 2014;Broncano-Berrocal 2014), since the view I defend, which endorses this condition, can properly accommodate this case.…”

Section: Benoit Gaultier 494mentioning

confidence: 91%

Achievements, Safety and Environmental Epistemic Luck

Gaultier

2014

Dialectica

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Theories of knowledge as credit for true belief, or as cognitive achievement, have to face the following objection: in the famous Barn façades case, it seems that the truth of Barney's belief that he is in front of a barn is to be explained by the correct functioning of his cognitive capacities, although we are reluctant to say that he knows he is in front of a barn. Duncan Pritchard concludes from this that a safety clause, irreducible to the conditions a true belief must satisfy in order to be credited to the believer, constitutes a necessary condition of knowledge. Because those who define knowledge as a cognitive achievement have not convincingly answered this objection, I intend, in the first section of this paper, to refute it by showing how practical and doxastic achievements differ. Then I defend the idea that we should also distinguish two kinds of environmental epistemic luck, and, correlatively, two kinds of safety, that are not equally incompatible with knowledge. Finally, I argue that this distinction is inevitably vague and I indicate some consequences of this vagueness for our knowledge‐intuitions.

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Section: Benoit Gaultier 494mentioning

confidence: 91%

Achievements, Safety and Environmental Epistemic Luck

Gaultier

2014

Dialectica

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“…For notice that in the scenario where the normative defeater is present, what ensures that the agent's belief is safe is precisely not her manifestation of relevant cognitive agency but rather her failure to manifest relevant cognitive agency. After all, had she properly manifested Footnote 17 continued Broncano-Berrocal (2014) for further critical discussion of Bogardus's clock case, to which Bogardus and Marxen (2014) is a response. 18 And notice that it would be irrelevant to respond to this argument by nothing that it only works on misleading modally close non-normative defeaters.…”

Section: Knowledge Risk Agency and Defeatmentioning

confidence: 99%

Anti-luck virtue epistemology and epistemic defeat

Pritchard

2016

Synthese

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This paper explores how a certain theory of knowledge-known as antiluck virtue epistemology-can account for, and in the process shed light on, the notion of an epistemic defeater. To this end, an overview of the motivations for anti-luck virtue epistemology is offered, along with a taxonomy of different kinds of epistemic defeater. It is then shown how anti-luck virtue epistemology can explain: (i) why certain kinds of putative epistemic defeater are not bona fide; (ii) how certain kinds of epistemic defeater are genuine in virtue of exposing the subject to significant levels of epistemic risk; and (iii) how certain kinds of epistemic defeater are genuine in virtue of highlighting how the subject's safe cognitive success does not stand in the appropriate explanatory relationship to her manifestation of relevant cognitive ability.Keywords Epistemology · Knowledge · Epistemic defeaters · Anti-luck virtue epistemology Introductory remarksIt is incumbent upon any theory of knowledge to explain how it handles cases involving epistemic defeaters. To this end, I will be offering an account of how my preferred theory of knowledge-anti-luck virtue epistemology-can incorporate this epistemic notion. In particular, I will be arguing that this proposal is well-placed to account for the various different types of epistemic defeater (and can also explain why some related phenomena do not qualify as genuine cases of epistemic defeat). Although my claim is not the ambitious one that anti-luck virtue epistemology is uniquely placed to account B Duncan Pritchard

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“…Berrocal (2014) has attempted to provide a solution to the generality problem on the behalf of the safety theorist. He argues that two methods m 1 and m 2 are the same only if they are globally reliable to the same extent, they are based on the same epistemic faculty, and that the circumstances in which the belief is gained through m 2 belong to the set of circumstances with respect to which m 1 is globally reliable (2014, p. 75) Bogardus and Marxen (2014).…”

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confidence: 99%

Global safety: how to deal with necessary truths

Hirvelä

2017

Synthese

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According to the safety condition, a subject knows that p only if she would believe that p only if p was true. The safety condition has been a very popular necessary condition for knowledge of late. However, it is well documented that the safety condition is trivially satisfied in cases where the subject believes in a necessary truth. This is for the simple reason that a necessary truth is true in all possible worlds, and therefore it is true in all possible worlds where it is believed. But clearly, all beliefs concerning necessary truths do not amount to knowledge. The safety theorists have attempted to deal with the problem caused by necessary truths by restricting the safety condition to purely contingent truths and by globalizing the safety condition to a set of propositions. Both of these solutions are problematic. The principal aim of this paper is to develop a version of the safety condition that is able to deal with cases featuring necessary truths.

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Is Safety In Danger?

Cited by 30 publications

References 12 publications

Achievements, Safety and Environmental Epistemic Luck

Achievements, Safety and Environmental Epistemic Luck

Anti-luck virtue epistemology and epistemic defeat

Global safety: how to deal with necessary truths

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