Is the Enemy of My Enemy My Friend?

Bacon, Tricia

doi:10.1080/09636412.2017.1416813

Cited by 14 publications

(5 citation statements)

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“…Evidence (Findley and Young, 2012;Kydd and Walter, 2006;Bloom, 2004) has shown that as intra-group cohesion and loyalty increase in extremists groups, competitive inter-group behavior can emerge, leading to patterns of inter-group conflict and increased violence. Yet, studies (Bacon, 2018;Perliger and Palmieri, 2022) have also observed frequent patterns of cooperation and co-offending among terrorist groups. Alliances increase the longevity of a terrorist group (Choi et al, 2022) and oftentimes involve partners with similar ideologies, frames, or organizational structures (Phillips, 2014).…”

Section: Community Structures and Homophilymentioning

confidence: 99%

Extremists of a Feather Flock Together? Community Structure and Patterns of Homophily in the US Islamist Co-Offending Network

Schwarzenbach¹,

Jensen²

2023

Preprint

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Violence is exacerbated in small close-knit groups and through social identi cation processes.Furthermore, the homophily principle postulates that individuals tend to form relationshipsbecause of shared characteristics. We analyze the community structure of the Islamist co-o endingnetwork { a highly violent social network { and assess whether shared characteristics increase theprobability to form co-o ending ties. We rely on a new database on the individual attributes andthe co-o ending relationships of 503 Islamist o enders radicalized in the United States between1948 and 2020. Using community detection algorithms, we show that the US Islamist co-o endingnetwork is highly clustered, modular, and includes only a few large communities. Furthermore,results from the exponential random graph modeling evidence the roles of spatial proximity,ideological a liation, and shared social characteristics in driving co-o ending among US Islamists.Overall, these ndings demonstrate that small, local communities and homophily shape violentsocial networks.

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Section: Community Structures and Homophilymentioning

confidence: 99%

Extremists of a Feather Flock Together? Community Structure and Patterns of Homophily in the US Islamist Co-Offending Network

Schwarzenbach¹,

Jensen²

2023

Preprint

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“…While most alliances are formed at the local or regional level, VNSAs have allied despite being separated by significant distances. VNSAs form alliances with other armed groups to secure both groups' survival (alliances make it more difficult to eliminate either group) or when the groups have "complementary organizational needs" that can be met by working together, including "knowledge, skills, and resource mobilization" (Bacon, 2018). The types of alliances can also vary widely, and most, appropriately, exist along a spectrum with low-end cooperation at one end and more frequent and sustained high-end cooperation at the other.…”

Section: Alliancesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…• Abu Zayd, 2009• Asal et al, 2016• Bacon, 2018• Bloom, 2003• Box and McCormack, 2004• Debos and Brown, 2016• Eelam Revolutionary Organisation of Students, n.d., circa 1985• Fotini, 2012• Hoole et al, 1990• Horowitz and Potter, 2014• Joshi, 1996• Kearney, 1986• Lebovich, 2013• Levett, 2007• Mahoney, 2017• Phillips, 2014• Phillips, 2018• Shekau, 2016• Staniland, 2014• Swamy, 2002• Toft and Zhukov, 2015• al Zarqawi, 2004 Materiel and Technology • Behera, 2017• Bonomo et al, 2007• Boyle, 2015• Butt, 2017• Castner, 2017• Clover and Feng, 2017• Corera, 2016• Cragin et al, 2007• Dunn, 2013• Firik, 2014• Horton, 2017• Jones and Johnston, 2013• Karp, 2009 Tactics • Belew, 2018• Bloom, 2005• Blume, 2017• Boeke, 2016• Coaffee, O'Hare, and Hawkesworth, 2009• Elster, 2006, pp. 233-258 • Fishman, 2016• Flanigan, 2008• Fla...…”

Section: Alliancesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Understanding and Reducing the Ability of Violent Nonstate Actors to Adapt to Change

2022

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■ Most violent nonstate actor (VNSA) adaptations occur within the first five years of a VNSA's existence. The VNSAs examined adapted to their environments quickly and then retained an adaptive capacity through their life cycles. This suggests that there is an opportunity to limit a VNSA's ability to adapt in the period shortly after it emerges and the possibility of reducing its ability to remain operationally effective.■ Not all VNSAs adapt with the same frequency. The pressures (or strategies) exerted on a VNSA by counter-VNSA forces, coupled with changes in the operational environment, may lead to different levels of adaptation.■ Of the 46 VNSA adaptations we examined, 12 occurred in roughly one-half of the periods and two-thirds of the cases examined. The 12 VNSA adaptations occur frequently.Knowing that these adaptations are the most likely to occur can inform how resources are focused, the development of indicators for their detection, and the creation of means for mitigating their occurrence or the effects of their occurrence.■ To reduce VNSA capacity to adapt, strategies and efforts should focus on limiting VNSAs' access to military, technological, and warfighting materiel and on VNSAs' ability to seize and hold terrain.

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“…Organizational issues and concerns have been the focus of numerous studies which, instead of IR theory, draw insights from businesses cooperation or organizational theory (Bacon 2018;Byman 2014;Horowitz and Potter 2014). Along the lines of realist-inspired literature, these studies downplay ideology in favor of resources-related considerations.…”

Section: Friends or Foes? Alliance-building And Fragmentation In Non-mentioning

confidence: 99%

Fragmentation and Cooperation in the Jihadi International (Sub)System: ‘Islamic State’ vs. Al-Qaeda and Beyond

Eleftheriadou

2020

Religions

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The article explores the implications the rise of the ‘Islamic State’ (IS) had on the international order and the salafi-jihadi movement. The main argument is that at the height of its activity (2014–2016) IS was a de facto revolutionary state. In this capacity, IS challenged the international order because contrary to revolutionary states in the past it negated the foundations of the Westphalian system. At the same time, the rise of IS had a tremendous impact on the jihadi (sub)system, as it initiated a period of fragmentation and alliance-building. The competition between IS and al-Qaeda for the hegemony of the movement did not revolve around direct fighting as much as efforts to outbid the rival group. One of the main conduits of this competition was the ‘war of bay’as (pledges of allegiance)’, which consisted of competitive oaths of allegiance from local jihadi forces to one of the two groups. In local contexts, the ‘war of bay’as’ increased tensions and factionalism within jihadi groups, as splinter groups decided to side with the new revolutionary foco. The fragmentation of local jihadi groups unfolded along pre-existing cleavages, grievances and resource-related motivations, increasing the levels of violence and complexity in these local conflicts.

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Is the Enemy of My Enemy My Friend?

Cited by 14 publications

References 0 publications

Extremists of a Feather Flock Together? Community Structure and Patterns of Homophily in the US Islamist Co-Offending Network

Extremists of a Feather Flock Together? Community Structure and Patterns of Homophily in the US Islamist Co-Offending Network

Understanding and Reducing the Ability of Violent Nonstate Actors to Adapt to Change

Fragmentation and Cooperation in the Jihadi International (Sub)System: ‘Islamic State’ vs. Al-Qaeda and Beyond

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