Is the Good News About Compliance Good News About Cooperation? (1996)

Downs, George W.; Rocke, David M.; Barsoom, Peter N.

doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808760.008

Cited by 4 publications

(3 citation statements)

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“…Universal membership and technical expertise closely mirror two standards of legitimacy (state consent and comparative benefit, respectively) discussed by Buchanan and Keohane 2006. institution] requires states to depart from what they would have done in its absence." 72 In regime complexes, however, effective cooperation demands not only depth but also inter-institutional coordination. In other words, assessing cooperation in regime complexes requires investigating how institutions interact with each other in addition to the obligations they place on member states.…”

Section: Discussion and Future Researchmentioning

confidence: 99%

Deference and Hierarchy in International Regime Complexes

Pratt¹

2018

Int Org

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How do states resolve jurisdictional conflicts among international institutions? In many issue areas, global governance is increasingly fragmented among multiple international organizations (IOs). Existing work argues this fragmentation can undermine cooperation as different institutions adopt conflicting rules. However, this perspective overlooks the potential for interinstitutional coordination. I develop a theory ofinstitutional deference: the acceptance of another IO's exercise of authority. By accepting rules crafted in another IO, member states can mitigate rule conflict and facilitate a division of labor within the regime complex. I use an original data set of over 2,000 IO policy documents to describe patterns of deference in the counterterrorism, intellectual property, and election-monitoring regime complexes. Empirical tests support two theoretical claims. First, institutional deference is indeed associated with a division of labor among institutions: IOs that defer to each other are more likely to focus their rule-making efforts on separate subissues. Second, deference is a strategic act that is shaped both by efficiency concerns and power politics. Statistical tests confirm that deference is used to efficiently pool resources among disparate organizations, and that IOs with weaker member states tend to defer to organizations with more powerful members.

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Section: Discussion and Future Researchmentioning

confidence: 99%

Deference and Hierarchy in International Regime Complexes

Pratt¹

2018

Int Org

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“…For a comprehensive review, see Simmons 2010. based on calculations of material costs and benefits. States comply when compliance is in their self-interest 14 or when there is a credible enforcement mechanism. 15 Since countries are more likely to sign onto international agreements that already reflect their interests, the costs of compliance that emerge after ratification are central for understanding whether international law in fact constrains state behavior.…”

Section: Legal Obligation and Compliance In International Politicsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Due Deference: Cosmopolitan Social Identity and the Psychology of Legal Obligation in International Politics

Bayram¹

2017

Int Org

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Why are some politicians guided by a sense of obligation toward international law but others are not? Why do some politicians have a social as opposed to an egoistic preference over compliance with international legal rules? Existing approaches largely assume that the structural features of the compliance environment shape preferences. As a result, they neglect the heterogeneity across decision makers' subjective beliefs in the legitimacy of international law, which is critical for explaining who exhibits a sense of obligation and has a non-egoistic preference for compliance. Drawing upon a large body of psychological research on social identity and influence, I argue that obligation toward international law has a behavioral foundation shaped by cosmopolitan social identity. Using data from an original survey of German politicians that includes two compliance experiments, I show that politicians with a high degree of cosmopolitanism are driven by a sense of legal obligation that results in a social preference for compliance while those low on cosmopolitanism lack the same sense of normative respect. Replicated in a second experimental study conducted with a convenience sample, my results indicate that strategic rationality in compliance applies, but only to a particular set of actors. By illuminating the psychological underpinnings of obligation toward international law, this study contributes to a richer understanding of compliance preferences and builds a bridge between instrumental and normative models.

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“…41 The managerial element helps to address the causes for non-compliance through a 'cooperative, problem-solving approach' 42 and the coercive element allows the imposition of sanctions. 43 The Compliance Committee is composed of two branches: the facilitative branch that is responsible for 'providing advice and facilitation to Parties in implementing the Protocol', 44 and the enforcement branch that is responsible for 'determining whether a party included in Annex I is not in compliance' 45 with its quantified emissions limitation or reduction commitment, the methodological and reporting requirements under Articles 5(1)-(2) and 7(1) and (4) of the Protocol, and the eligibility requirements under Articles 6, 12 and 17 of the Protocol. 46 The consequences applied by the two branches differ considerably.…”

Section: Complying With the Kyoto Protocolmentioning

confidence: 99%

Innovativeness and Paralysis in International Climate Policy

Streck

2012

TEL

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This article describes the challenges of using the constrained tools of international law to negotiate a sustainable framework to address climate change. It sets out to show how the particularities of the problem have led to creative and innovative solutions expanding the borders of international law. To this end, the article discusses carbon market mechanisms, the compliance regime of the Kyoto Protocol, and the emerging framework to create incentives to reduce land-based emissions in developing countries. These examples illustrate that the recognition of the role of sub-national and private entities in mitigating climate change has had significant impact on the rules of the climate regime. But the article also asserts that the un process, while recognizing the role of private actors, is still inadequately equipped to involve non-state actors in a meaningful way. The climate regime therefore challenges the traditional thinking about interstate relationships. No longer solely a matter for international environmental law, contemporary environmental governance has become a global affair, which makes the lens of transnational law a useful tool to think about these issues in practice in a more intellectually fruitful and relevant way. This article thereby provides a snapshot of the type of issues and discussion that readers of this journal can look forward to in the years to come.

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Is the Good News About Compliance Good News About Cooperation? (1996)

Cited by 4 publications

References 0 publications

Deference and Hierarchy in International Regime Complexes

Deference and Hierarchy in International Regime Complexes

Due Deference: Cosmopolitan Social Identity and the Psychology of Legal Obligation in International Politics

Innovativeness and Paralysis in International Climate Policy

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