2016
DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2016.1164306
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Is the paradox of fiction soluble in psychology?

Abstract: If feeling a genuine emotion requires believing that its object actually exists, and if this is a belief we are unlikely to have about fictional entities, then how could we feel genuine emotions towards these entities? This question lies at the core of the paradox of fiction. Since its original formulation, this paradox has generated a substantial literature. Until recently, the dominant strategy had consisted in trying to solve it. Yet, it is more and more frequent for scholars to try to dismiss it using data… Show more

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Cited by 12 publications
(9 citation statements)
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“…Within this debate, it is often said that philosophers who advance claim 2 (or something similar) have a narrow cognitive theory of emotions (Friend 2016; for a critical discussion of the role of narrow cognitivism see Cova and Teroni 2016). According to narrow cognitive theories, a genuine emotion has to involve, or be identical to a belief or judgement (Solomon 1976;Nussbaum 2001).…”
Section: The 'Paradox' Of Fiction and The Nature Of Fictional Emotionsmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…Within this debate, it is often said that philosophers who advance claim 2 (or something similar) have a narrow cognitive theory of emotions (Friend 2016; for a critical discussion of the role of narrow cognitivism see Cova and Teroni 2016). According to narrow cognitive theories, a genuine emotion has to involve, or be identical to a belief or judgement (Solomon 1976;Nussbaum 2001).…”
Section: The 'Paradox' Of Fiction and The Nature Of Fictional Emotionsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…2 If a theory of the emotions does not entail the claim that emotions involve or are to be identified with beliefs or judgements, the 'paradox' seems to disappear. Accordingly, many authors consider it not worth any further theoretical effort (Stecker 2011;Buckwalter and Tullmann 2014;Matravers 2014; for a critical discussion and an attempt to solve rather than dissolve the paradox see Cova and Teroni 2016). However, even if there is no paradox of fiction, there are still important open questions about our emotional responses to fiction.…”
Section: The 'Paradox' Of Fiction and The Nature Of Fictional Emotionsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…For instance, Gendler and Kovakovich drew on empirical research by Harris and Damasio to challenge Walton's view, arguing that our affective responses to fiction closely resemble real emotions not only with respect to phenomenology, but also with respect to motivational force. More recently, Cova and Teroni also pointed to empirical evidence for the motivational force of affective responses to fiction (e.g., evidence that admiring virtuous fictional characters can motivate real‐life virtuous behavior). On the other hand, though, they also pointed to the large body of empirical research on emotion regulation to question the extent to which fictional emotions resemble real ones phenomenologically .…”
Section: Fiction Imagination and Cognitive Sciencementioning
confidence: 99%
“…It is beyond doubt that, with the exception of proponents of a very narrow cognitivist approach (e.g., Nussbaum, 2001; Solomon, 2003), few emotion theorists would find P3 even intuitively acceptable, at least in the formulation provided above. As acknowledged by Cova and Teroni (2016, p. 5), Radford himself does not take it for granted and “devotes a substantial part of his seminal discussion to arguing in favour of (PF3), or the slightly different proposition he uses in his own formulation of the paradox”. I shall soon have more to say on the implications of Radford's “slightly different proposition”, that brings into question notions such as those of likelihood and vividness, the analysis of which – I will argue – can help us out of the impasse 3.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%