Is There a Problem About Persistence?

Johnston, Mark; Forbes, Graeme

doi:10.1093/aristoteliansupp/61.1.107

Cited by 151 publications

(58 citation statements)

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“…8). I should mention a third option-building the temporal reference into the copula: a [is] t F. This 'adverbialist' proposal has been offered by Johnston (1987), Lowe (1987Lowe ( , 1988, Haslanger (1989). However, it is unclear whether As my presentation suggests, these three views on persistence can be taken as alternative ways of endorsing B-theory.…”

Section: Persistencementioning

confidence: 95%

Two Fundamentally Different Perspectives on Time

Mulder

2016

Axiomathes

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Frege taught us how to understand one form of predication: an atemporal one. There is also a different, temporal form of predication, which I briefly introduce. Accordingly, there are two fundamentally different approaches to time: a reductive one, aiming to account for time in terms of Frege's atemporal predication, and a non-reductive one, insisting that the temporal form of predication is sui generis, and that time is to be understood in its terms. I do not directly argue for or against reductionism in this paper. Rather, by evaluating the debates on endurantism-perdurantism, A-theory-B-theory, and presentism-eternalism, I argue that these debates, although aiming to be fundamental, largely boil down to mere quarrels between alternative reductive approaches. We should take notice of this fact and reorient ourselves within the debate on time accordingly: the real issue is whether we should reduce or not. I briefly sketch in what sense endurantism, A-theory, and presentism may be developed on a properly anti-reductionist basis.

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Section: Persistencementioning

confidence: 95%

Two Fundamentally Different Perspectives on Time

Mulder

2016

Axiomathes

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“…Johnston [1987], Lowe [1988]) hold that in a temporally qualified statement such as 'The candle has the property of being straight at t', the qualifier 'at t' is an adverb which modifies the copula 'has', and accordingly that such a statement expresses that the corresponding object exemplifies the corresponding property in a certain way-in our example, that the candle exemplifies the property of being straight 't-ly'. It would seem that adverbialists can account for the loss of properties without being committed to the view that these properties are tensed.…”

Section: Averting Hostile Takeovermentioning

confidence: 96%

Eternal Facts in an Ageing Universe

Correia¹,

Rosenkranz²

2012

Australasian Journal of Philosophy

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“…SORs of a four-dimensionalist persuasion might argue that even if social scientists tend to presuppose a commonsense endurance theory of persistence (according to which objects persist by being wholly present at distinct times as numerically the same entity, see Johnston 1987), this presupposition need not be a hindrance to the kind of ontological reductions under consideration so long as the social scientists do not, in their theorizing, explicitly deny that social objects exdure or perdure, and do not say things which are incompatible with such reductions.…”

Section: Against Reductive Token-token Identities IImentioning

confidence: 99%

Why the social sciences are irreducible

Wahlberg

2017

Synthese

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It is often claimed that the social sciences cannot be reduced to a lowerlevel individualistic science. The standard argument for this position (usually labelled explanatory holism) is the Fodorian multiple realizability argument. Its defenders endorse token-token(s) identities between "higher-level" social objects and pluralities/sums of "lower-level" individuals (a position traditionally called ontological individualism), but they maintain that the properties expressed by social science predicates are often multiply realizable, entailing that type-type identities between social and individualistic properties are ruled out. In this paper I argue that the multiple realizability argument for explanatory holism is unsound. The social sciences are indeed irreducible, but the principled reason for this is that the required token-token(s) identifications cannot in general be carried through. In consequence, paradigmatic social science predicates cannot be taken to apply to the objects quantified over in the lowerlevel sciences. The result is that typical social science predicates cannot even be held to be co-extensive with individualistic predicates, which means type-type identifications are ruled out too. Multiple realizability has nothing to do with this failure of co-extensiveness, because the relevant social science predicates are not multiply realized in the sense intended by the explanatory holists, a sense which presupposes reductive token-token(s) identifications.

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Is There a Problem About Persistence?

Cited by 151 publications

References 5 publications

Two Fundamentally Different Perspectives on Time

Two Fundamentally Different Perspectives on Time

Eternal Facts in an Ageing Universe

Why the social sciences are irreducible

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