Recent work on the hole argument in general relativity by Weatherall (2016b) has drawn attention to the neglected concept of (mathematical) models' representational capacities. I argue for several theses about the structure of these capacities, including that they should be understood not as many-to-one relations from models to the world, but in general as many-tomany relations constrained by the models' isomorphisms. I then compare these ideas with a recent argument by Belot (2017) for the claim that some isometries "generate new possibilities" in general relativity. Philosophical orthodoxy, by contrast, denies this. Properly understanding the role of representational capacities, I argue, reveals how Belot's rejection of orthodoxy does not go far enough, and makes better sense of our practices in theorizing about spacetime. * I would like to thank Gordon Belot, Neil Dewar, Ben Feintzeig, Jim Weatherall, and an anonymous referee for encouraging comments on a previous draft of this essay, which was written in part with the support from a Marie Curie Fellowship (PIIF-GA-2013-628533).1 See also Earman (1989). For reviews of the vast literature on the subject, from a range of philosophical and physical perspectives, including its bearing on broader debates about the metaphysics of spacetime, see Pooley (2013), Stachel (2014), Norton (2015, and references therein.