“…We conjecture that the firm's markups would likely be rising, at least since the 1980s as “industrial concentration in the US began to increase in the early 1980s in most sectors” (Pryor , 317) possibly due to a relaxation of antitrust activity and the associated boom in mergers (see Council of Economic Advisers ; Krugman ; Pryor ; Stiglitz , ). Recent papers by Autor et al (, ), Barkai (), Bessen (), Döttling, Gutiérrez, and Philippon (), and Grullon, Larkin, and Michaely (), amongst others, report rising concentration ratios and rising market power for the United States. Autor et al () find that there is a clear upward trend in industry concentration over the period 1982–2012 “across the vast bulk of the US private sector” (p.3).…”
We investigate the relationship between labor's share, firm's market power, and the elasticity of output with respect to labor input using an approach based on an unobserved components model. The approach yields time‐varying estimates of market power and the elasticity. Evidence on the market power of firms (which we find to be rising since 2000) gives a deeper understanding of movements in labor's share and the labor wedge. The generated values of the elasticity yield revised estimates of total factor productivity growth which is informative about the extent of the downward bias inherent in traditional estimates which use labor's share as a proxy for the elasticity. (JEL O47, C32, E25)
“…We conjecture that the firm's markups would likely be rising, at least since the 1980s as “industrial concentration in the US began to increase in the early 1980s in most sectors” (Pryor , 317) possibly due to a relaxation of antitrust activity and the associated boom in mergers (see Council of Economic Advisers ; Krugman ; Pryor ; Stiglitz , ). Recent papers by Autor et al (, ), Barkai (), Bessen (), Döttling, Gutiérrez, and Philippon (), and Grullon, Larkin, and Michaely (), amongst others, report rising concentration ratios and rising market power for the United States. Autor et al () find that there is a clear upward trend in industry concentration over the period 1982–2012 “across the vast bulk of the US private sector” (p.3).…”
We investigate the relationship between labor's share, firm's market power, and the elasticity of output with respect to labor input using an approach based on an unobserved components model. The approach yields time‐varying estimates of market power and the elasticity. Evidence on the market power of firms (which we find to be rising since 2000) gives a deeper understanding of movements in labor's share and the labor wedge. The generated values of the elasticity yield revised estimates of total factor productivity growth which is informative about the extent of the downward bias inherent in traditional estimates which use labor's share as a proxy for the elasticity. (JEL O47, C32, E25)
“…All financials are converted to USD using the OECD's exchange rates. See Dottling et al (2017) for additional discussion of the dataset.…”
Section: G4 Bvd Orbismentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Data is sourced across all countries as reported, and aggregated to the segments of Dottling et al (2017) in order to use the corresponding ORBIS concentration series. To be specific, KLEMS data is available at the sector level (19 groups) following the ISIC Rev.…”
Section: G Datamentioning
confidence: 99%
“…from OECD, including all countries for which NFC data was available (AUT, BEL, CZE, DEU, ITA, ESP, EST, FIN, FRA, HUN, LTU, LUX, LVA, NLD, SWE, USA). SeeDottling et al (2017) for details on dataset construction.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Again, we find no persistent investment gap in the EU, compared to a persistent investment gap in the US. SeeGutiérrez and Philippon (2017b) for a more detailed discussion of the evolution of investment in the US, andDottling et al (2017) for a comparison of the EU and the US.…”
Over the past twenty years, Europe has deregulated many industries, protected consumer welfare, and created strongly independent regulators. These policies represent a stark departure from historical traditions in continental Europe. How and why did this turnaround happen? We build a political economy model of market regulation and we compare the design of national and supranational regulators. We show that countries in a single market willingly promote a supranational regulator that enforces free markets beyond the preferences of any individual country. We test and confirm the predictions of the model. European institutions are indeed more independent and enforce competition more strongly than any individual country ever did. Countries with ex-ante weaker institutions benefit more from the delegation of competition policy to the EU level.
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