Is There an Islamist Political Advantage?

Abstract

There is a widespread presumption that Islamists have an advantage over their opponents when it comes to generating mass appeal and winning elections. The question remains, however, as to whether these advantages—or, what we refer to collectively as an Islamist political advantage—actually exist. We argue that—to the extent that Islamists have a political advantage—the primary source of this advantage is reputation rather than the provision of social services, organizational capacity, or ideological hegemony. Our purpose is not to dismiss the main sources of the Islamist governance advantage identified in scholarly literature and media accounts, but to suggest a different causal path whereby each of these factors individually and sometimes jointly promotes a reputation for Islamists as competent, trustworthy, and pure. It is this reputation for good governance that enables Islamists to distinguish themselves in the streets and at the ballot box.

Infrastructure Provision, Politics and Religion: Insights From Tunisia's New Democracy

“…The party explicitly emphasized on 'implementing an urgent local development program starting in 2012 to improve the living conditions of citizens in deprived regions by improving infrastructure, public amenities and health care' (Ennahdha Electoral Programme 2011, principle 123, p. 38). 4 As argued by Cammett and Luong (2014), Ennahdha's commitment to provide better public services for the most deprived regions is consistent with the widespread sense in the Middle East that Islamist organizations have a solid ability to deliver public and social services in a more effective and less corrupt way than do non-religious parties. Islamist movements, such as Hamas, Hezbollah, and Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood have been considerably more active in areas 'where state-run services were absent or deficient' than in other areas (Wickham 2002, p. 104).…”

“…We find that the direction of the relationship fluctuates. In 2011, areas with higher access are associated with higher support for Ennahdha than areas with lower access, appearing, at least initially, to contradict Cammett and Luong (2014). The apparent contradiction disappears with the election of December 2014; despite the election loss, improvements in access to water between the two elections are (partially) associated with stronger support for Ennahdha (that is, in areas where improvements took place).…”

Genießen islamistische Parteien tatsächlich einen politischen Vorteil? Das Beispiel Tunesien

“…Wir argumentieren, dass islamistische Parteien ihren Wählern einen "information shortcut" oder "cue" als Heuristik 3 bereitstellen, der die von ihnen zu erwartenden moralischen Qualitäten (Cammett / Luong 2014) bzw. die damit verbundenen politischen Positionen (Pepinsky et al 2012) signalisiert und so bei WählerInnen positive Evaluierungen auslöst.…”

Dimensions of Youth Exclusion in the Middle East

“…69 This suggests that, despite declining support for Islamists even among those who receive services, Islamist social services may generate support not only through clientelism but also by building a reputation for effectiveness and good governance. 70 Engagement with political organizations that provide services also opens up an avenue for employment, improved well-being, as well as a sense of belonging.…”