Is there imaginary loudness? Reconsidering phenomenological method

Abstract

Because imagination constitutes an indispensable tool of phenomenology, e.g., in understanding another author's description, in eidetic reduction, etc., the practicability of phenomenological method and its claim to objectivity ought to be reconsidered with regard to its dependence on imagination. Auditory imagery serves to illustrate problems involved in grasping and analyzing imaginative contents -loudness in this case. Similar to phonetic segmentation and classification, phenomenologists segment and classify mental acts and contents. Just as phoneticians rely on experts' evaluations of notations to reach valid results, phenomenologists may try to develop similar agreement procedures to escape the 'subjectivism' of their solitary first-person approach.Imagination constitutes an integral part of phenomenological method. Imagination is involved in understanding phenomenological descriptions of things not originally present to oneself, in distinguishing abstract parts from each other or from a whole, in generalizing abstraction, and in "eidetic intuition." However, acts of imagination are only indirectly observable. Thus they are apt to motivate suspicions about the objectivity of phenomenology. The practicability of (classical) phenomenological analysis and its claim to objectivity ("rigorous science," "apodicticity") ought to be reconsidered with regard to their dependence on imagination.In what follows I shall not try to scrutinize the whole of phenomenological method. I will confine myself to Husserlian phenomenology, i.e., to the dependence of Husserlian phenomenological method on imagination. The case of imaginary loudness will serve to illustrate one of the problems arising within this particular area; namely, the problem of auditory imagery, a problem which also concerns the practicability of the phenomenological analysis of this area and phenomenology in general. In the final section of the paper I will consider a possible remedy for "subjectivism," i.e., the threat of missing the validity or objectivity of phenomenology. This remedy could involve doing phenomenology cooperatively, taking as an example the agreement procedures in phonetics.

Experiences of hearing voices: analysis of a novel phenomenological survey

“…So-called sound talk (mentions of loudness, timbre, pitch, resonance, accent, and rhythm) was very common throughout the sample, complicating clear distinctions between thoughts and perceptions (eg, “My thoughts are shouting” or “I experience a silent scream […] a presence, an emotional energy, or potential that I can feel but not hear”). These findings are similar to historical, cognitive, and phenomenological research on the qualities of imagined sound 23,24 and raise the question of whether some voices might be better understood as passive or uncontrolled imagined perceptions, rather than perceptual hallucinations. The extent to which the message of auditory hallucinations can be understood without being heard is also worthy of further study.…”