Is there introspective evidence for phenomenal intentionality?

Abstract

Abstract. The so-called transparency of experience (henceforth TE) is the intuition that, in introspecting one's own experience, one is only aware of certain properties (like colors, shapes, etc.) as features of (apparently) mind-independent objects. TE is quite popular among philosophers of mind and has traditionally been used to motivate Representationalism, i.e. the view that phenomenal character is in some strong way dependent on intentionality. However, more recently, others have appealed to TE to go the opposite way and support the Phenomenal Intentionality View (PIV), according to which intentionality is in some strong way dependent on phenomenal character. If this line of argument succeeds, then not only TE does not speak in favor of Representationalism, but it actually speaks against it, contrary to the philosophical common-sense of the last two decades. Moreover, the representationalist project of naturalizing phenomenal character turns out to be seriously undermined on the same intuitive grounds that were supposed to make it plausible. In this paper, I reconstruct and discuss the line of argument from TE to PIV and argue that our introspective intuitions (TE) do not push us in the direction of PIV. On the contrary, the line of argument from TE to PIV is (at best) simply too weak to force us to conclude that intentionality depends on phenomenal character in the sense required for PIV to be true.

Troubles with Phenomenal Intentionality

“…Clearly, however, this reply risks presupposing what it must explain (Nelkin 2001, Georgalis 2003, Bordini 2017a). If by appealing to looks one ends up holding that intentionality is determined by a way of seeming, then that seeming is already an intentional state.…”

A New Puzzle for Phenomenal Intentionality

“…An account of intentionality aims to explain how mental states have this kind of intentionality. According to phenomenal intentionality theories (PITs), which have recently enjoyed significant attention (Bailey & Richards 2014;Bordini 2017;Forrest 2017;Goff 2017;Horgan 2013;Kriegel 2013;Mendelovici 2018;Montague 2016), the intentionality of mental states has its basis in their phenomenology.…”

The extended mind argument against phenomenal intentionality

“…The argument is important because it undermines an increasingly prominent account of the nature of intentionality. PIT has entered the philosophical mainstream and is now a serious contender to naturalistic views of intentionality like the tracking theory and the functional role theory (Bordini, 2017;Farkas, 2008;Forrest, 2017;Horgan & Tienson, 2002;Kriegel, 2013;Loar, 1987Loar, , 2003Mendelovici, 2018;Montague, 2016;Pitt, 2004;Searle, 1990;Strawson, 1994). The extended mind argument against PIT challenges the popular sentiment that intentionality is grounded in consciousness.…”