Is There Reason to Believe the Principle of Sufficient Reason?

Abstract

Shamik Dasgupta (2016) proposes to tame the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) to apply to only non-autonomous facts, which are facts that are apt for explanation. Call this strategy to tame the PSR the taming strategy. In a recent paper, Della Rocca (2020a) argues that proponents of the taming strategy, in attempting to formulate a restricted version of the PSR, nevertheless find themselves committed to endorsing a form of radical monism, which, in turn, leads right back to an untamed-PSR. Suppose, for the sake of argument, that Della Rocca is right. My question is this:Is there reason to believe the principle of sufficient reason (in its untamed version)?In this paper, I argue that it is impossible for there to be a reason to believe the untamed-PSR.

Nāgārjuna and Vasubandhu on the principle of sufficient reason

“…Moreover, the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras, on which Nāgārjuna's system is based, consistently describe all things as without a ground (apada, gzhi med/gzhi ma mchis pa), 57 which at first glance might be read as a flat rejection of the PSR. However, the 54 See also Walters (2022) for a response to Levey's argument from the indefinite extensibility of contingent truths. 55 For instance, Kris McDaniel (2019b: 235) has pointed out that the indefinite extensibility response to the Bennett-van Inwagen argument would yield a hierarchy of increasingly more fundamental facts, and comments that, "if this is the price one must pay for salvaging the PSR, better to consign the PSR to the wrecking yard.".…”