Is your commute driving you crazy?

Abstract

Traffic is not only a source of frustration but also a leading cause of death for people under 35 years of age. Recent research has focused on how driver assistance technologies can be used to mitigate traffic fatalities and create more enjoyable commutes. In this work, we consider cooperative adaptive cruise control (CACC) or platooning, a driver assistance technology that controls the speed of vehicles and inter-vehicle spacing. CACC equipped cars use radar to fine tune inter-vehicle spacing and dedicated short-range communication (DSRC) to collaboratively accelerate and decelerate. Platooning can reduce fuel consumption by over 5% and increases the density of cars on a highway. Previous work on platooning has focused on proving string stability, which guarantees that the error between cars does not grow with the length of a platoon, but little work has considered the impact an attacker can have on a platoon. To design safe distributed controllers and networks it is essential to understand the possible attacks that could be mounted against platoons.In this work, we design a set of insider attacks and abnormal behaviors that occur in a platoon of cars. For example, we introduce the collision induction attack where an attacker exploits the platoon controller to cause a high-speed accident with the car following it. To mitigate these insider attacks we design a model-based detection scheme that leverages the broadcast nature of DSRC. Each car uses DSRC messages from other cars in the platoon to model the expected behavior of the car directly preceding it. If the expected behavior and actual behavior differ the monitoring vehicle switches to non-cooperative ACC, relying solely on radar, to mitigate the impact of the attack. We show that our detection scheme is able to detect many of our proposed insider attacks and when combined with a well designed ACC controller can avoid collisions. We propose combining our detection scheme with a global reputation scheme to detect when a car is malicious or needs maintenance.

Security and Privacy Issues in Autonomous Vehicles: A Layer-Based Survey

“…This malicious car combines some changes to the gains of the control law with vehicle movements, thereby forcing the platoon to oscillate at a resonant frequency and violating the platoon string stability features, resulting in fatal accidents. In [32], the authors managed to mimic a high-speed collision induction attack by overtaking the platoon controller. They manipulated the DSRC to cause an expected behavior from a platoon member, thereby causing collisions.…”

Adaptive radial basis function sliding mode control for platoons under DoS attacks

“…[24] investigated a novel convex optimization‐based Resilient Distributed State Estimator (RDSE), which performs better than the Distributed Kalman Filter (DKF). [25] developed an error calculation and threshold‐based mechanism that compares the expected behaviour of the vehicle ahead with the observed behaviour to detect an attack. When an attack is detected, the control mode is switched from CACC to ACC so that the vehicle can navigate using only radar or LIDAR data.…”

Observer-based adaptive ISMC for connected vehicles against cyber-attacks

“…Remark 5. Different from previous studies, [19][20][21][22][23][24] which only consider system stability under different attacks, this paper analyze the string stability of CV, which can effectively suppress the gradual amplification of interference along a string of vehicles with cyber-attacks.…”

“…Zhao et al 23 also designed an attack detection framework, which can realize the safe driving by estimation and prediction when the vehicle cannot obtain the complete state information. Debruhl et al 24 extended the attack detection strategy based on sensor-based proportional differential link and communication feedforward link to real-time switching control strategy in the presence of cyber-attacks. As far as we know, how to design a controller that can effectively suppress the gradual amplification of interference along a string of vehicles with cyber-attacks while ensuring individual stability still remains as an open and challenging problem.…”