Islamization by Secular Ruling Parties: The Case of Bangladesh

Abstract

As of yet, Islamization by secular ruling parties has hardly been investigated in depth. To bridge this gap, the present article reviews the existing literature on Islamization, synthesizes the scattered existing theoretical insights on Islamization by secular actors and applies them to the case of Bangladesh. It argues that, especially when they act in conjunction, three main conditions can drive secular rulers to Islamize public policy: first, the rise of Islamist social movements; second, fierce political competition; and third, (semi-)authoritarian rule. Focusing on the current Awami League (AL) government, the article shows how these three factors have interacted to produce a top-down process of state-led Islamization in Bangladesh.

Political Leadership Transmission Practices by The Political Parties from 2006: A Study of Democracy in Bangladesh

“…The leaderless BNP has threatened to boycott the upcoming elections if he is not released, and the neutral or non-partisan caretaker government (NPCG) is not conducted (BBC, 2014). The BNP boycotted the 2014 elections (Ellen Barry, 2014), saying it had no faith in the electoral process in the absence of a non-partisan caretaker government (NPCG) (Lorch, 2019). Although the boycott resulted in only 30% of the electorate voting, the Awami League (AL) came to power with an overwhelming majority (Kamran Reza Chowdhury, 2020).…”

Blasphemy and Judicial Legitimacy in Indonesia

“…Considering the increasing salience of blasphemy cases, and the modest performance of Islamic parties such as the National Awakening Party (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, PKB) in recent general elections, there appears to be a paradox in Indonesian politics. One explanation is that both secular and religious political parties defend religious beliefs and engage in Islamization (Lorch 2019, 260), while risk aversion tends to prevent parties from challenging the blasphemy laws. As Marcus Mietzner (2018) suggests, the calculated Islamist mobilizations against former governor Purnama, particularly the December 2, 2016 mass incident known as the “212 movement” involving hundreds of thousands of protestors in Jakarta, have reopened debates about religious polarization and the resurgence of populism in Indonesia.…”

‘Safeguarding Islam’ in modern times: Politics, piety and Hefazat-e-Islami ‘ulama in Bangladesh

“…In highlighting the nature of academic work on Islam in South Asia, Osella and Osella (2008, 249-251) argue that much of the ethnographic work on South Asian Islam portrays Sufi-inspired forms of popular Islam as “plural, fluid, authentic and so on,” while reformism and traditionalism are attributed as being “closed, rigid, and dogmatic.” Though anthropologists problematize this dichotomy in a number of ways, 3 recent academic works often deem traditionalist Islamic groups like HI as a threat to and crisis for national identity in Bangladesh (e.g., Khondker 2016, 29; Islam 2015, 75). In explaining the influence of the ‘ulama and the turn of the “masses” to Islamic forms of sociability in Bangladesh, scholars often note that the military regimes as well as the secularized government actively patronized the process of Islamization to legitimize their semi-autocratic rule since 1975 (e.g., Islam 2015; Lorch 2019). Some attribute it to backward-thinking among the ‘ulama , while some accuse certain Middle Eastern countries of financing the Islamization of Bangladesh (e.g., Hasan 2012, 69).…”

“…However, since 2016 the HI has been heard again in pressuring the government as a form of resistance against a series of issues (i.e., removing the Greek-inspired sculpture in front of the Supreme Court, changing textbook curriculum, etc.). This time the government met many of its demands, including state recognition of QM Education, removing the Greek-inspired sculpture in front of the Supreme Court, and so on (Lorch 2019).…”