ISP and CP collaboration with content piracy

Park, Ji Won; Im, Nari; Mo, Jeonghoon

doi:10.1109/iccs.2014.7024788

Cited by 5 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 5 publications

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“…Note that when 1 < r/c ≤ n, unlike in the non-neutral regime, making no contributions to the ISP, resulting in zero suplus for all parties, is an equilibrium between the CPs. The other equilibrium, given by (10), results in a positive surplus for all parties (as is shown in the following corollary). In the remainder of this section, we will refer to this latter equilibrium as the non-zero equilibrium.…”

Section: B Neutral Regimementioning

confidence: 63%

“…Several works [7], [8], [9], [10], [11] study the possibility of content charges by ISPs to recover investment costs. In [7] and [8], the authors investigated the feasibility of ISPs charging a content charge to CPs, and evaluate its effect by modeling the Stackelberg game between CPs and ISPs.…”

Section: A Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In [7] and [8], the authors investigated the feasibility of ISPs charging a content charge to CPs, and evaluate its effect by modeling the Stackelberg game between CPs and ISPs. In [9] and [10], a revenue-sharing scheme is proposed when the ISP provides a content piracy monitoring service to CPs for increasing the demand for their content. This work is extended to two ISPs competing with each other in [11] where only one of them provides the content piracy monitoring service.…”

Section: A Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…When r/c > n, (β N i , i ∈ N ) is the only Nash equilibrium, where β N i is given by (10). Note that when 1 < r/c ≤ n, unlike in the non-neutral regime, making no contributions to the ISP, resulting in zero suplus for all parties, is an equilibrium between the CPs.…”

Section: B Neutral Regimementioning

confidence: 99%

See 3 more Smart Citations

Revenue Sharing in the Internet: A Moral Hazard Approach and a Net-neutrality Perspective

Malik,

~Hanawal,

Hayel

et al. 2019

Preprint

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Revenue sharing contracts between Content Providers (CPs) and Internet Service Providers (ISPs) can act as leverage for enhancing the infrastructure of the Internet. ISPs can be incentivised to make investments in network infrastructure that improve Quality of Service (QoS) for users if attractive contracts are negotiated between them and CPs. The idea here is that part of the net profit gained by CPs are given to ISPs to invest in the network. The Moral Hazard economic framework is used to model such an interaction, in which a principal determines a contract, and an agent reacts by adapting her effort. In our setting, several competitive CPs interact through one common ISP. Two cases are studied: (i) the ISP differentiates between the CPs and makes a (potentially) different investment to improve the QoS of each CP, and (ii) the ISP does not differentiate between CPs and makes a common investment for both. The last scenario can be viewed as network neutral behavior on the part of the ISP. We analyse the optimal contracts and show that the CP that can better monetize its demand always prefers the non-neutral regime. Interestingly, ISP revenue, as well as social utility, are also found to be higher under the non-neutral regime.

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Section: B Neutral Regimementioning

confidence: 63%