Israel and the Arab Gulf states: from tacit cooperation to reconciliation?

Abstract

The Gulf states have preferred to adhere to the basic Arab position vis-à-vis Israel, albeit supplementing such positions with their own, sometimes significant, adjustments. However the common threat from Iran has become a source of rapprochement between them and Israel, even if the establishment of 'normal relations' remains dependent on progress in the peace process between Israel and the Palestinians, Arab consensus and GCC politics. The two sides, each with their own logic, seem to prefer to maintain a dual policy that on the one hand accepts the lack of normalization but on the other hand maintains active, albeit tacit, ties.

Democratic values and the microfoundations of Arab support for peace with Israel

“…The so-called Arab Peace Initiative, which was launched by then-Crown Prince and later King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia in late 2002 and endorsed by the 22 member states of the Arab League and the 57 member states of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, was designed to specifically address the aforementioned Israeli skepticism regarding the Arab world’s willingness to accept Israel’s right to exist (Podeh, 2014). While the initial Abdullah plan had offered Israel full political, economic and cultural normalization, Syrian and Lebanese intransigence meant that the final version only offered “normal relations” (Guzansky, 2015; Maddy-Weitzman, 2010).…”

“…These countries have very different relations with Israel ranging from the ups and downs of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, the relatively stable peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan, the tensions and conflict with Lebanon and Iraq, to the more distant relations with North and East African countries such as Algeria, Tunisia, and Sudan. Most importantly, the data offers a rare insight into public opinion on peace with Israel within Saudi Arabia, a country which has played a central role in regional crisis diplomacy over the last decades and is seen as able to lend crucial political and religious legitimacy to any agreement which Israelis and Palestinians might reach over controversial issues such as refugees and the status of Jerusalem (Guzansky, 2015). The detection of consistent attitudinal patterns across such as diverse set of countries would tremendously improve confidence in the generalizability of findings.…”

Balancing deterrence: Iran-Israel relations in a turbulent Middle East

“…Although the Saudi regime has never confirmed any bilateral cooperation with the Israeli’s, there is, however, manifestations to this non-formal cooperation, by which obviously, Saudi Arabia together with the Gulf States adopted a firm stance over Iran’s regional policy and on the Iranian nuclear issue in particular. This bloc of Gulf monarchies is the most united and seems to be the closest to the Israeli position on Iran (Guzansky, 2015, p. 138).…”

“…The agreement reached in Geneva between Iran and the P5 + 1 countries regarding Iran’s nuclear program has got Israel and Saudi Arabia even closer. Both countries opposed the agreement they feared would allow Iran to become, in fact, a nuclear threshold state and simultaneously to break out of its isolation in the international arena, thus, offering Iran the opportunity to expand its regional influence (Guzansky, 2015, p. 140).…”

Τουρκία Και Ισραήλ Στη Μέση Ανατολή

“…Παρά το ότι αυτό δεν υπονοεί ότι οι κυβερνήσεις δεν ασκούν πια την εξωτερική πολιτική, είναι φανερό ότι η αλληλεξάρτηση, η ανησυχία για παγκόσμια προβλήματα και μόνιμες συμμετοχές σε συμμαχίες, περιφερειακές και διεθνείς οργανώσεις, σημαίνει ότι οι κυβερνήσεις δεν είναι πλέον ελεύθερες να αποφασίζουν αυτόνομα για τις πολιτικές των κρατών τους». 16 64 Alpher, "Israel: alternative regional options in a changing Middle East", ό.π., 1-9.…”