Italian Mafias, Public Procurement and Public Works in Southern Italy

The effects of mafia infiltration on public procurement performance

“…To our knowledge, our study is the first attempt to analyse the effects of Mafia infiltration on PP performance, using a wide sample of PWC over a 6-year period. In particular, we contribute to the related literature by providing empirical evidence of opportunistic strategies, recently documented in anti-Mafia judicial investigations (Caneppele and Martocchia, 2014;DIA, 2016;Martocchia et al, 2014;Spartà, 2016), whereby, to exclude more efficient and capable competitors, colluded companies within the Mafia network get PWC awarded through abnormally high rebates that are subsequently offset with price renegotiations, leading to cost overruns.…”

Mafia wears out women in power: Evidence from italian municipalities

“…In the tender phase, the mafia often uses threats or violence to deter competitors. Finally, the execution of contracts often involves firms connected to criminal groups as well as "clean" firms which must transfer a portion of the revenue to them (Caneppele and Martocchia, 2014).…”

The extra‐legal governance of corruption: Tracing the organization of corruption in public procurement

“…The article draws on the case of Italy, a country experiencing both high levels of corruption (Della Porta & Vannucci, 1999, 2012) 1 and a rooted and heterogeneous presence of mafia‐like groups. These groups operate in the South (Calderoni, 2011), their homeland and stronghold, but also in Central and Northern Italy, where these groups have transplanted new criminal branches since the 1960s, infiltrating the legitimate economy (Caneppele et al, 2009), such as the construction industry or public procurement (Caneppele & Martocchia, 2014; Catino & Moro, 2016; Dagnes et al, 2020; Sciarrone, 2012; Varese, 2011). In the past two decades, mafias' impact on Italy's economy and policy‐making has been widely scrutinized by a significant number of empirical studies, assessing their influence upon elections and local governance (Di Cataldo & Mastrorocco, 2020; Sberna & Vannucci, 2019), public spending (Acconcia et al, 2014; Barone & Narciso, 2015; Fenizia, 2018; Ravenda et al, 2020), legitimate economy (Montani, 2013).…”