Japan's emerging role as a 'global ordinary power'

Transposition in Japanese state identities: overseas troop dispatches and the emergence of a humanitarian power?

“…Further to the emergence of the debate on Japan becoming a normal state, identity research has focused on the contemporary period (Inoguchi and Bacon 2006;Singh 2011). In their five-stage model, for instance, Inoguchi and Bacon (2006) go so far as to say that, since 2005, Japan has entered the stage of 'a global ordinary power [normal state]'.…”

“…In their five-stage model, for instance, Inoguchi and Bacon (2006) go so far as to say that, since 2005, Japan has entered the stage of 'a global ordinary power [normal state]'. But such a conclusion appears premature to us, given the existence of the unrevised peace constitution, the asymmetrical alliance with the USA, the continuing efficacy of anti-militarist norms and, especially, the exclusive use of non-combat troops for overseas military projection.…”

“…The implication for security policy was indirect, rather than direct, support of US wars, as evidenced by Prime Minister Satō Eisaku's unwillingness to dispatch troops to fight alongside the USA in Vietnam, unlike South Korea, Australia and other US allies. Since a peace state is largely devoid of any sense of proactive involvement in international peace and security through the deployment of military forces, Japan became embedded deeply in the US-dominated security structure as a reactive peace state, as expressed through the Yoshida Doctrine (Inoguchi and Bacon 2006). …”

Japan's security policy: from a peace state to an international state

“…They pushed for Japan to develop a stronger military and greater security independence from the United States (Boyd and Samuels 2005: 3); and (2) the progressives' (including intellectuals, labour activists, and left-of-centre politicians) position, as articulated by the Heiwa Mondai Danwakai (Peace Issues Discussion Group), supported the concept of 'unarmed neutrality' that opposed the use of organised violence. They supported the institutionalisation of the Peace Constitution, and opposed the US-Japan Security Treaty and the rearmament efforts based on the justification that both contradicted the Japanese Constitution (Inoguchi and Bacon 2006: 2). 6 The peace-state identity emerged as a compromise between the pragmatists and revisionists before the 1960s and between the pragmatists and progressives after the 1960s.…”

“…10 Many competing identities emerged to account for the developments in Japan's post-Cold War security policy, including Japan as a 'global civilian power' (Funabashi 1991-92;Hughes 1999); a 'normal' state (Hughes 2004;Ozawa 1994; Downloaded by [Harvard Library] at 08:19 04 October 2014 B. Singh: Japan's security policy 321 Singh 2002); and an 'ordinary' state or country (Inoguchi and Bacon 2006). Japan as a global civilian power falls within the peace-state category, as it argues for a continuation of Japan's minimalist security policy in military-strategic affairs.…”