Japanese keiretsu: Past, present, future

McGuire, Jean; Dow, Sandra

doi:10.1007/s10490-008-9104-5

Cited by 94 publications

(38 citation statements)

References 97 publications

(147 reference statements)

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“…Second, the availability of financing from a group's internal capital market insulates the firm from external scrutiny and capital market pressures that constrain unrelated diversification in public corporations (Almeida & Wolfenzon, 2006;Keister, 2001). Third, sociological perspectives suggest that the investment activity of affiliates is driven more by the needs of the group than by their own requirements, leading to their involvement in activities that unaffiliated firms would not take part in (McGuire & Dow, 2009). Given the significant bureaucratic and coordination costs associated with the management of diverse operations (Hoskisson, Johnson, Tihanyi, & White, 2005), we expect that these tendencies toward unrelated diversification will negatively influence affiliate-level financial performance.…”

Section: Diversificationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Business Group Performance, Context, and Strategy: A Meta-Analysis.

Carney¹,

Gedajlovic²,

Heugens³

et al. 2010

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Research on business groups -legally independent firms tied together in a variety of formal and informal ways -is accelerating. Through meta-analytical techniques employed on a database of 141 studies covering 28 different countries, we synthesize this research and extend it by testing several new hypotheses. We find that affiliation diminishes firm performance in general, but also that affiliates are comparatively better off in contexts with underdeveloped financial and labor market institutions. We also trace the affiliation discount to specific strategic actions taken at the firm and group levels. Overall, our results indicate that affiliate performance reflects complex processes and motivations.The past decade has witnessed a surge in research regarding the performance of business groups (BGs), which Khanna and Rivkin (2001) define as "firms which though legally independent, are bound together by a constellation of formal and informal ties and are accustomed to taking coordinated action" (p. 47). Three points of consensus are apparent in this body of work. First, BGs are ubiquitous in many countries with types such as Japanese Keiretsus and Zaibatsu

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Section: Diversificationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Business Group Performance, Context, and Strategy: A Meta-Analysis.

Carney¹,

Gedajlovic²,

Heugens³

et al. 2010

AMPROC

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“…While Japan and Korea's emblematic firms may be considered to be, respectively, the keiretsu and chaebol linked enterprise (McGuire & Dow, 2009), the question arises as to the distinctive features of the Asian firm beyond these two countries. On this point, different scholars have emphasized differing distinctive characteristics of Asian firms including: ownership concentration (Huegens, Van Oosterhout, & van Essen, 2009), broad product market scope (Peng & Delios, 2006), the organization of firms into business groups (Carney, 2008), reliance on personal networks to facilitate transactions (Park & Luo, 2001), dependence upon imported technology (Hobday, 1995), presence of family in top management teams (Steier, 2009), and modest emphasis given to research and development or the establishment of international brands (Redding, 1990).…”

Section: An Emblematic Asian Firm?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Varieties of Asian capitalism: Toward an institutional theory of Asian enterprise

2009

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In this paper we respond to calls for an institution-based perspective on strategy. With its emphasis upon mimetic, coercive, and normative isomorphism, institutional theory has earned a deterministic reputation and seems an unlikely foundation on which to construct a theory of strategy. However, a second movement in institutional theory is emerging that gives greater emphasis to creativity and agency. We develop this approach by highlighting co-evolutionary processes that are shaping the varieties of capitalism (VoC) in Asia. To do so, we examine the extent to which the VoC model can be fruitfully applied in the Asian context. In the spirit of the second movement of institutional theory, we describe three processes in which firm strategy collectively and intentionally feeds back to shape institutions: (1)

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“…In contrast to the symmetrical shareholding in horizontal keiretsu, shareholding in vertical keiretsu is not reciprocal and suppliers hold small (if any) in their core manufacturer. The core manufacturer usually invests holds share in first tier, concurrently encourages them to buy shares in second tier suppliers (McGuire & Dow, 2009). This pyramidal nature of shareholding links all companies in the group in a way in which the core company even might be unaware of number of its affiliates (Miyashita & Russel, 1994), (Figure 2).…”

Section: Vertical Keiretsumentioning

confidence: 99%

“…On the other hand, the core company prefer to hold greater ownership in more dedicated affiliates and suppliers. These mutual benefits induce both parties to work toward long-term relationship by offering lower costs and higher quality (McGuire & Dow, 2009). Cross-shareholding also could facilitate flow of information among group members and stability of their relationships which could result in a mutual moralized trading relationship in which both sides consider it as an obligation and try to support it (McMillan, 1994).…”

Section: Vertical Keiretsumentioning

confidence: 99%