Jaspers’ Dilemma: The Psychopathological Challenge to Subjectivity Theories of Consciousness

Billon, Alexandre; Kriegel, Uriah

doi:10.7551/mitpress/9780262029346.003.0002

Cited by 59 publications

(34 citation statements)

References 29 publications

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“…As some of the advocates of this distinction put it, the subjective character does not capture the what-it-is-like-ness of the conscious state, but its for-me-ness : while my experiences of seeing a red apple and seeing a green apple differ in their qualitative character, they are said to be the same with respect to their subjective character, because in both cases it is for me that it is like something to have them (Zahavi and Kriegel, 2016). According to a bundle of theories which have been collectively referred to as “subjectivity theories of consciousness”, subjective character is a necessary condition of phenomenal consciousness, because the two are constitutively linked (Billon and Kriegel, 2015) 4 . These theories endorse the following “subjective character principle” (SCP):

(SCP) Necessarily, a mental state is phenomenally conscious if and only if it has subjective character .

…”

Section: The Significance Of Died For Philosophy Of Mindmentioning

confidence: 99%

Looking for the Self: Phenomenology, Neurophysiology and Philosophical Significance of Drug-induced Ego Dissolution

Millière

2017

Front. Hum. Neurosci.

148

155

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There is converging evidence that high doses of hallucinogenic drugs can produce significant alterations of self-experience, described as the dissolution of the sense of self and the loss of boundaries between self and world. This article discusses the relevance of this phenomenon, known as “drug-induced ego dissolution (DIED)”, for cognitive neuroscience, psychology and philosophy of mind. Data from self-report questionnaires suggest that three neuropharmacological classes of drugs can induce ego dissolution: classical psychedelics, dissociative anesthetics and agonists of the kappa opioid receptor (KOR). While these substances act on different neurotransmitter receptors, they all produce strong subjective effects that can be compared to the symptoms of acute psychosis, including ego dissolution. It has been suggested that neuroimaging of DIED can indirectly shed light on the neural correlates of the self. While this line of inquiry is promising, its results must be interpreted with caution. First, neural correlates of ego dissolution might reveal the necessary neurophysiological conditions for the maintenance of the sense of self, but it is more doubtful that this method can reveal its minimally sufficient conditions. Second, it is necessary to define the relevant notion of self at play in the phenomenon of DIED. This article suggests that DIED consists in the disruption of subpersonal processes underlying the “minimal” or “embodied” self, i.e., the basic experience of being a self rooted in multimodal integration of self-related stimuli. This hypothesis is consistent with Bayesian models of phenomenal selfhood, according to which the subjective structure of conscious experience ultimately results from the optimization of predictions in perception and action. Finally, it is argued that DIED is also of particular interest for philosophy of mind. On the one hand, it challenges theories according to which consciousness always involves self-awareness. On the other hand, it suggests that ordinary conscious experience might involve a minimal kind of self-awareness rooted in multisensory processing, which is what appears to fade away during DIED.

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(SCP) Necessarily, a mental state is phenomenally conscious if and only if it has subjective character .

…”

Section: The Significance Of Died For Philosophy Of Mindmentioning

confidence: 99%

Looking for the Self: Phenomenology, Neurophysiology and Philosophical Significance of Drug-induced Ego Dissolution

Millière

2017

Front. Hum. Neurosci.

148

155

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“…This is also independently interesting because many theories of consciousness claim that phenomenal character constitutively depends on subjective character and imply that an attenuation of the latter should entail an attenuation of the former (see fn. 6 and Billon and Kriegel (in press)).…”

Section: Rationality and Experience Among Self‐doubtersmentioning

confidence: 95%

Why Are We Certain that We Exist?

Billon

2014

Philos Phenomenol Research

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Descartes was certain that he was thinking and he was accordingly certain that he existed. Like Descartes, we seem to be more certain of our thoughts and our existence than of anything else. What is less clear is the reason why we are thus certain. Philosophers throughout history have provided different interpretations of the cogito, disagreeing both on the kind of thoughts it characterizes and on the reasons for its cogency. According to what we may call the empiricist interpretation of the cogito, I can only claim to be certain of having experiences, and this certainty, as well as that of my own existence, stems from their phenomenal and subjective character. According to rationalist interpretations, on the other hand, I am certain of having some self‐reflexive propositional attitudes, and this certainty derives from their rational features. Psychiatric patients suffering from acute forms of depersonalization or of the Cotard syndrome often doubt that they think and exist, and might even believe that they don't. I argue that their study allows us to favor the empiricist interpretation of the cogito.

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“…This motivates Billon and Kriegel (2014) to suggest that rather than there being "something missing" (e.g., SA), delusions of control and thought insertion really involve "something added"-namely a phenomenology of alienation, which is not present in the case of unbidden thoughts, and which is reflected in the claim made by the subject manifesting these symptoms that someone or something else is making his thoughts, or making him act or forcing him to move. 5 Clearly, however, a more adequate account must include both something missing (SA) and something added (a phenomenology of alienation) to explain these phenomena.…”

Section: Phenomenologymentioning

confidence: 96%

“…One can take the phenomenological report of the subject seriously, as Billon wants to do, without assuming that the schizophrenic subject has adopted the philosophical or scientific conceptual vocabulary of the distinction between SO and SA and is using it to express his complaint. Indeed, as Billon and Kriegel (2014) suggest, "we cannot reasonably expect [patients] to spontaneously master some conceptual distinctions that philosophers have just started to draw rigorously." Only if the subject adopted such a specialized vocabulary would we be required to follow what Billon defines as the "Phenomenological principle: If the patient says that an occurrent thought is not his, then it is not subjective [i.e., owned]" (2013,299).…”

Section: From Ownership Back To Agencymentioning

confidence: 96%

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Relations Between Agency and Ownership in the Case of Schizophrenic Thought Insertion and Delusions of Control

Gallagher

2014

Rev.Phil.Psych.

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This article addresses questions about the sense of agency and its distinction from the sense of ownership in the context of understanding schizophrenic thought insertion. In contrast to "standard" approaches that identify problems with the sense of agency as central to thought insertion, two recent proposals argue that it is more correct to think that the problem concerns the subject's sense of ownership. This view involves a "more demanding" concept of the sense of ownership that, I will argue, ultimately depends on the sense of agency. In this regard, the sense of agency still appears to be the originating problem.Recent discussions of schizophrenic symptoms of delusions of control and thought insertion suggest that it has become standard to explain such symptoms in terms of problems with the sense of agency (e.g., Bortolotti 2010; Langland-Hassan 2008; Roessler 2013). Both in developing and challenging this standard view a number of theorists have paid close attention to the distinction between sense of agency (SA) and sense of ownership (SO), and have introduced a number of qualifications that complicate the original distinction (as found in Gallagher 2000; Graham and Stephens 1994;Stephens and Graham 2000). Some have argued that the notion of the SO has wrongly been defined in terms of spatial location or privileged access (Bortolotti and Broome 2009); others have argued that the primary problem in delusions of control and thought insertion involves a loss of SO rather than SA (Billon 2013). In this paper I'll focus on two arguments that suggest that the case of thought insertion is really or primarily a problem with SO rather than SA. In contrast, I'll suggest that SO cannot be the primary Rev.Phil.Psych.

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Jaspers’ Dilemma: The Psychopathological Challenge to Subjectivity Theories of Consciousness

Cited by 59 publications

References 29 publications

Looking for the Self: Phenomenology, Neurophysiology and Philosophical Significance of Drug-induced Ego Dissolution

Looking for the Self: Phenomenology, Neurophysiology and Philosophical Significance of Drug-induced Ego Dissolution

Why Are We Certain that We Exist?

Relations Between Agency and Ownership in the Case of Schizophrenic Thought Insertion and Delusions of Control

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