Job design with conflicting tasks reconsidered

Schmitz, Patrick W.

doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2012.11.001

Cited by 30 publications

(38 citation statements)

References 30 publications

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“…effort independent) part of the second‐stage success probability. Our results differ from the case studied by Schmitz (), who considers outcome externalities with regard to the marginal second‐stage success probability.…”

contrasting

confidence: 99%

“…Dewatripont and Tirole () originally analyse conflicting tasks in an incomplete contracting model, but such an issue can also be explored in a complete contracting approach (see Bolton & Dewatripont, , ch. 6; Schmitz, , p. 109). Bolton and Dewatripont () pioneeringly identify effort externalities between simultaneous tasks in terms of the success probability.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Bolton and Dewatripont () pioneeringly identify effort externalities between simultaneous tasks in terms of the success probability. Schmitz () seminally considers sequential tasks with outcome externalities and effort externalities regarding the success probability. Pi () extends Schmitz () by taking outcome externalities with regard to the exertion cost into account.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Another Look at Job Design with Conflicting Tasks

2018

Australian Economic Papers

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This paper provides another look at job design with conflicting tasks. In a two-stage moral hazard framework with risk-neutral agents and limited liability, we study externalities that the first-stage outcome has on the second-stage success probability. We focus on outcome externalities with regard to the fixed (i.e. effort independent) part of the second-stage success probability. Our results differ from the case studied by Schmitz (2013a), who considers outcome externalities with regard to the marginal second-stage success probability.JEL codes: D86, J33, L23, M54.

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contrasting

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Another Look at Job Design with Conflicting Tasks

2018

Australian Economic Papers

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“…If an agent exerts effort in two subsequent periods, second-period rents can be utilized by the principal to optimally design first-period incentives. This effect was first emphasized by Schmitz (2005a) and further elaborated by Schmitz (2005bSchmitz ( , 2012, Ohlendorf and Schmitz (2012), and Kräkel and Schöttner (2010). In our setting, contrary to these contributions, the principal may actually find it optimal to dampen first-period incentives that stem from prospective second-period rents.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 67%

Merger efficiency and managerial incentives

Kräkel

Müller

2015

International Journal of Industrial Organization

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“…Let

w_{H}

(

w_{L}

) denote the wage paid to the worker if realized output is π (zero). To exclude the discussion of additional cases that do not really add to the analysis, I assume that π is sufficiently large so that the firm always wants to implement high effort

e = 1

(see similarly Schmitz, , p. 322; Schmitz, , p. 110; Kaya and Vereshchagina, , p. 297):

π > \frac{p_{1}}{p_{1} - p_{0}} \cdot max \{\frac{c - δ τ l}{p_{1} - p_{0}}, \frac{c - δ τ l + {\bar{u}}_{2}}{p_{1}}\} .

This condition implies that second‐period employment of the worker is efficient, given that he works hard:

p_{1} π - (c - δ τ l) > {\overset{u}{true}}_{2} \Leftrightarrow π > \frac{c - δ τ l + {\overset{u}{true}}_{2}}{p_{1}} .

…”

Section: The Basic Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Human Capital Investment and Work Incentives

Kräkel

2015

Economics Manag Strategy

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Traditional human capital theory based on the work by Gary Becker shows that firms do not invest in general human capital but offer firm‐specific training that is only useful for the training firm. I extend the traditional approach by adding two natural assumptions—workers cannot be forced to acquire new knowledge, and they exert unobservable effort to produce valuable output for their employer. I show under which conditions firms do not offer firm‐specific training but invest in general human capital, which increases the workers' outside option. This investment behavior is well in line with the documented prevalence of industry‐specific and occupation‐specific human capital over firm‐specific human capital.

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Job design with conflicting tasks reconsidered

Cited by 30 publications

References 30 publications

Another Look at Job Design with Conflicting Tasks

Another Look at Job Design with Conflicting Tasks

Merger efficiency and managerial incentives

Human Capital Investment and Work Incentives

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