Job search requirements for older unemployed: Transitions to employment, early retirement and disability benefits

Lammers, Marloes; Bloemen, H.; Hochguertel, Stefan

doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2012.11.003

Cited by 73 publications

(101 citation statements)

References 32 publications

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“…8 Studies for Sweden (Karlström et al 2008), the Netherlands (Borghans et al 2014, Lammers et al 2013), Finnland (Kyyrä and Ollikainen 2008), and Austria (Staubli, 2011) suggest that program substitution might be quantitatively important. See also the recent US study of Lindner (2016), who finds that higher UI benefits reduce DI application and the e↵ect is quantitatively large.…”

Section: Program Substitution? Ui and Other Benefitsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Unemployment insurance and the labor market

Zweimüller

2018

Labour Economics

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The existing literature assumes that unemployment insurance (UI) a↵ects the labor market through the job finding rate of eligible workers. I argue that this focus is too narrow. I show evidence for UI e↵ects through three other margins: (i) search externalities; (ii) takeup of other welfare state programs; and (iii) job separations. This suggests that the analysis of optimal UI should take a more comprehensive view of how UI a↵ects the labor market.Keywords: Unemployment insurance, extended benefits, unemployment duration, unemployment inflow, layo↵s, disability insurance, optimal benefits. JEL Codes: J65, J63, J64. * Address: University of Zurich, CH-8000 Zurich, Switzerland; email josef.zweimueller@econ.uzh.ch. This paper was written for the Adam Smith Lecture at EALE 2017, St.Gallen, Switzerland. I want to thank the organizers for inviting me to give this lecture and for the opportunity to present my work in front of this great audience. The research discussed here would not have happened without the energy and enthusiasm of my co-authors. First and foremost, I am indebted to my long-term collaborator Rafael Lalive, who provided invaluable input for this research. With him I started working on the universe of the Austrian social security data (ASSD) in the late 1990s, a data set that many other researchers are using now. Special thanks go to Stefan Staubli with whom I have enjoyed working over the last years and whose expertise and work attitude were of tremendous help in all our projects. The research discussed here benefitted from the energetic input of Camille Landais, who initiated the market externality project. I am indebted to Lukas Inderbitzin who co-authored the paper on program substitution. The paper on UI and job separations is work in progress and I have the pleasure to work with Simon Jäger and Benjamin Schoefer on this project. Over the years, I could rely on the support of engaged and talented research assistants. Particular thanks go to Andreas Kettemann and Philippe Ruh, who were extremely helpful over the last years and who provided decisive input for the empirical evidence presented here. Thanks also to Damian Osterwalder and Dominik Eglo↵ for putting together the tables and graphs of the paper. I also thank Andreas Steinhauer and Andreas Haller for comments on an earlier version of this paper and Johanna Posch for checking the final version.

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Section: Program Substitution? Ui and Other Benefitsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Unemployment insurance and the labor market

Zweimüller

2018

Labour Economics

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“…The Netherlands is a particularly interesting case because the re-introduction of job search requirements for older workers in January 2004 allows for a detailed policy evaluation, where the situations before the reform and the after reform can be compared using treatment and control groups [1]. The inflow rate of older Dutch workers into unemployment is typically low, which is often attributed to employment protection legislation that is particularly favorable for older, highly tenured workers.…”

Section: Discussion Of Pros and Cons Abolishing Exemptions From Job Smentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In many countries, including Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, and the UK, older unemployed workers have been, at some stage, exempted from looking for work [1], [2]. However, there has been a tendency internationally towards increasing the age at which older workers are excused from job search requirements (Belgium increased the age from 50 to 58), or towards abolishing the exemption entirely, as France did in 2012 and the Netherlands in 2004.…”

Section: Discussion Of Pros and Cons Abolishing Exemptions From Job Smentioning

confidence: 99%

Job search requirements for older unemployed workers

Bloemen¹

2016

izawol

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte.

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“…fore, contribute to the literature that documents important interactions between (or substitutions between) programmes to support those with poor health (such as the DI programme in the US) and programmes to support the unemployed: in addition to works already cited, see also, for example, Lammers et al (2013), Reiso (2014) (who also finds that activation reforms for single parents induced a significant flow towards health-related benefits), Brodersen (2015) , and Lindner (2016) for recent empirical evidence, and Lawson (2015) for an assessment for how this affects the optimal design of UI. We discuss in Section 5 the relationship between our findings and the literature on how in-work benefits affect lone parents ' employment.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Can’t work or won’t work: quasi-experimental evidence on work search requirements for single parents

Avram¹,

Brewer²,

Salvatori³

2016

Working Paper Series

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a b s t r a c tIncreasing the labour market participation of single parents, whether to boost incomes or reduce welfare spending, is a major policy objective in a number of countries. This paper presents causal evidence on the impact of work search requirements on single parents ' transitions into work and onto other benefits. We use rich administrative data on all single parent welfare recipients, and apply a difference-in-differences approach that exploits the staggered roll-out of a reform in the UK that gradually decreased the age of the youngest child at which single parents lose the right to an unconditional cash benefit. Consistent with the predictions of a simple search model, the work search requirements have heterogeneous impacts, leading some single parents to move into work, but leading some (especially those with weak previous labour market attachments) to move onto disability benefits (with no search conditionalities) or non-claimant unemployment.

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Job search requirements for older unemployed: Transitions to employment, early retirement and disability benefits

Cited by 73 publications

References 32 publications

Unemployment insurance and the labor market

Unemployment insurance and the labor market

Job search requirements for older unemployed workers

Can’t work or won’t work: quasi-experimental evidence on work search requirements for single parents

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