Jockeying for position in the humanitarian field: Iraqi refugees and faith‐based organisations in Damascus

Abstract

The rise in the number of interventions by faith-based organisations in the humanitarian field has reignited debate about the role of religion in the public sphere. This paper presents a nuanced examination of the part played by religious institutions and networks in the strategies of forced migrants in urban contexts. Furthermore, it considers how such organisations work to integrate displaced populations into their new surroundings. Drawing on two case studies and ethnographic fieldwork and in-depth interviews with Iraqi refugees and refugee service providers in Damascus, Syria, carried out between March 2010 and March 2011, it evaluates how Iraqi refugees, as active social agents, utilise religious institutions and networks in conjunction with established international humanitarian organisations to produce a distinctive geography of exile. In addition, it draws attention to how the Syrian state exerts influence over religious actors and how ultimately this affects the decision-making of forced migrants.

Between international donors and local faith communities: Intermediaries in humanitarian assistance to Syrian refugees in Jordan and Lebanon

“…Furthermore, owing to their religious orientation, LFCs tend to express their aims and motivations using religious language, which secular donors may interpret as a marker of partiality, that is, associating assistance with a religious agenda, while this may simply be the language that LFCs employ. These linguistic differences are an example of the different ‘scripts’ used by secular humanitarian donors and LFCs (Fiddyan‐Qasmiyeh, 2011; Zaman, ).…”

“…Furthermore, these principles are understood differently by different actors. As Zaman (, p. S135) notes, ‘international humanitarian organisations, including the United Nations (UN) agencies, simply do not share a common “script” with certain local faith‐based aid providers’. What is more, their cultural embeddedness may make it difficult for local faith‐motivated actors to make decisions based on need rather than on local power dynamics (De Cordier, , p. 619; Korf et al, , p. S70).…”

“…Apropos donor relations, there is some concern that LFCs may not honour the wishes of their donors for humanitarian accountability, either through neglect or because of conflicting priorities (Kirmani, ; Leurs, ), although other scholars have suggested that this may be better understood as LFCs’ higher commitment to comprehending and meeting the needs of the affected communities than to the specific expectations of donors’ (De Cordier, ; Korf et al, ; Zaman, ). In a further complication, donors may not always distinguish LFCs from other types of FBOs (Jeavons, ), while in highly religious settings, as in much of the developing world, community members may not distinguish FBOs from secular organisations (Sparre and Petersen, ; Leurs, ).…”

Psychosocial support among refugees of conflict in developing countries

“…Faith-based organizations can play an important role in refugees' life, like in the case of Karen refugees in Thailand whose religious practices helped refugees to better adaptation by bringing the community together and creating a place of familiarity (Rangkla, 2013). Another example is the case of Iraqi refugees in Syria who used religious institutions and their networks to build a livelihood in exile (Zaman, 2012).…”

Paradox of humanitarian intervention: A critical analysis of theory and practice

“…According to Zaman (2012) discourse, in the 21st century has become the advent of a new etymological term for humanitarian interventionism that stresses the logic of human rights vs. sovereignty, human rights, and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). Theorized by the ICISS in 2001 and recognized in the 2005 World Meeting Consequence Document, R2P, in brief, denotes that each sovereign country should protect its individuals from pain and harm.…”