Joined-up Government of utilities: a meta-review on a public–public partnership and inter-municipal cooperation in the water and wastewater industries

Silvestre, Hugo Consciência; Marques, Rui Cunha; Gomes, Ricardo Corrêa

doi:10.1080/14719037.2017.1363906

Cited by 64 publications

(59 citation statements)

References 78 publications

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“…Accordingly, we observe that many firms and foundations have multiple shareholders (e.g., Maury and Pajuste 2005), that governments and agencies, local councils, and political parties frequently cooperate (e.g., Bouckaert et al 2016), that public-private partnerships are used more frequently (Hodge and Greve 2007), and that cooperation between the public sector and the non-profit sector is rising (Warner and Hebdon 2001). Such cooperation is called collaborative or joint service delivery when it exists for the delivery of (public) services (Hulst et al 2009;Hilvert and Swindell 2013); alternative terms, such as 'joined-up government' (Hood 2005;Silvestre et al 2017) and 'collaborative governance' (Ansell and Gash 2008), are also used.…”

Section: Background and Approachmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Is joint service delivery beneficial for public sector organizations? We know from the literature on inter‐municipal cooperation that knowledge sharing and scale economies frequently make joint service delivery efficient (Hulst et al ; Bel et al ; Bel and Warner ; Silvestre et al ; Voorn et al ). However, joint service delivery is also prone to failure, due to multiple possible collective action problems (Feiock , ).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Multiple principals, multiple problems: Implications for effective governance and a research agenda for joint service delivery

Voorn

Genugten

Thiel

2019

Public Administration

113

103

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The multiple principal problem refers to multiple collective action problems that organizations face when they must balance (competing) interests of multiple stakeholders under joint service delivery. It negatively affects different types of organization, yet we know little about how organizations (can) mitigate it. We expand a framework based on principal–agent theory, review the literature, and consider implications for effective governance of joint service delivery in the public sector. We observe that joint service delivery can lead to free‐riding and duplication in monitoring, lobbying by principals, and increased autonomy for agents, leading to inefficiency. We build a research agenda and tentatively suggest, based on the literature, that an interface approach, where an elected unitary actor is placed in a middle tier between politics and service delivery, might best mitigate the multiple principal problem, which is currently not dealt with effectively in public management.

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Section: Background and Approachmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Multiple principals, multiple problems: Implications for effective governance and a research agenda for joint service delivery

Voorn

Genugten

Thiel

2019

Public Administration

113

103

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Intermunicipal cooperation and public–public partnerships for local service delivery represent a subset of this genre of public service provision. From a local government perspective, Warner and Hefetz () have identified intermunicipal cooperation as a kind of horizontal partnership, whereas Silvestre et al () have classified local public–public partnerships into two broad categories. The first category comprises agreements between two or more local public units that share a common aim in improving efficiency, increasing service quality and promoting regional development while decreasing resource rationing and diminishing territorial problems (Citroni et al ; Bel and Warner ).…”

Section: Public Sector Network and Intermunicipal Cooperationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Intermunicipal cooperation and public-public partnerships for local service delivery represent a subset of this genre of public service provision. From a local government perspective, Warner and Hefetz (2003) have identified intermunicipal cooperation as a kind of horizontal partnership, whereas Silvestre et al (2018) have classified local 1 Municipal law defines urban areas as those within the urban perimeter of a city or town, which can be classified as urbanized, nonurbanized and/or isolated. Rural households are those to be found outside urban perimeters (IBGE 2010a).…”

Section: Public Sector Network and Intermunicipal Cooperationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Warner and Hefetz (2003) see public sector cooperative agreements as a major alternative to private sector involvement in local public service delivery to small and rural communities since larger local governments have much greater administrative and technical capacity (Schoute et al 2018). While public-public partnerships (PuPs) can play a key role in cooperative agreements (Silvestre et al 2018), a major concern is the differences in power among partners (Agranoff 1998;Terhorst 2008;Homsy et al 2018).…”

Section: Public Sector Network and Intermunicipal Cooperationmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Shared services in Brazilian local government: Urban development in small counties

Silvestre

Marques

Dollery

et al. 2019

Public Administration

Self Cite

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In this article we break new ground by investigating cooperative agreements in urban development services, which include urban development, housing and sanitation for small local governments in Brazil (i.e., those with fewer than 20,000 residents in 2013–15). We find that public expenditure on urban development can be explained by both horizontal (intermunicipal cooperation) and vertical (public–public partnerships) cooperation. Regarding the impact of public sector cooperation on public expenditure, our results show that housing and sanitation services are less costly under intermunicipal cooperation. By contrast, urban development services are less costly when local authorities do not cooperate with other public entities. For public–public partnerships (with the state or federal government) cooperation leads to an increase in public funding, which implies that cooperative agreements might not lead to lower public expenditure. The findings in this article provide useful empirical insights into the administrative reorganization of Brazilian local government.

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Impact of inter-utility agreements on cooperative regional water infrastructure investment and management pathways

Gorelick

Gold

Reed

et al. 2021

Preprint

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Urban water utilities, facing rising demands and limited supply expansion options, increasingly partner with neighboring utilities to develop and operate shared infrastructure. Inter-utility agreements can reduce costs via economies of scale and help limit environmental impacts, as substitutes for independent investments in large capital projects. However, unexpected shifts in demand growth or water availability, deviating from projections underpinning cooperative agreements, can introduce both supply and financial risk to utility partners. Risks may also be compounded by asymmetric growth in demand across partners or inflexibility of the agreement structure itself to adapt to changing conditions of supply and demand. This work explores the viability of both fixed and adjustable capacity inter-utility cooperative agreements to mitigate regional water supply and financial risk for utilities that vary in size, growth expectations, and independent infrastructure expansion options. Agreements formalized for a shared regional water treatment plant with fixed or adjustable treatment capacities, coupled with structured financing for partner utilities, are found to significantly improve regional supply reliability and financial outcomes.Regional improvements in performance, however, mask tradeoffs among individual agreement partners. Adjustable treatment capacity allocations add flexibility to inter-utility agreements but can compound the financial risk of each utility as a function of the decision-making of the other partners. Often the sensitivity to partners' decision-making under an adjustable agreement degrades financial performance, relative to agreements with fixed capacities allocated to each partner. Our results demonstrate the significant benefits cooperative agreements offer, providing a template to aid decision-makers in development of water supply partnerships.

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Joined-up Government of utilities: a meta-review on a public–public partnership and inter-municipal cooperation in the water and wastewater industries

Cited by 64 publications

References 78 publications

Multiple principals, multiple problems: Implications for effective governance and a research agenda for joint service delivery

Multiple principals, multiple problems: Implications for effective governance and a research agenda for joint service delivery

Shared services in Brazilian local government: Urban development in small counties

Impact of inter-utility agreements on cooperative regional water infrastructure investment and management pathways

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