Joining the Club: Accession to the GATT/WTO

Davis, Christina L.; Wilf, Meredith

doi:10.1086/691058

Cited by 57 publications

(38 citation statements)

References 47 publications

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“…States support applicants that they believe would shift the decision-making outcomes in their direction. 2 This argument complements existing accounts of enlargement, which tend to focus 1 We address this paradox primarily from the point of view of the "supply side" of IO enlargement, focusing on member-state perspectives, in line with Schneider and Urpelainen (2012) and Davis and Wilf (2016). For the demand side -that is, for accounts of why countries would want to enter various international organizations -see, for example, Joliffe and Jupille (2011); Mattli (1999); Mattli and Plümper (2002).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 84%

The Dynamics of Enlargement in International Organizations

Gray

Lindstädt

Slapin

2016

International Interactions

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Most international organizations (IOs) expand their membership over the course of their lifespan. Although these enlargements tend to be heralded as normatively positive-for the IOs themselves, for the new members, and for cooperative outcomes more generally-expansions can also lead to conflicts in the organization. What conditions lead to enlargement rounds that reshape an organization in unexpected ways? We argue that, depending upon the diversity of the initial group of countries, members may vote to admit new entrants that can tilt organizational decision-making in unexpected directions. We anticipate fewer enlargements with lesser impact on the character of the organization among organizations that have either a smaller range of founding members or a relatively even initial dispersion. We develop an agent-based model that accounts for the complex decision-making environment and social dynamics that typify IO accession processes. The model helps us explain how the nature of decision-making in organizations can shift following enlargement, likely changing the organization's output and goals.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 84%

The Dynamics of Enlargement in International Organizations

Gray

Lindstädt

Slapin

2016

International Interactions

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“…While the existing literature has analyzed countries’ accession to GATT/WTO (Copelovitch and Ohls, ; Davis and Wilf, , ; Neumayer, ), there is surprisingly little work that explores the membership dynamics at the ISO. The membership of the ISO has experienced a remarkable increase over the past six decades.…”

Section: Choosing Trade Regimesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Inter‐Governmental Regimes and Recruitment to Private Regimes:GATT/WTOand theISO, 1951–2005

Lim

Prakash

2018

Global Policy

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Scholars of international relations and public policy recognize that quasi-private actors supply governance services alongside governmental actors. We explore how membership in the dominant trade regime, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/the World Trade Organization (GATT/WTO) influences countries' incentives to join the quasi-private regime, International Organization for Standardization (ISO). Both global regimes seek to remove trade barriers; the former focuses on tariff and non-tariff obstacles, and the latter on technical barriers. While any firm can subscribe to over 18,000 ISO standards, only national standards bodies, one per country, can become ISO members. We posit that given the substantial political costs of joining GATT/WTO and the relatively low entry barriers to joining the ISO, high trading countries might view the ISO as a (partial) functional equivalent of the GATT/WTO. Our empirical analysis of ISO membership dynamics over the period 1951-2005 lends support to our argument. Policy Implications• When faced with barriers to entry at the dominant trade regime, exporting firms and their governments may consider participating in private regimes to influence the trade environment.• As evidenced in the debates over the reform of UN Security Council and the emergence of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the institutional architecture and the rule-making powers of global regimes should reflect the power configurations of the 21st century, and not of the post-World War II order.• Creating private regimes in a policy area requires factoring in potential participants' positions with regard to the existing intergovernmental regimes.• While existing intergovernmental regimes are the key pillars of global governance, their rule-making systems privilege certain perspectives over others. Private regimes can foster polycentricity and bridge democracy deficits by allowing multiple stakeholders to create regimes with different rule structures.

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“…According to Davis and Wilf (2011), frequently foreign policy goals and geopolitical interests outweighted economic considerations, with GATT parties tolerating some degree of free-riding and policies inconsistent with GATT rules.…”

Section: Gatt/wto Accession and Vat Adoptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

WTO membership and the shift to consumption taxes

Buettner

Madzharova²

2018

World Development

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. . Employing robust difference-in-difference specifications as well as semi-parametric methods, we find that countries joining the WTO experience a decline in revenues from import duties between 0.5% and 1% of GDP. Revenue losses from import duties are more than compensated for by an increase in consumption taxes. Although triggered by WTO accession, the shift towards consumption taxes, in particular to VAT, typically takes place before trade liberalization commitments result in declining tariff revenues. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor mayJEL-Codes: H200, F130.

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Joining the Club: Accession to the GATT/WTO

Cited by 57 publications

References 47 publications

The Dynamics of Enlargement in International Organizations

The Dynamics of Enlargement in International Organizations

Inter‐Governmental Regimes and Recruitment to Private Regimes:GATT/WTOand theISO, 1951–2005

WTO membership and the shift to consumption taxes

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