Joint Action, Participatory Intentions, and Team Reasoning

Duijf, Hein

doi:10.1007/978-3-030-92655-7_5

Cited by 2 publications

(21 citation statements)

References 45 publications

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“…To clarify, over the last two decades researchers have shown that one can draw bridges between stit theory and theories such as dynamic logic (Canavotto, 2020;Herzig & Lorini, 2010;Horty, 2019;van Benthem & Pacuit, 2014), coalition logic (Broersen, Herzig, & Troquard, 2006b), § 1.2. Logic-Based Formalization of Responsibility • 11 alternating-time temporal logic (Broersen, Herzig, & Troquard, 2006a), and decision-& epistemic game theory (Abarca & Broersen, 2021a;Duijf, 2018;Tamminga, 2013), among others. Consequently, one can incorporate the concepts native to these fields into stit-theoretic analyses.…”

Section: The Toolmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In recent years logicians in AI have argued that any comprehensive study of responsibility attribution should include a proper treatment of the interplay between agency and four kinds of agentive knowledge: ex ante knowledge, ex interim knowledge, ex post knowledge, and know-how (Broersen, 2011a;Duijf, 2018;Horty, 2019;Lorini, Longin, & Mayor, 2014). The first three kinds are standard from game-theoretical analyses on the stages of information disclosure across the decision making process (Pacuit & Roy, 2017), and the fourth has gained prominence both in logics of action and in deontic logic as a means to formalize ability (Herzig & Troquard, 2006;Horty & Pacuit, 2017).…”

Section: Chapter 3: Agency and Knowledgementioning

confidence: 99%

“…First formally introduced by Balbiani et al (2008), and independently by Kooi and Tamminga (2008), Kripke semantics for atemporal BST has often been used to work with simpler models (see, for instance, Broersen, 2011a;Duijf, 2018;Herzig & Schwarzentruber, 2008;Schwarzentruber, 2012). Indeed, one can express all the logic-based properties of atemporal BST in terms of Kripke semantics, since-as discussed below-the proof system Λ (Definition 2.7) is sound and complete with respect to certain classes of Kripke structures.…”

Section: Kripke Semantics For Atemporal Bstmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Although the works mentioned in the previous paragraph introduced Kripke semantics for atemporal BST in slightly different ways, they all presuppose domains of possible worlds and accessibility relations on them. The following definition of Kripke-stit frames closely follows the presentation of Balbiani et al (2008) (see also Broersen, 2011a;Duijf, 2018). Definition 2.9 (Kripke-stit-frames & models).…”

Section: Kripke Semantics For Atemporal Bstmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Therefore, if one is to adapt the conceptual ideas of agency-in terms of partitions of the set of histories passing through a moment-to Kripke-stitmodels, then the actions available to agents would involve partitions of the set of possible worlds. As explained by Duijf (2018), this implies that each possible world should be taken to include a full temporal evolution of the world-even in this setting without temporal operators.…”

Section: Kripke Semantics For Atemporal Bstmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Logics of Responsibility

Abarca¹

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The study of responsibility is a complicated matter. The term is used in different ways in different fields, and it is easy to engage in everyday discussions as to why someone should be considered responsible for something. Typically, the backdrop of these discussions involves social, legal, moral, or philosophical problems. A clear pattern in all these spheres is the intent of issuing standards for when---and to what extent---an agent should be held responsible for a state of affairs. This is where Logic lends a hand. The development of expressive logics---to reason about agents' decisions in situations with moral consequences---involves devising unequivocal representations of components of behavior that are highly relevant to systematic responsibility attribution and to systematic blame-or-praise assignment. To put it plainly, expressive syntactic-and-semantic frameworks help us analyze responsibility-related problems in a methodical way. This thesis builds a formal theory of responsibility. The main tool used toward this aim is modal logic and, more specifically, a class of modal logics of action known as stit theory. The underlying motivation is to provide theoretical foundations for using symbolic techniques in the construction of ethical AI. Thus, this work means a contribution to formal philosophy and symbolic AI. The thesis's methodology consists in the development of stit-theoretic models and languages to explore the interplay between the following components of responsibility: agency, knowledge, beliefs, intentions, and obligations. Said models are integrated into a framework that is rich enough to provide logic-based characterizations for three categories of responsibility: causal, informational, and motivational responsibility. The thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 discusses at length stit theory, a logic that formalizes the notion of agency in the world over an indeterministic conception of time known as branching time. The idea is that agents act by constraining possible futures to definite subsets. On the road to formalizing informational responsibility, Chapter 3 extends stit theory with traditional epistemic notions (knowledge and belief). Thus, the chapter formalizes important aspects of agents' reasoning in the choice and performance of actions. In a context of responsibility attribution and excusability, Chapter 4 extends epistemic stit theory with measures of optimality of actions that underlie obligations. In essence, this chapter formalizes the interplay between agents' knowledge and what they ought to do. On the road to formalizing motivational responsibility, Chapter 5 adds intentions and intentional actions to epistemic stit theory and reasons about the interplay between knowledge and intentionality. Finally, Chapter 6 merges the previous chapters' formalisms into a rich logic that is able to express and model different modes of the aforementioned categories of responsibility. Technically, the most important contributions of this thesis lie in the axiomatizations of all the introduced logics. In particular, the proofs of soundness & completeness results involve long, step-by-step procedures that make use of novel techniques.

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Section: The Toolmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Chapter 3: Agency and Knowledgementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Kripke Semantics For Atemporal Bstmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Kripke Semantics For Atemporal Bstmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Kripke Semantics For Atemporal Bstmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Logics of Responsibility

Abarca¹

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A Logic-Based Analysis of Responsibility

Abarca

2023

Electron. Proc. Theor. Comput. Sci.

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This paper presents a logic-based framework to analyze responsibility, which I refer to as intentional epistemic act-utilitarian stit theory (IEAUST). To be precise, IEAUST is used to model and syntactically characterize various modes of responsibility, where by 'modes of responsibility' I mean instances of Broersen's three categories of responsibility (causal, informational, and motivational responsibility), cast against the background of particular deontic contexts. IEAUST is obtained by integrating a modal language to express the following components of responsibility on stit models: agency, epistemic notions, intentionality, and different senses of obligation. With such a language, I characterize the components of responsibility using particular formulas. Then, adopting a compositional approach-where complex modalities are built out of more basic ones-these characterizations of the components are used to formalize the aforementioned modes of responsibility. * L ′′ * , so that assumption (⋆⋆) yields that L ′′ * ⊆ |¬φ | m , which contradicts the previously shown fact that L ′′ * ⊆ |φ | m . Thus, M , m, h |= ⊙ S α ϕ → ¬ ⊙ α ¬ϕ for every index m, h , so that ⊙ S α ϕ → ¬ ⊙ α ¬ϕ is indeed valid. It is clear that the rules of inference Modus Ponens, Substitution, and Necessitation for the modal operators all preserve validity.

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Joint Action, Participatory Intentions, and Team Reasoning

Cited by 2 publications

References 45 publications

Logics of Responsibility

Logics of Responsibility

A Logic-Based Analysis of Responsibility

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