We study a variant of the Student-Project Allocation problem with lecturer preferences over Students where ties are allowed in the preference lists of students and lecturers (spa-st). We investigate the concept of strong stability in this context. Informally, a matching is strongly stable if there is no student and lecturer l such that if they decide to form a private arrangement outside of the matching via one of l's proposed projects, then neither party would be worse off and at least one of them would strictly improve. We describe the first polynomial-time algorithm to find a strongly stable matching or to report that no such matching exists, given an instance of spa-st. Our algorithm runs in O(m 2 ) time, where m is the total length of the students' preference lists.Existing results in spa-st. Every instance of spa-st admits a weakly stable matching, which could be of different sizes [21]. Moreover, the problem of finding a maximum size weakly stable matching (MAX-SPA-ST) is NP-hard [12,21], even for the so-called Stable Marriage problem with Ties and Incomplete lists (smti). Cooper and Manlove [7] described a 3 2 -approximation algorithm for MAX-SPA-ST. On the other hand, Irving et al. argued in [10] that super-stability is a natural and most robust solution concept to seek in cases where agents have incomplete information. Recently, Olaosebikan and Manlove [24] showed that if an instance of spa-st admits a superstable matching M , then all weakly stable matchings in the instance are of the same size (equal to the size of M ), and match exactly the same set of students. The main result of their paper was a polynomial-time algorithm to find a super-stable matching or report that no such matching exists, given an instance of spa-st. Their algorithm runs in O(L) time, where L is the total length of all the preference lists.Motivation. It was motivated in [11] that weakly stable matching may be undermined by bribery or persuasion, in practical applications of hrt. In what follows, we give a corresponding argument for an instance I of spa-st. Suppose that M is a weakly stable matching in I, and suppose that a student s i prefers a project p