Joint replenishment and pricing decisions with different freight modes considerations for a supply chain under a composite incentive contract

Noori-daryan, Mahsa; Taleizadeh, Ata Allah; Govindan, Kannan

doi:10.1057/s41274-017-0270-z

Cited by 30 publications

(14 citation statements)

References 52 publications

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“…Zhou et al [18] studied the dynamic incentive of supply chain under information asymmetry for the information screening in long-term supply chain cooperation. Noori-Daryan et al [19] analyzed optimal pricing and replenishment decisions of a single-manufacturer/multipleretailer supply chain where a composite contract combines quantity and freight discounts. Taleizadeh et al [20] developed a pricing-inventory model for a single-item twoechelon supply chain which was coordinated by three different incentive contracts.…”

Section: Contract Design and Coordination Of A Supply Chainmentioning

confidence: 99%

Collaborative Innovation with Dynamic Incentive Contracts in a Supply Chain

Hao

Chen

Hong

2020

Mathematical Problems in Engineering

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The collection and sharing of consumers’ knowledge by retailers can help manufacturers improve the innovation level of products, thereby improving the performance of supply chain. However, due to the cost of collecting consumers’ knowledge, the wholesale price contract can no longer coordinate supply chain members effectively. It is necessary to study the problem how the retailers are encouraged to make more efforts for the cooperative innovation with manufacturers. This paper introduces two dynamic incentive contracts for improving collaborative innovation level in a two-player supply chain, and the impacts of these contracts on supply chain’s performance are investigated, by using a Stackelberg differential game model. The manufacturer, as a Stackelberg leader, determines the R&D investment while the retailer is responsible for the retail price and the efforts in collection of the consumer’s information (or preference) to the products. The model incorporates a wholesale price contract and two incentive contracts to better understand how the manufacturer can facilitate the retailer’s efforts in the collection of consumer’s information and increase the profits of the members of supply chain. Our results suggest that the optimal profit of the supply chain, the retailer’s efforts in the collection of consumer’s knowledge, the retail price, and the innovation level under the reward incentive contract are higher than their counterparts in other contracts. In particular, the retailer’s optimal effort under the reward incentive contract is even higher than the one in the centralized decision scenario. However, if the manufacturer commits an effort target to the retailer, it shows that the retailer’s optimal effort is independent of the target. The manufacturer’s optimal R&D investments are constants in the three contracts under the dynamic setting. Furthermore, numerical simulations show that the effort target has little impact on profits of the supply chain although it affects the decision making of supply chain members to some extent, whereas the retailer’s marginal reward offered by the manufacturer influences the innovation level of product and the supply chain’s profit significantly.

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Section: Contract Design and Coordination Of A Supply Chainmentioning

confidence: 99%

Collaborative Innovation with Dynamic Incentive Contracts in a Supply Chain

Hao

Chen

Hong

2020

Mathematical Problems in Engineering

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“…Power structure plays an important role in the decision-making process, consequently affecting the participant's profit margin [18]. Game theory is the most applicable approach to model the relationships between the members in the supply chain [19,20]. When the supplier is more powerful than the retailer, the resulting game is called the supplier-Stackelberg game [21].…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…By applying Stackelberg game theoretic approach, Taleizadeh and Noori-Daryan [28] explore the optimal pricing, manufacturing, and inventory policies for a three-level supply chain including a supplier, a producer, and some retailers, where the retailers and the producer act as the leaders in the first and second stages, the demand is sensitive to the price, and the shortage is not permitted. Noori-daryan et al [20] analyze the combined pricing and replenishment problem for a supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and multiple retailers under blend usage of quantity and freight discount contracts and free shipping contracts, in which the retailers act as the leader, different transportation modes are considered, and the transportation capacity is limited. More related studies can be found in Taleizadeh et al [29] and so on.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Multiperiod Production and Ordering Policies for a Retailer-Led Supply Chain through Option Contracts

Wan

Chen

2018

Mathematical Problems in Engineering

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This paper formulates two groups of multiperiod production and ordering models with call and bidirectional option contracts for a two-party supply chain consisting of one followed supplier and one dominant retailer, respectively. Based on dynamic programming theory, we characterize the optimal policy structures for two partners in each period. We also provide an approximation for the corresponding policy parameters evaluation in two cases. Then, we investigate the impacts of different option contracts and the demand risk on the decisions and performances of two members. Our results suggest that, whether concerning call or bidirectional option contracts, the optimal policies for two members always follow a base stock type. When the price parameters are the same for different option contracts, the service levels of both the system and the retailer are higher with call option contracts than with bidirectional ones, whereas the retailer's inventory risk is lower with bidirectional option contracts than with call ones. Under the same conditions stated above, call option contracts can always benefit the supplier, but not the retailer. Owing to the retailer's dominant position, call option contracts are better choice for the supply chain if the option (exercise) price is low (high), while bidirectional option contracts are more suitable choice for the supply chain if the option (exercise) price is high (low). In addition, an increase in the demand risk would prompt the supplier to increase his production quantity and the retailer to reduce the initial firm order quantity, either with call or bidirectional option contracts.

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“…Taleizadeh and Pentico [14] introduced price discount concept in their model. In this field, Taleizadeh et al [15], Shah & Naik [16], Noori-darayan et al [17], Pervin & Roy [18] and Guiping et al [19] did their work taking price discount into reflection. Alfares and Ghaithan [20] developed an inventory model for no shortage case under price discount facility.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Effect of Price Concession Strategy and Preservation Technology on Inventory Model for Decaying Products with Partial Backlogging and Price-Stock-Dependent Demand

De¹,

Mallick²

2020

International Journal of Engineering Research and Technology

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This paper develops an economic order quantity model for deteriorating products that assumes price and stock depending demand. Shortages are permitted with partial backlogging. The proposed model focused on two things. The first one is the consideration of the fact that the deterioration rate can be reduced by the use of preservation technology investment and the second one is using the assumption that the unit purchase cost has a hostile bond with the order size to maximize the total profit. The idea of salvage/recover cost is considered and merged in this model. The solution technique of proposed optimization model is exemplified by a couple of numerical illustrations. Concavity of the average profit function is shown by plotting graphs. Sensitivity investigation is done to study the effect of changing the value of all parameters in the projected maximization model.

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Joint replenishment and pricing decisions with different freight modes considerations for a supply chain under a composite incentive contract

Cited by 30 publications

References 52 publications

Collaborative Innovation with Dynamic Incentive Contracts in a Supply Chain

Collaborative Innovation with Dynamic Incentive Contracts in a Supply Chain

Multiperiod Production and Ordering Policies for a Retailer-Led Supply Chain through Option Contracts

Effect of Price Concession Strategy and Preservation Technology on Inventory Model for Decaying Products with Partial Backlogging and Price-Stock-Dependent Demand

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