2020
DOI: 10.1109/twc.2020.2999721
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Joint Resource Allocation and Incentive Design for Blockchain-Based Mobile Edge Computing

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Cited by 94 publications
(33 citation statements)
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“…In Ref. [ 76 ], two double auction mechanisms were utilized to encourage blockchain entities to share their computing power. Furthermore, Wang et al.…”
Section: Blockchain Networkingmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In Ref. [ 76 ], two double auction mechanisms were utilized to encourage blockchain entities to share their computing power. Furthermore, Wang et al.…”
Section: Blockchain Networkingmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…However, trustworthiness should be considered in this research direction. Sun et al [91] proposed double auction mechanisms to motivate MEC servers. Moreover, a blockchain was used to prevent record tampering from malicious edge servers.…”
Section: Blockchain-enabled Incentive Mechanisms In Iotmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Auction Mechanism [91] Propose double auction mechanisms to motivate MEC servers in cross-server resource allocation.…”
Section: Ref Contributionsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Given a consensus algorithm, when the number of transactions to the blockchain increases, the consensus workload to validate and append them into the blockchain will increase significantly. In current consensus schemes, e.g., DPoS [38], each miner node must implement a repeated verification process across the miner network, which results in unnecessary consensus latency and network bandwidth waste. A possible solution is to reduce the number of miner nodes to reduce the consensus latency, but it potentially compromises the security of blockchain because of the high probability of adding compromised transactions from malicious nodes [39].…”
Section: Blockchain Consensus Designmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…3. Also, similar to the traditional DPoS framework [38], in our PoR mechanism, each of the active EMs takes turn to act as a block manager during its time slot to coordinate the consensus process. In other words, there is one manager in each consensus process.…”
Section: Miner Selectionmentioning
confidence: 99%