Judging Others Who Hold Opposite Beliefs: The Development of Belief-Discrepancy Reasoning

Enright, Robert; Lapsley, Daniel K.

doi:10.1111/j.1467-8624.1981.tb03148.x

Cited by 8 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 15 publications

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“…In addition, the participants' judgments depended on age, gender and educational level. In contrast to the idea of an age-related progression from less to more tolerance toward dissenting beliefs and practices (e.g., Enright & Lapsley, 1981), the present results show no consistent age effects (see also Wainryb, 1993;Wainryb et al, 1998). Rather, the age differences that were found indicate both less and more tolerance among the older (15-18 years) than the younger (12-14 years) adolescents.…”

Section: Discussioncontrasting

confidence: 56%

“…Age, gender, education, and religiousness Enright and Lapsley (1981) have described a developmental progression from a generally intolerant attitude during the childhood years through to increasingly tolerant judgments during adolescence (see also Enright et al, 1984). The sequence they proposed runs parallel with changes in perspective-taking and Kohlberg's stages of moral development (see Berti, 2005).…”

Section: Tolerancementioning

confidence: 99%

“…The theoretical implication is that the social-cognitive domain model (see Killen, Margie, & Sinno, 2006;Smetana, 1995;Turiel, 2002) seems more adequate for understanding the development of tolerance than a cognitive developmental framework that proposes increasingly advanced stages of tolerance (e.g., Enright & Lapsley, 1981;Enright, Lapsley, Franklin, & Streuck, 1984). The domain model emphasizes that children and adolescents apply different domains of knowledge in their social reasoning and judgments.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Tolerance of Muslim beliefs and practices: Age related differences and context effects

Verkuyten

Slooter

2007

International Journal of Behavioral Development

103

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Tolerant judgments of Muslims' political rights and dissenting beliefs and practices by ethnic Dutch adolescents (12-18 years) were examined. Participants (N = 632) made judgments of different types of behaviors and different contexts in an experimental questionnaire study. As in other studies, tolerance was found to not be a global construct. Adolescents took into account various aspects of what they were asked to tolerate and the sense in which they should be tolerant. The type of actor, the nature of the social implication of the behavior, the underlying belief type, and the dimension of tolerance, all made a difference to the tolerant judgments. Additionally, the findings strongly suggest that tolerance judgments do not develop through an age-related stage-like sequence where an intolerant attitude is followed by tolerance. For females, there were no age differences, and older males were less tolerant than younger males. There were also gender differences with males being less tolerant for some types of behavior and females being less tolerant for behaviors that negatively affected Muslim females. Level of education had a positive effect on tolerance. The findings are discussed with reference to social-cognitive domain theory.

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Section: Discussioncontrasting

confidence: 56%

Section: Tolerancementioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Tolerance of Muslim beliefs and practices: Age related differences and context effects

Verkuyten

Slooter

2007

International Journal of Behavioral Development

103

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“…The little developmental research and theorizing that exists has focused on a single dimension of tolerance, namely, judgments about the personal worth of dissenting individuals. In a series of studies (Enright & Lapsley, 1981;Enright, Lapsley, Franklin, & Steuck, 1984), children and adolescents were asked to give their opinion about certain issues and were subsequently asked to judge a hypothetical person who allegedly took the opposite stand. The issues about which dissenting opinions were sampled in those studies were diverse, and included decisions regarding conflicts between different kinds of considerations or goals (e.g., keeping a prize or returning it to the person who has a prior claim to it; obeying a teacher or helping a friend; allowing the American Nazi party to hold a march in a predominantly Jewish community or protecting the community from potential harm and offense).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Tolerance and Intolerance: Children's and Adolescents' Judgments of Dissenting Beliefs, Speech, Persons, and Conduct

Wainryb¹,

Shaw

Maianu

1998

Child Development

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Tolerant and intolerant judgments of different types of dissent were examined. One hundred sixty participants (aged 7,3,10,4,13,6, and 20,l) made judgments about dissenting beliefs, speech, practices, and people engaged in those practices. Across all ages, participants were more tolerant (1) of the holding of dissenting beliefs than of their expression, (2) of the expression of beliefs than of the persons engaged in acts based on those beliefs, and (3) of the persons than of the acts. Tolerance of dissenting beliefs and speech increased with age. Although, at all ages, participants were intolerant of the practices, they were relatively more tolerant of practices grounded in cultural contexts. Participants were more tolerant of people espousing dissenting information than dissenting values. We concluded that tolerance and intolerance coexist at all ages and hinge on what individuals are asked to tolerate and on the sense in which they are asked to tolerate it.

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“…Regardless of the realm of disagreement, 7-9 year olds described disagreeing characters as nice or normal more often than did 5 year olds. Enright and Lapsley (1981) presented a short vignette to adults, students from grades 3 to 12, and college students, and asked for their judgment about a moral dilemma. They then confronted participants with an audio-taped peer stating the opposite judgment.…”

Section: Tolerance and Respectmentioning

confidence: 99%

Varying versions of moral relativism: the philosophy and psychology of normative relativism

Quintelier

Fessler

2011

Biol Philos

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Among naturalist philosophers, both defenders and opponents of moral relativism argue that prescriptive moral theories (or normative theories) should be constrained by empirical findings about human psychology. Empiricists have asked if people are or can be moral relativists, and what effect being a moral relativist can have on an individual's moral functioning. This research is underutilized in philosophers' normative theories of relativism; at the same time, the empirical work, while useful, is conceptually disjointed. Our goal is to integrate philosophical and empirical work on constraints on normative relativism. First, we present a working definition of moral relativism. Second, we outline naturalist versions of normative relativism, and third, we highlight the empirical constraints in this reasoning. Fourth, we discuss recent studies in moral psychology that are relevant for the philosophy of moral relativism. We assess here what conclusions for moral relativism can and cannot be drawn from experimental studies. Finally, we suggest how moral philosophers and moral psychologists can collaborate on the topic of moral relativism in the future. Keywords moral relativism; moral psychology; experimental ethics; normative ethics; tolerance Moral Relativism and its oppositesThe goal of this paper is to integrate recent naturalist philosophical and moral psychological work on moral relativism. Philosophers draw distinctions between cultural and individual relativism, and between extreme and moderate moral relativism, and ask what moral prescriptions are in accordance with human psychology. However, moral psychologists generally do not employ these distinctions, making it difficult to examine the extent to which their research findings can or cannot be compared to various philosophical positions. We aim to bridge this disciplinary divide and integrate this conceptual landscape in contemporary and future research. Where appropriate, we will MANUSCRIPT CURRENTLY UNDER REVIEW. PLEASE DO NOT CITE OR CIRCULATE WITHOUT PERMISSION.

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Judging Others Who Hold Opposite Beliefs: The Development of Belief-Discrepancy Reasoning

Cited by 8 publications

References 15 publications

Tolerance of Muslim beliefs and practices: Age related differences and context effects

Tolerance of Muslim beliefs and practices: Age related differences and context effects

Tolerance and Intolerance: Children's and Adolescents' Judgments of Dissenting Beliefs, Speech, Persons, and Conduct

Varying versions of moral relativism: the philosophy and psychology of normative relativism

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