Judgments of Intentionality in Response to Videotaped and Verbally Presented Moral Dilemmas: The Medium Is the Message

Chandler, Michael J.; Greenspan, Stephen; Barenboim, Carl

doi:10.1111/j.1467-8624.1973.tb02157.x

Cited by 55 publications

(37 citation statements)

References 6 publications

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“…That is, all the children were found to understand correctly what Punch was "trying to do" and whether his thinly veiled attempt at murder was in fact "on purpose" or not. When this procedural detail is combined with (Chandler, Greenspan, and Barenboim, 1973;Joseph and Tager-Flusberg, 1999;Nelson, 1980), the evident differences in how interpretive and noninterpretive children register the role of agency in their moral judgments becomes a bit of a puzzle. The key, we would argue, turns on children's early notions of intention and the crucial difference between mechanical and autonomous conceptions of agency.…”

Section: Agency Regainedmentioning

confidence: 99%

From mechanical to autonomous agency: The relationship between children's moral judgments and their developing theories of mind

Sokol

Chandler

Jones

2004

New Directions for Child and Adolescent Development

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Despite their linchpin role in the ordinary self-understanding of ordinary people, familiar notions of human agency, the central stuff of this chapter, have never succeeded in finding a workable place in the traditional explanatory armamentarium of psychology. Within recent memory, even the slightest whiff of agentiveness was enough to evoke the discipline's signature fear of vitalism (Skinner, 1973), the very thing that psychology as a science had arisen to defeat. While this reflexive aversion to all talk of human agency is perhaps less automatic than was once the case, remnants of this persistent squeamishness are not altogether missing. For many, the problem is set by Wittgenstein's famous question: "What is left over if I subtract the fact that my arm goes up from the fact that I raise my arm?" This curious arithmetic is usually seen to yield two kinds of phenomena. The first, historically ceded to philosophy, has to do with all those human activities that are guided by so-called higher faculties, such as beliefs or intentions. Such purposeful actions, as they are commonly identified, are generally construed as agentive in nature and held in contrast to lesser, nonagentive behaviors. This second

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Section: Agency Regainedmentioning

confidence: 99%

From mechanical to autonomous agency: The relationship between children's moral judgments and their developing theories of mind

Sokol

Chandler

Jones

2004

New Directions for Child and Adolescent Development

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“…In contrast, older 254 JOURNAL OF GENETIC PSYCHOLOGY children, in judging culpability, would be expected to weigh the motive more heavily than the consequences. These observations have become the focus of renewed attention in a number of recent attempts to specify the cognitive processes involved in the development of moral reasoning in young children (3,4,6,8,9,18). Examinations of Piaget's proposition that moral reasoning proceeds from reliance on objective criteria to more reliance on information about the intent of the actor have been central to this research.…”

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confidence: 99%

Effects of Ethnicity and Child's Age on Maternal Judgments of Children's Transgressions against Persons and Property

et al. 1982

The Journal of Genetic Psychology

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Mothers (N = 256) of four different cultural groups judged the culpability of children whose actions were described in Piaget-type stories depicting commission of harm under various conditions. Child's age, harm to persons vs material objects, intentions, and amount of harm were systematically varied. All main effects (culture, intent of transgressor, age, and magnitude of harm) were significant, but several effects were qualified interactions. A cognitive social learning explanation is proposed to account for group differences in judgement, with special attention to cultural differences in values attached to harm to persons vs damage to property.

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“…First, a typical SR task can be seen as analogous to a Conservation task in that both involve two cues, for instance height and width in conservation, and intention and outcome in SR (Chandler, Greenspan and Barenboim, 1973). The problem with this analogy is that decentration, i.e.…”

Section: -27721mentioning

confidence: 99%

Two studies of Piaget's theory of moral judgment

Helkama

1988

Euro J Social Psych

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Judgments of Intentionality in Response to Videotaped and Verbally Presented Moral Dilemmas: The Medium Is the Message

Cited by 55 publications

References 6 publications

From mechanical to autonomous agency: The relationship between children's moral judgments and their developing theories of mind

From mechanical to autonomous agency: The relationship between children's moral judgments and their developing theories of mind

Effects of Ethnicity and Child's Age on Maternal Judgments of Children's Transgressions against Persons and Property

Two studies of Piaget's theory of moral judgment

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