Judicial Ingroup Bias in the Shadow of Terrorism *

Shayo, Moses; Zussman, Asaf

doi:10.1093/qje/qjr022

Cited by 274 publications

(150 citation statements)

References 27 publications

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“…It then gathered their responses about their preferences for private-public sector meetings, taxation, and regulation. Previous work has also used priming in studies of social preferences (Fong and Luttmer 2007;Chen and Li 2009;Shayo and Zussman 2011), public opinion (Gerber, et al 2010), and ideology (Berdejó and Chen 2012). The latter is particularly relevant as it does so in the field.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Meet the Oligarchs: Business Legitimacy, State Capacity and Taxation

2016

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We analyze the role of people's beliefs about the rich in the determination of public policy in the context of a randomized online survey experiment. A question we study is the desirability of government-private sector meetings, a variable we argue is connected to State capacity. Survey respondents primed with negative views about business leaders want fewer meetings, as well as higher taxes to the top 1% and more regulation. We also study how these effects change when subjects are (additionally) primed with positive/negative views about government officials. Distrust in the government increases the preferred tax rate on the top 1% only when business legitimacy is low. A model with multiple equilibria helps interpret these findings. In one of the equilibria, meetings are allowed, business legitimacy is high, and people set a low income tax rate for businesspeople. In the other, meetings are forbidden, business legitimacy is low, and people set high taxes to punish the businesspeople for their corrupt behavior.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Meet the Oligarchs: Business Legitimacy, State Capacity and Taxation

2016

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“…Ayres and Waldfogel (1994) present early evidence for discrimination at the bail bond setting stage, and Alesina and La Ferrara (2014) reject the hypothesis of no prejudice in capital sentencing. Shayo and Zussman (2011) present evidence for judicial ingroup bias in Israel. Rich data is key in empirical analyses: More evidence on discrimination comes from experiments selling iPods in local online classi…ed advertisements (Doleac and Stein, 2013) and from a job market …eld experiment that implemented changes in the cost of discrimination during required collaborations (Heddegaard and Tyran, 2016).…”

mentioning

confidence: 72%

Prejudice in naturalization decisions: Theory and evidence

Ilić

2018

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

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Immigrant groups that are marginalized in their host countries are disproportionately more likely to have their citizenship applications rejected. It is not readily obvious whether this disparity is due to prejudice on the part of decisionmakers or due to applicant di¤erences in meeting naturalization standards. To address this question, I develop a simple model of a council deciding whether to grant applicants citizenship. The model implies an empirical test for relative prejudice using average applicant group rejection rates. Using Switzerland as a case study, I apply the test to newly collected data from six large municipalities. In …ve municipalities, the test cannot reject the hypothesis of no relative prejudice with respect to country of origin. The rejection pattern of the sixth municipality is consistent with prejudice.The model illustrates that the underlying mechanism in the decisionmaking process has bearing on the inference of prejudice from empirical data.

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“…It is well-documented that inequalities exist in the application of the law to different groups of individuals (e.g., Argys and Mocan 2004;Shayo and Zussman 2011;Abrams et al 2012;Alesina and La Ferrara 2015). A different layer of complication arises in the application of the law because some of the capricious judicial decisions seem arguably unintentional.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Emotional Judges and Unlucky Juveniles

Eren

Mocan

2016

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Employing the universe of juvenile court decisions in a U.S. state between 1996 and 2012, we analyze the effects of emotional shocks associated with unexpected outcomes of football games played by a prominent college team in the state. We investigate the behavior of judges, the conduct of whom should, by law, be free of personal biases and emotions. We find that unexpected losses increase disposition (sentence) lengths assigned by judges during the week following the game. Unexpected wins, or losses that were expected to be close contests ex-ante, have no impact. The effects of these emotional shocks are asymmetrically borne by black defendants. We present evidence that the results are not influenced by defendant or attorney behavior or by defendants' economic background. Importantly, the results are driven by judges who have received their bachelor's degrees from the university with which the football team is affiliated. Different falsification tests and a number of auxiliary analyses demonstrate the robustness of the findings. These results provide evidence for the impact of emotions in one domain on a behavior in a completely unrelated domain among a uniformly highly-educated group of individuals (judges), with decisions involving high stakes (sentence lengths). They also point to the existence of a subtle and previously-unnoticed capricious application of sentencing.

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Judicial Ingroup Bias in the Shadow of Terrorism *

Cited by 274 publications

References 27 publications

Meet the Oligarchs: Business Legitimacy, State Capacity and Taxation

Meet the Oligarchs: Business Legitimacy, State Capacity and Taxation

Prejudice in naturalization decisions: Theory and evidence

Emotional Judges and Unlucky Juveniles

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