Judicial Review of the Budgetary Authority During the Enactment of the European Union's Budget

Skiadas, Dimitrios

doi:10.2139/ssrn.302757

Cited by 1 publication

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“…Many decisions adopted in the EU multilevel system have a budgetary impact. Furthermore, as in any polity, EU budget decisions are subject to intense inter-institutional conflicts (Becker et al 2017), which often lead to the use of judicial review, especially by the Council against decisions of the EP (Skiadas 2002). The Commission, too, may adopt decisions that affect member states' budgets in a negative way (Bauer and Becker 2014;Ege et al 2018).…”

Section: Materials Gainsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Motivations: When Conflict Leads to Litigation

Adam

Bauer

Hartlapp

et al. 2019

Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics

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What motivates political actors to engage in European Union annulment litigation? This is the main question studied in this chapter. Our starting point is the observation that it is not possible to reduce public actors' decisions to initiate annulment actions to the pure legal characteristics of the cases. Annulment actions do not automatically arise from specific legal circumstances. This is what we learn from the examples of annulments reported in the previous chapters. There is more to filing an annulment lawsuit then just a legal-technical quarrel. This more is the political context that surrounds a concrete decision to engage in annulment litigation. While never contradicting the legal logic of annulment litigation, actors chose from the universe of potential annulment conflicts to engage in due to political reasons, which we conceive as material gains, institutional competences, ideology, or political trust. Consider in this context that annulment litigation is a defence against decisions made by an EU institution; such a supranational decision, if it remains unchallenged, constitutes a final point in a struggle about particular policy choices. In other words, if actors do not take up the fight-that is, if nobody litigates-the current interpretation of the supranational measure adopted prevails. It marks the institutional endpoint of a conflict, which can then have feedback effects. Actors obviously can choose not to engage in annulment conflict, but if their choice is to do so, it is the context of the struggle they go through in the multilevel policy CHAPTER 5

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Section: Materials Gainsmentioning

confidence: 99%