Jumping the queue: Nepotism and public-sector pay

Chassamboulli, Andri; Gomes, Pedro

doi:10.1016/j.red.2020.07.006

Cited by 13 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 34 publications

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“…However, relatively little is known about the determinants of incursions of familial networks in political and public administration institutions. We only know that nepotism is more prevalent when public-sector wages are set above an optimal level (Chassamboulli and Gomes 2019) and recruitment decisions are placed in the hands of individuals rather than, say, hiring committees. For example, research by Geys (2017) demonstrates that electorates prioritize meritocracy over belonging to political dynasties, while politicians tend to prefer family memberseven if they are less qualifiedwhen making hiring decisions.…”

Section: Determinants Of Nepotism and Overstaffingmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…2. Researchers have also explored nepotism using surveys (Scoppa 2009;Wang 2013;Chassamboulli and Gomes 2019), publicly provided data (Kauder and Potrafke 2015) and simulations (Kuznar and Frederick 2007). 3.…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Source: The map was generated using data on nepotism levels provided by STT. institution (in this case, municipal administrations). Importantly, the nepotism data that we use do not depend on using last names as an indicator of relatedness or connectedness (Allesina 2011;Gagliarducci and Manacorda 2016;Fafchamps and Labonne 2017;Geys 2017;Lehne, Shapiro, and Vanden Eynde 2018;Szakonyi 2019) or surveys (Scoppa 2009;Wang 2013;Chassamboulli and Gomes 2019). Rather, our data allow us to directly count the persons who work in the same municipal administration who and are firstor second-degree relatives.…”

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confidence: 99%

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Nepotism, political competition and overemployment

Ragauskas

Valeškaitė

2020

Political Research Exchange

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We extend the research on nepotism in public institutions by first investigating the determinants of nepotism, then by establishing the association between nepotism levels and overstaffing. We take advantage of novel and uniquely reliable data on levels of nepotism within Lithuanian municipalities to test three expectations: first, we expect to see a higher level of nepotism in municipalities with fewer economic opportunities. Second, we hypothesize that nepotism is more prevalent in regions with less democratic accountability. Third, we argue that because nepotism distorts institutional incentives, we should observe an association between nepotism and overstaffing of public institutions. Our analysis does not ultimately show a meaningful relationship between the supply of economic opportunities and penetration of relative networks in public institutions. Yet, our work does confirm that robust political competition increases accountability and reduces levels of state exploitation. We also establish a link between nepotism and a swollen public sector: the penetration of nepotism goes hand in hand with higher levels of employment in Lithuanian municipality administrations.

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Section: Determinants Of Nepotism and Overstaffingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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confidence: 99%

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Nepotism, political competition and overemployment

Ragauskas

Valeškaitė

2020

Political Research Exchange

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“…Gomes (2015) emphasizes the role of public-sector wages in achieving the efficient allocation, while Afonso and Gomes (2014) highlight the interactions between private and public wages. Chassamboulli and Gomes (2021) study the role of nepotism in public sector hiring. In a model with workers heterogeneous in ability, Geromichalos and Kospentaris (2022) study how workers' selection into the public sector affects macroeconomic aggregates.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Public-sector employment, wages and education decisions

Chassamboulli

Gomes

2023

Labour Economics

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“…Regrettably, there are ample reports of corruption in public procurement in both developed and developing countries [15], [16]. At the same time, corruption, mainly in the form of nepotism, is a recognized problem in the public sector, affecting public procurement and personnel recruitment [17].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Assessing Transparency in eGovernment Electronic Processes

et al. 2022

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Context. The electronic government has become a trend for transforming public management to comply with the performance of an efficient, modern state. The processes for public procurement and personnel recruitment represent an essential fraction of a country's public spending. Objective. Maturity models are tools for assessing different management dimensions resulting in some level of organizational maturity on an ordinal scale which can show null, partial, or total progress towards the desired state. This paper presents an e-government maturity model for public procurement and personnel recruitment processes, based on a literature review to determine the current state of research in the field. Methodology. We have used a known procedural model from Becker to support the design of the proposed model. Later on, we have tested it with government buyers and personnel recruiters. Findings. These initial results show that users understand the questionnaires designed for the study, and their answers allow us to obtain deep validation. A tool with these characteristics can be handy for measuring the degree of transparency in public entities, thus reducing corruption levels in their processes. Conclusion. This proposal describes the complexity of variables that influence the transparency of a socio-technical process in public tenders. We describe five levels of transparency for software procurement through development projects. These classifications enable the maturity levels of the transparency of electronic procedures used by government agencies to be measured in different dimensions. Implications. One of the crucial challenges to increasing a government's transparency is defining a regulatory or legal framework that regulates its processes and allows the levels of transparency or corruption to be measured in its different departments. Thus instruments and metrics play a crucial role in monitoring the expected change. With direct application in the industry, a model is an essential step for fundamental transparency in electronic governments.

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Jumping the queue: Nepotism and public-sector pay

Cited by 13 publications

References 34 publications

Nepotism, political competition and overemployment

Nepotism, political competition and overemployment

Public-sector employment, wages and education decisions

Assessing Transparency in eGovernment Electronic Processes

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