Jurors and Juries

Greene, Edith; Chopra, Sonia R.; Penrod, Steven D.; Rose, V. Gordon; Schuller, Regina A.; Studebaker, Christina A.

doi:10.1007/0-306-47944-3_8

Cited by 8 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 164 publications

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“…It would be inappropriate to study real juries in real trial situations where the standard of proof was manipulated experimentally, as we did in the present study. Rather, we used the methodological procedures typical of experimental psychological research on jury decision-making (see Bornstein & Greene, 2011; Greene, Chopra & Kovera, 2002). Beyond this, we made a concerted effort to minimize the limitations of the method in several ways.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Instructions on reasonable doubt: Defining the standard of proof and the juror’s task.

Dhami¹,

Lundrigan²,

Mueller‐Johnson³

2015

Psychology, Public Policy, and Law

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Reasonable doubt (RD) is the standard of proof used in criminal trials. It is, however, a fuzzy concept in most jurors’ minds, and several jurisdictions have developed judicial instructions defining RD to help jurors understand and correctly apply the standard. We investigated the effectiveness of two instructions that have been used and challenged in the US (briefly RD is “proof that makes you willing to act”, and RD is “doubt that makes you hesitate to act’”. In order to describe and explain the effectiveness of these two instructions (i.e., abbreviated as “proof-willing” and “doubt-hesitate”), we used an experiment to isolate the effects of the precise language used in them (i.e., “willing to act”, “hesitate to act”, “proof”, and “doubt”). Two hundred mock jurors provided their quantitative interpretations of RD following one of four instructions (i.e., “doubt hesitate”, “proof-willing”, “doubt-willing”, and “proof-hesitate”). Participants had significantly lower interpretations of RD under the “doubt-hesitate” than “proof-willing” instruction. There was also greater inter-individual (i.e., across juror) variability and greater intra-individual (i.e., within-juror) variability in interpretations of RD under the “doubt-hesitate” instruction. Finally, there was also a significant interaction effect of the “proof v. doubt” language and the “willing v. hesitate to act” language on interpretations of RD. The “willing v. hesitate to act” language reduced the standard when it was used in combination with the word “doubt”. The present findings have implications for the study of how people understand and interpret standards of proof as well as the development of RD instructions.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Instructions on reasonable doubt: Defining the standard of proof and the juror’s task.

Dhami¹,

Lundrigan²,

Mueller‐Johnson³

2015

Psychology, Public Policy, and Law

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“…Indeed, outcomes tracked by the Bureau of Justice Statistics indicate that roughly 95% of both federal and state cases are disposed of via guilty plea rather than trial conviction (Pastore & Maguire, 2005). By contrast, the majority of research has focused on trial proceedings and jury or juror decision making (Devine, Clayton, Dunford, Seying, & Price, 2001; Greene et al, 2002; Kramer, Wolbransky, & Heilbrun, 2007), with less focus on the plea bargaining process and determinants of plea offers. Furthermore, although evidence plays an important role in prosecutorial decision making (Albonetti, 1987; Jacoby, Mellon, Ratledge, & Turner, 1982; Spohn & Holleran, 2001), the role of different types of evidence in prosecutors’ decisions at various stages of the plea bargaining process is unclear.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Does evidence really matter? An exploratory analysis of the role of evidence in plea bargaining in felony drug cases.

Kutateladze

Lawson

Andiloro³

2015

Law and Human Behavior

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The majority of cases in the United States are disposed of through plea bargaining; however, this important discretionary point has received relatively little attention from researchers compared with trial and jury proceedings, and other discretionary points such as arrest and sentencing. Additionally, although evidence is considered an important factor in determining case outcomes, its influence on prosecutors' decisions regarding plea offers is less clear. In this study, we examined the potential impact of evidentiary factors, as well as other legal and extralegal factors, on two plea bargaining decisions, plea-to-a-lesser-charge offers and sentence offers, using data on felony drug cases processed by the New York County District Attorney's office. We found that prosecutors made more punitive charge offers when they had audio/video evidence, eyewitness identification(s), prerecorded buy money used by an undercover officer in a buy-and-bust operation, or had recovered currency. Of all evidence factors analyzed, only the recovery of currency predicted sentence offers. By contrast, three other factors-defendants' detention status, the presence of multiple plea offers, and prior prison sentence-had a much greater impact on charge and sentence offers. Although additional research is needed, it is possible that evidence has a greater impact at the initial stages of a case, particularly on the decision about whether to accept a case for prosecution, than it does on subsequent prosecutorial decisions.

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“…Indeed, only one study to our knowledge has examined it. Conversely, a large and growing body of experimental research on mock jurors has demonstrated that jury verdicts can be readily influenced by manipulating the quantity or nature of the evidence presented, as well as by other non-evidentiary variables that ideally should have no impact (see Devine, Clayton, Dunford, Seying, & Pryce, 2001; Greene et al, 2002; Levett, Danielsen, Kovera, & Cutler, 2005 for reviews). The picture remains fuzzy, however, with regard to empirical relationships among strength of evidence (SOE), extraevidentiary variables, and verdicts outside the laboratory.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Strength of evidence, extraevidentiary influence, and the liberation hypothesis: Data from the field.

Devine¹,

Buddenbaum²,

Houp³

et al. 2009

Law and Human Behavior

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To examine relationships between strength of evidence (SOE) and extraevidentiary variables in the context of Kalven and Zeisel's (The American Jury, 1966) liberation hypothesis, post-trial questionnaire data were collected from judges, attorneys, and jurors associated with 179 criminal jury trials. SOE ratings were strongly correlated with jury verdicts on the three most serious charges against the defendant, and several extraevidentiary variables (i.e., pretrial publicity, trial complexity, charge severity, and foreperson demographics) were moderately correlated with verdicts. Extraevidentiary-verdict relationships remained significant when SOE was controlled, although extraevidentiary variables yielded only modest improvement in classification accuracy beyond SOE. In partial support of the liberation hypothesis, several case-related extraevidentiary variables were significantly related to jury verdicts only when the prosecution's evidence was rated as moderately strong.

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Jurors and Juries

Cited by 8 publications

References 164 publications

Instructions on reasonable doubt: Defining the standard of proof and the juror’s task.

Instructions on reasonable doubt: Defining the standard of proof and the juror’s task.

Does evidence really matter? An exploratory analysis of the role of evidence in plea bargaining in felony drug cases.

Strength of evidence, extraevidentiary influence, and the liberation hypothesis: Data from the field.

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