In this article, we use a Bourdieusian framework to theorize the relationship between cultural capital and legal consciousness, and in turn to consider how variation in legal consciousness contributes to the creation and maintenance of legal hegemony. We investigate how cultural capital shapes the ways people navigate situations that force them to mediate between state-conferred rights, on one hand, and requests from state authority, on the other. Specifically, we analyze open-ended responses to a series of vignettes about constitutional rights in the criminal procedure context. We find that high cultural capital gives rise to a greater sense of self-efficacy in police-citizen interactions. This finding parallels the literature on the influence of cultural capital in the education context and may point to a more general pattern of selfadvocacy within the juridical field. People with high cultural capital also evince a more salient sense of entitlement, understanding their own needs and desires as paramount. The social processes we identify may make people with limited cultural capital more vulnerable to investigative authority, and thus more susceptible to arrest and prosecution. Even if knowledge of a right and the opportunity to assert that right are equally distributed, meaningful access to that right remains inequitable.When courts hand down rulings about police-citizen encounters, they often assume that rights assertion is a straightforward matter: If a suspect does not want her home searched without a warrant, she can refuse. If a suspect would rather not tell police where he went last night, he need not speak to them. Courts tend to hold, either implicitly (e.g., United States v. Drayton [2002]) or explicitly (e.g., Salinas v. Texas [2013]) that the rights assertion playing field is level-that is, that the US Constitution affords everyone a meaningful chance to assert his or her rights.But as an empirical matter, we know little about this playing field. Do all innocent people feel equally enabled to assert their rights? What situational factors shape how people think about constitutional rights? Occasionally the Supreme Court has lamented this dearth of research. During oral argument in Brendlin v. California (2007), for example, Justice Stephen BreyerThe authors thank Rebecca Sandefur and two anonymous reviewers for their thoughtful feedback, David Sklansky and Robert Weisberg for discussions about the legal implications of this project, Emma Aulenback for her research assistance, and several instructors who generously allowed us to distribute surveys in their courses.Please direct all correspondence to Kathryne M. Young